Narrative:

In cruise at FL340 my first officer (first officer) noticed sparks coming from his windshield. They looked to me like very faint st. Elmos fire. I watched for a minute; then realizing we were in VMC I asked the first officer to get the QRH. The sparks ran the length of the bottom of the window and began climbing at a decent pace toward the top. Not wanting to find out what happens when the sparks got to the top of the window I shut off the right window heat. About that time the first officer located the QRH checklist for the window arcing. As he began to read it we heard a loud bang and noticed the rh windshield had completely shattered. The first officer began reading the windshield shatter checklist. While the first officer went through the checklist I took the radios and requested lower from ATC. With the first officer reading the checklist he was raising the cabin altitude and he got to a point that said crew and passenger oxygen... Confirm and on - if required.not wanting to be caught off guard in case this escalated any further the first officer and I put on our masks. The checklist then informed us to descent.... Initiate if required. ATC had still not allowed us to descend and it had felt like a few minutes. I then decided to declare an emergency as the safest course of action in my view was not to see a windshield take out my first officer. We started our way down to 8000 feet. On the way down we were able to read the QRH a second time through and were in agreement that this is the course of action we should be taking. We also discussed the memo that had been published just before this trip started. We could not remember the exact details of the memo and when it was valid to continue or when we should divert. We decided the best course was to head to a nearby airport; only 90NM away. The flight landed without other incident and taxied to the gate.suggestions: to start with; a complete overhaul of the 'window/windshield (arcing; ...') QRH checklist. To say that the checklist is vague in detail is only the beginning. As I had read the memo about the windshield I was aware there was more information out there on this issue. I was sure I had printed the memo off but was unable to locate it at the time. All I had to rely on was the QRH. That was the only piece of information that was operationally binding at the time that I could put my hands on. Even if I was able to recall the memos main points; it was a 3 page document that had instances where diversion was acceptable. It was safer to error on the side of the published document I had in my hand than some memo I only slightly recalled.in my conversation with a manager after the flight he informed me the flight could have continued if 6.2 psi differential; could have been maintained. He claims this usually occurs around FL320. As this is stated nowhere in the QRH or any document mandated to be on the aircraft at the time of my flight I find it hard to accept that continuing was a realistic option with 1:45 remaining. Our divert airport was very close and it had options for passengers and probably a plane we could swap to once we landed. The QRH does not state land at nearest suitable or continue on to destination. The first officer and I discussed other airports that where closer to us at the time of the incident but both agreed to land at the divert airport we decided on. I also recalled another airline 767 flight declaring an emergency and diverting about 6 months prior for the same issue. This was a logical decision and the safest one to be made. If the company wishes for a different outcome than this I suggest they do more than put out a memo. I have seen memos in the past delivered to my mailbox. Those memos have said on them to keep with us for reference. Or they should look at clarifying the QRH.to tell a pilot they made the incorrect decision by landing a broken plane at a safe airport; with options for the company to help passengers and deal with the aircraft when all the published company material on the plane leads them to that outcome is a bit unrealistic and sets a very bad precedent.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-900 Captain reported his First Officers windshield cracked in cruise at FL340. He decided to divert to a nearby airport and was criticized by manager for not continuing.

Narrative: In cruise at FL340 my First Officer (FO) noticed sparks coming from his windshield. They looked to me like very faint St. Elmos Fire. I watched for a minute; then realizing we were in VMC I asked the FO to get the QRH. The sparks ran the length of the bottom of the window and began climbing at a decent pace toward the top. Not wanting to find out what happens when the sparks got to the top of the window I shut off the right window heat. About that time the FO located the QRH checklist for the window arcing. As he began to read it we heard a loud bang and noticed the RH Windshield had completely shattered. The FO began reading the Windshield Shatter checklist. While the FO went through the checklist I took the radios and requested lower from ATC. With the FO reading the checklist he was raising the cabin altitude and he got to a point that said Crew and Passenger Oxygen... Confirm and ON - if required.Not wanting to be caught off guard in case this escalated any further the FO and I put on our masks. The checklist then informed us to Descent.... Initiate if required. ATC had still not allowed us to descend and it had felt like a few minutes. I then decided to declare an emergency as the safest course of action in my view was not to see a windshield take out my FO. We started our way down to 8000 feet. On the way down we were able to read the QRH a second time through and were in agreement that this is the course of action we should be taking. We also discussed the memo that had been published just before this trip started. We could not remember the exact details of the memo and when it was valid to continue or when we should divert. We decided the best course was to head to a nearby airport; only 90NM away. The flight landed without other incident and taxied to the gate.Suggestions: To start with; a complete overhaul of the 'Window/Windshield (Arcing; ...') QRH checklist. To say that the checklist is vague in detail is only the beginning. As I had read the memo about the windshield I was aware there was more information out there on this issue. I was sure I had printed the memo off but was unable to locate it at the time. All I had to rely on was the QRH. That was the only piece of information that was operationally binding at the time that I could put my hands on. Even if I was able to recall the memos main points; it was a 3 page document that had instances where diversion was acceptable. It was safer to error on the side of the published document I had in my hand than some memo I only slightly recalled.In my conversation with a manager after the flight he informed me the flight could have continued if 6.2 PSI Differential; could have been maintained. He claims this usually occurs around FL320. As this is stated nowhere in the QRH or any document mandated to be on the aircraft at the time of my flight I find it hard to accept that continuing was a realistic option with 1:45 remaining. Our divert airport was very close and it had options for passengers and probably a plane we could swap to once we landed. The QRH does not state land at nearest suitable or continue on to destination. The FO and I discussed other airports that where closer to us at the time of the incident but both agreed to land at the divert airport we decided on. I also recalled another airline 767 flight declaring an emergency and diverting about 6 months prior for the same issue. This was a logical decision and the safest one to be made. If the company wishes for a different outcome than this I suggest they do more than put out a memo. I have seen memos in the past delivered to my mailbox. Those memos have said on them to keep with us for reference. Or they should look at clarifying the QRH.To tell a pilot they made the incorrect decision by landing a broken plane at a safe airport; with options for the company to help passengers and deal with the aircraft when all the published company material on the plane leads them to that outcome is a bit unrealistic and sets a very bad precedent.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.