Narrative:

We were level at 6;000 feet; in IMC; and being vectored northwest of airport; eventually planning to land south. Approximately 10-12 minutes before landing; fluctuations were observed on the #1 engine vibration indicator and vibrations were felt from the flight deck.with the situation persisting; the first officer (first officer) pilot monitoring (pm) looked up the engine vibration checklist in the QRH; but quickly accessing the page was problematic as he noticed the engine/APU table of contents referenced the incorrect page for the vibration checklist (after the flight it was discovered that the engines/APU table of contents page was incorrectly dated.) in very short time; the engine vibration/noise became much worse. With first officer concurrence; the #1 engine throttle was brought to idle then; after a short period of time; power was slowly brought up; but the vibration indications increased and the engine did not sound normal. I called for the engine shutdown checklist and an emergency was declared with approach as we started on downwind. Just prior to the fuel lever being placed to cutoff; I noticed the engine 1 oil filter bypass light on the upper du blink momentarily. The engine shutdown checklist was completed. We were turned onto a 14 mile final; were quickly established on the glideslope; and broke out of the clouds. The winds were out of the south; no more than 5 knots with light rain. Landing was uneventful with a weight of about 135;000 pounds and maximum brakes selected. We turned off with no further assistance needed. As we taxied to gate under our own power; I asked the first officer to call operations and inform them that we would be arriving at the gate with #2 engine running until parked. I was concerned about ramp personnel approaching the right side of the aircraft when they are accustomed to the #2 engine normally being shut down. After the flight; we had time to talk to the flight attendants and explain what happened. Because of the high workload in the approach environment prior to landing; we did not have time to brief the flight attendants regarding the engine being shut down. They had felt the vibration and mentioned that passengers had observed sparks and/or a flame coming from the back of the left engine. Our lead flight attendant had also noticed the same.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 flight crew reported they shut #1 engine down in descent for landing because of excessive vibration.

Narrative: We were level at 6;000 feet; in IMC; and being vectored northwest of airport; eventually planning to land south. Approximately 10-12 minutes before landing; fluctuations were observed on the #1 engine vibration indicator and vibrations were felt from the flight deck.With the situation persisting; the First Officer (FO) Pilot Monitoring (PM) looked up the Engine Vibration checklist in the QRH; but quickly accessing the page was problematic as he noticed the Engine/APU table of contents referenced the incorrect page for the Vibration checklist (after the flight it was discovered that the Engines/APU table of contents page was incorrectly dated.) In very short time; the engine vibration/noise became much worse. With FO concurrence; the #1 engine throttle was brought to idle then; after a short period of time; power was slowly brought up; but the vibration indications increased and the engine did not sound normal. I called for the Engine Shutdown checklist and an emergency was declared with approach as we started on downwind. Just prior to the fuel lever being placed to cutoff; I noticed the ENG 1 Oil Filter Bypass light on the upper DU blink momentarily. The Engine Shutdown checklist was completed. We were turned onto a 14 mile final; were quickly established on the glideslope; and broke out of the clouds. The winds were out of the south; no more than 5 knots with light rain. Landing was uneventful with a weight of about 135;000 pounds and MAX brakes selected. We turned off with no further assistance needed. As we taxied to gate under our own power; I asked the FO to call operations and inform them that we would be arriving at the gate with #2 engine running until parked. I was concerned about ramp personnel approaching the right side of the aircraft when they are accustomed to the #2 engine normally being shut down. After the flight; we had time to talk to the flight attendants and explain what happened. Because of the high workload in the approach environment prior to landing; we did not have time to brief the flight attendants regarding the engine being shut down. They had felt the vibration and mentioned that passengers had observed sparks and/or a flame coming from the back of the left engine. Our lead FA had also noticed the same.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.