Narrative:

We picked up the aircraft and there was a mel 32. Which is alternate anti-skid valve inoperative. As part of procedure the gear pins must be installed and they were installed and removed as part of the maintenance procedure for the mel. We were concerned and called dispatch about a mel 32-10....and found that that was reference to the master mel and everyone felt confident to go as planned. However we had an anti-skid light inoperative which I mistakenly assumed was caused from the alternate anti-skid vale being inoperative. Takeoff conditions and arrival conditions were basically clear with dry runways. However when we touched down the speed brakes would not are and that when the entire event came in focus. While doing the maintenance procedure for mel 32-7 there is a step that if the brakes are not working manually the anti-skid breakers must be pulled. And they were. Which of course made the anti-skid system inoperative; once the breakers are pulled then the procedures for anti-skid system inoperative should have been done; which they were not. The flight was actually not dispatchable in its condition. When we got to the gate I went for a walk to filter through things and called dispatch once again and we got tulsa tech on the line. We called maintenance out and performed the steps outlined for mel 32-7. As part of the procedure the breakers for anti-skid must be in; so we reset them. Upon performing the manual brake test found them to work fine. At that point the procedure is complete.I read through the procedure for maintenance three times before I caught what happened. I think that if the procedure was broken down into two parts in the mel instead of all run together this could have been avoided. We operate in a time critical environment and it was not until I forced myself to go line by line that I got everything correct. The dispatcher also was having trouble discerning it. Also I should have caught it the anti-skid inoperative light....I made an assumption rather than just taking what I had in front of me as its own problem. Much confusion as the anti-skid was inoperative only because the circuit breakers were pulled.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-800 flight crew reported they did not properly conform to an MEL because they had difficulty understanding it.

Narrative: We picked up the aircraft and there was a mel 32. Which is alternate anti-skid valve inoperative. As part of procedure the gear pins must be installed and they were installed and removed as part of the maintenance procedure for the mel. We were concerned and called dispatch about a mel 32-10....and found that that was reference to the master mel and everyone felt confident to go as planned. However we had an anti-skid light inoperative which I mistakenly assumed was caused from the alternate anti-skid vale being inoperative. Takeoff conditions and arrival conditions were basically clear with dry runways. However when we touched down the speed brakes would not are and that when the entire event came in focus. While doing the maintenance procedure for mel 32-7 there is a step that if the brakes are not working manually the anti-skid breakers must be pulled. And they were. Which of course made the anti-skid system inoperative; once the breakers are pulled then the procedures for anti-skid system inoperative should have been done; which they were not. The flight was actually not dispatchable in its condition. When we got to the gate I went for a walk to filter through things and called dispatch once again and we got Tulsa tech on the line. We called maintenance out and performed the steps outlined for mel 32-7. As part of the procedure the breakers for anti-skid must be in; so we reset them. Upon performing the manual brake test found them to work fine. At that point the procedure is complete.I read through the procedure for maintenance three times before I caught what happened. I think that if the procedure was broken down into two parts in the mel instead of all run together this could have been avoided. We operate in a time critical environment and it was not until I forced myself to go line by line that I got everything correct. The dispatcher also was having trouble discerning it. Also I should have caught it the anti-skid inoperative light....I made an assumption rather than just taking what I had in front of me as its own problem. Much confusion as the anti-skid was inoperative only because the circuit breakers were pulled.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.