Narrative:

I was asked to help out and was told to operate a ferry flight/positioning to ZZZ then pick up the normal scheduled flight sequence. It was the middle of peak and all hands on deck was the call as my first officer (first officer) was on temporary duty (tdy). We departed without incident and were approaching TOD; we had already briefed our arrival and approach; when we received an ACARS message along the lines of; 'heads up; contingency is thinking of sending you direct to ZZZ1.' not much we can do at this point; other than start preparing just in case. We divided up tasks to get current weather; airport operations; approaches...as ZZZ1 wasn't even an alternate for our flight. (I should have realized something was up by this...) shortly; we received a release diverting us to ZZZ1 that said; I'm not kidding; 'divert ZZZ1 - as soon as possible' I'll return to this point later. If you have ever been in the cockpit during one of these magic sleigh re-route adventures; you know how busy things get; very quickly. I divided up duties further; and asserted as flying pilot that I would continue to maintain control of the aircraft. I also said that we were not going to rush; we would take as much time as we needed to accomplish what we needed to do; to safely complete the flight. Two issues came up immediately: first there is no digital ATIS for ZZZ1. They only have an audio AWOS with an added voice recording at the end with runway and NOTAM information. The problem here was that we could hear that an ILS was (out of service) OTS; but could not hear what runway was affected. This required one of us to listen to the broadcast 8-10 times. The second issue was the receipt of numerous ACARS messages with full aam data; weather; NOTAMS along with the release. Keep in mind also; this is on an old; legacy version of the ACARS system. As we notified ATC of our request to divert and simultaneously started our descent we began to program the FMC and request arrival information from center. ZZZ1 was landing runway 23L and 23R and initially set up for the ILS 23L. Our next issue was the realization that the ILS that was notamed out was the only available precision approach for runways 23L/right; only RNAV approaches were being flown. Quite honestly; I started preparing to brief the RNAV approach because it was the only available approach in the FMC and I rarely fly the B757; but my very sharp first officer reminded; 'hey captain dummy; we can't fly an RNAV approach in the B757.' this caused us to scratch our heads and ponder; 'well; now what?' at this point; I believe we were approaching level at 4;000 feet right on top of a cloud deck; and I asked the first officer to request some vectors so we could prepare for some kind of approach. Around this time an ATC supervisor came on frequency asking what was going on and did we require assistance. I responded that we were unable to shoot the requested RNAV approach and needed a few minutes to figure out our next plan. His comment was; 'ok; I just need to know if we need to launch the fighters.' his tone was not kidding. When we requested the vector; ATC initially gave us a descent to 3;000 feet. I requested to stay at 4;000 feet on top of the cloud deck; as light to moderate icing was reported to us by ATC between 2;000 feet and below 4;000 feet. At this point we found that there was an NDB approach jepp database. Quite honestly again; I wasn't sure we were legal to shoot an NDB in the B757. Now; someone may find a box checked somewhere in my training records contradicting me; but I have no recollection of ever flying an NDB approach in the B757. (In fact; I can't recall in how many years it has been since I have flown an NDB approach; but more than 10 years; I guess.) my thought process was; the approach isn't in the FMS database; we only have one NDB nav radio on the B757; who knows when I last flew one. I decided to contact dispatch and check with them. Once talking to dispatch and explaining the situation I was told to just descend to pick up the airport visually. I re-checked with ATC and was told the weather was 1;500 feet AGL overcast and the lowest they could descend us was 2;500 feet AGL. When I relayed this to dispatch I was told that they were showing 1;900 feet overcast as if that solved the problem. I was then told to just fly the ILS to runway 5 and circle to land. Wonderful option at night against airport traffic flow; I checked the ILS frequency and it is the same for both runways; so I did not know if it was working (i.e. Transmitter problem). We asked ATC if the ILS could be used to runway 5. While this was being checked; I asked my first officer if he would be comfortable based on the weather conditions; if needed; that we fly the NDB and he said he was comfortable. Based on our comfort in flying the approach; I asked dispatch to confirm that we were legal to fly an NDB approach. (After landing I reviewed our manual and am confident that our procedures do in fact allow us to legally fly an NDB approach. I also realized that the database only presents the ILS approach in this situation which is why the NDB 23L was not available. Interestingly; a review of the ILS; RNAV and NDB for 23L show somewhat similar approaches; other than that each has a different inbound course and both the ILS and RNAV depict a standard 3.0 degree descent profile; while the NDB depicts a 3.11 degree descent profile.) at this point ATC said they would swap the airport around and allow us to shoot the ILS 05R if we were comfortable landing with a 5 knot tailwind. We had not asked for this; but felt it was indeed the safest option. I ended the call with dispatch without getting an answer on the legality of shooting an NDB approach with one NDB nav radio in the B757. We landed without incident and I estimate the 'delay' in the arrival talking with dispatch was around 5 minutes. Upon taxi-in we were asked by ramp control to stop on the active taxiway as they were having difficulty parking another aircraft. After about 10 minutes we taxied in and parked. I quickly opened the door to our empty containers and to find out what the urgency was and where we were going next (remember we were told 'as soon as possible' on our release...). The answer was; 'you are going to sit here for 2 hours and operate the scheduled flight back to base.' where is the risk assessment analysis being done on this type of decision making within our operation? 1) re-dispatching close to TOD into an airport that was not a part of the original flight release. 2) no opportunity to realistically review normal pre-planning documentation to an airport without an operational precision approach (for current operations) or FMS approach. 3) expecting the crew to process and review weather; NOTAMS and full aam data; while in a descent; heads down reading the ACARS screen because there is no printer; in other words; you get to read something once because it's almost impossible to go back and cross check something. 4) figuring (eventually) that it's all legal because an NDB is available; (I do not believe that contingency or dispatch realized that the only approach we were being sent to use was the NDB until after I called; they had no idea until it became the third option they suggested) 5) allowing a single navigation-head NDB approach knowing full well the crew hasn't done one in a very long time 6) a complete lack of understanding; or concern; how this type of operation impacts ATC workload as well as security issues (at least they didn't launch the fighters). And finally; 7) what idiot in contingency thinks it is a good idea to tell dispatch to divert an airborne aircraft 'as soon as possible'??? Several years ago we used as standard practice; re-dispatching aircraft at any point during a flight. It was so bad that crews were receiving ACARS re releases at 500 feet on final to land in the busy ny-phl-D.C. Corridor for example. After much work by the safety committee; it was recognized that this was unsafe (and probably a violation of far 121.542) and the practice by and large stopped. While there are obviously situations where it is safe and prudent to re-dispatch an aircraft enroute; it is also logical that some situations should require an additional level of risk assessment before contacting the crew. I would hate to think that if faced with a similar situation; that a captain; declines the release because s/he is not confident that the folks on the ground have done everything necessary to ensure that the changed plan is safe and prudent...instead of just economically desirable.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 Captain on a ferry flight; reports being diverted by his company for operational reasons near the TOD point. With little time to prepare; it is discovered that the divert field's ILS is out of service and his B757 is not currently allowed to fly RNAV approaches; leaving an NDB approach. ATC agrees to turn the airport around and allow an ILS to the opposite runway with a 5 knot tailwind. After block-in it is learned that the next flight segment does not depart for two hours.

Narrative: I was asked to help out and was told to operate a ferry flight/positioning to ZZZ then pick up the normal scheduled flight sequence. It was the middle of peak and all hands on deck was the call as my First Officer (FO) was on temporary duty (TDY). We departed without incident and were approaching TOD; we had already briefed our arrival and approach; when we received an ACARS message along the lines of; 'Heads up; Contingency is thinking of sending you direct to ZZZ1.' Not much we can do at this point; other than start preparing just in case. We divided up tasks to get current weather; airport operations; approaches...as ZZZ1 wasn't even an alternate for our flight. (I should have realized something was up by this...) Shortly; we received a Release diverting us to ZZZ1 that said; I'm not kidding; 'Divert ZZZ1 - ASAP' I'll return to this point later. If you have ever been in the cockpit during one of these Magic Sleigh Re-route Adventures; you know how busy things get; very quickly. I divided up duties further; and asserted as Flying Pilot that I would continue to maintain control of the aircraft. I also said that we were not going to rush; we would take as much time as we needed to accomplish what we needed to do; to safely complete the flight. Two issues came up immediately: First there is no digital ATIS for ZZZ1. They only have an audio AWOS with an added voice recording at the end with runway and NOTAM information. The problem here was that we could hear that an ILS was (out of service) OTS; but could not hear what runway was affected. This required one of us to listen to the broadcast 8-10 times. The second issue was the receipt of numerous ACARS messages with full AAM data; weather; NOTAMS along with the Release. Keep in mind also; this is on an old; legacy version of the ACARS system. As we notified ATC of our request to divert and simultaneously started our descent we began to program the FMC and request arrival information from Center. ZZZ1 was landing runway 23L and 23R and initially set up for the ILS 23L. Our next issue was the realization that the ILS that was NOTAMed out was the only available precision approach for runways 23L/R; only RNAV approaches were being flown. Quite honestly; I started preparing to brief the RNAV approach because it was the only available approach in the FMC and I rarely fly the B757; but my very sharp FO reminded; 'Hey Captain Dummy; we can't fly an RNAV approach in the B757.' This caused us to scratch our heads and ponder; 'Well; now what?' At this point; I believe we were approaching level at 4;000 feet right on top of a cloud deck; and I asked the FO to request some vectors so we could prepare for some kind of approach. Around this time an ATC Supervisor came on frequency asking what was going on and did we require assistance. I responded that we were unable to shoot the requested RNAV approach and needed a few minutes to figure out our next plan. His comment was; 'OK; I just need to know if we need to launch the fighters.' His tone was not kidding. When we requested the vector; ATC initially gave us a descent to 3;000 feet. I requested to stay at 4;000 feet on top of the cloud deck; as light to moderate icing was reported to us by ATC between 2;000 feet and below 4;000 feet. At this point we found that there was an NDB approach Jepp database. Quite honestly again; I wasn't sure we were legal to shoot an NDB in the B757. Now; someone may find a box checked somewhere in my training records contradicting me; but I have no recollection of ever flying an NDB approach in the B757. (In fact; I can't recall in how many years it has been since I have flown an NDB approach; but more than 10 years; I guess.) My thought process was; the approach isn't in the FMS database; we only have one NDB nav radio on the B757; who knows when I last flew one. I decided to contact Dispatch and check with them. Once talking to Dispatch and explaining the situation I was told to just descend to pick up the airport visually. I re-checked with ATC and was told the weather was 1;500 feet AGL overcast and the lowest they could descend us was 2;500 feet AGL. When I relayed this to Dispatch I was told that they were showing 1;900 feet overcast as if that solved the problem. I was then told to just fly the ILS to Runway 5 and circle to land. Wonderful option at night against airport traffic flow; I checked the ILS frequency and it is the same for both runways; so I did not know if it was working (i.e. transmitter problem). We asked ATC if the ILS could be used to runway 5. While this was being checked; I asked my FO if he would be comfortable based on the weather conditions; if needed; that we fly the NDB and he said he was comfortable. Based on our comfort in flying the approach; I asked Dispatch to confirm that we were legal to fly an NDB approach. (After landing I reviewed our manual and am confident that our procedures do in fact allow us to legally fly an NDB approach. I also realized that the database only presents the ILS approach in this situation which is why the NDB 23L was not available. Interestingly; a review of the ILS; RNAV and NDB for 23L show somewhat similar approaches; other than that each has a different inbound course and both the ILS and RNAV depict a standard 3.0 degree descent profile; while the NDB depicts a 3.11 degree descent profile.) At this point ATC said they would swap the airport around and allow us to shoot the ILS 05R if we were comfortable landing with a 5 knot tailwind. We had not asked for this; but felt it was indeed the safest option. I ended the call with Dispatch without getting an answer on the legality of shooting an NDB approach with one NDB nav radio in the B757. We landed without incident and I estimate the 'delay' in the arrival talking with Dispatch was around 5 minutes. Upon taxi-in we were asked by ramp control to stop on the active taxiway as they were having difficulty parking another aircraft. After about 10 minutes we taxied in and parked. I quickly opened the door to our empty containers and to find out what the urgency was and where we were going next (remember we were told 'ASAP' on our Release...). The answer was; 'You are going to sit here for 2 hours and operate the scheduled flight back to base.' Where is the Risk Assessment Analysis being done on this type of decision making within our operation? 1) Re-dispatching close to TOD into an airport that was not a part of the original flight release. 2) No opportunity to realistically review normal pre-planning documentation to an airport without an operational precision approach (for current operations) or FMS approach. 3) Expecting the crew to process and review weather; NOTAMS and full AAM data; while in a descent; heads down reading the ACARS screen because there is no printer; in other words; you get to read something once because it's almost impossible to go back and cross check something. 4) figuring (eventually) that it's all legal because an NDB is available; (I do not believe that Contingency or Dispatch realized that the only approach we were being sent to use was the NDB until after I called; they had no idea until it became the third option they suggested) 5) allowing a single NAV-head NDB approach knowing full well the crew hasn't done one in a very long time 6) a complete lack of understanding; or concern; how this type of operation impacts ATC workload as well as security issues (at least they didn't launch the fighters). And finally; 7) what IDIOT in Contingency thinks it is a good idea to tell Dispatch to divert an airborne aircraft 'ASAP'??? Several years ago we used as standard practice; re-dispatching aircraft at any point during a flight. It was so bad that crews were receiving ACARS Re releases at 500 feet on final to land in the busy NY-PHL-D.C. corridor for example. After much work by the Safety Committee; it was recognized that this was unsafe (and probably a violation of FAR 121.542) and the practice by and large stopped. While there are obviously situations where it is safe and prudent to re-dispatch an aircraft enroute; it is also logical that some situations should require an additional level of risk assessment before contacting the crew. I would hate to think that if faced with a similar situation; that a Captain; declines the Release because s/he is not confident that the folks on the ground have done everything necessary to ensure that the changed plan is safe and prudent...instead of just economically desirable.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.