Narrative:

On departure we were issued an RNAV departure from runway 16 left. To the best of my recollection we were climbing via the SID and contacted departure control. Shortly after contacting departure control we were cleared to 'climb and maintain' an altitude above the climb via profile restrictions. I was the PF (pilot flying) and followed the SOP in selecting the new altitude. Since it was a 'climb and maintain' clearance I confirmed with the first officer (first officer) and he agreed that we did not have to comply with the climb via altitude restrictions.I do not recall being advised that we had missed any of the altitude restrictions on the SID. Unfortunately the intervening period between the event and the many other flights leaves me at a loss to recall in more detail the specific particulars of this alleged incident. Because of the relative newness of the climb via procedures I am very cautious to confirm that the FMS indicates climb and that the restrictions are still present on the nd and the mcdu. This is part of our airbus cami (confirm; monitor; activate; intervene) procedures. Cami procedures were implemented in order to ameliorate the profound deficiencies of the airbus vertical navigation system. If such an event occurred and I were advised of its occurrence at the time I probably would have been able to make such determination to the cause. We are required; by company procedures; to use level 4 automation as much as possible. Many times the automation is wholly inadequate (specifically the vertical navigation component) and safety in compromised because the automation does not perform as expected. At this point the automation becomes a distraction and does not enhance safety but actually compromises it.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An A319 Captain was apparently notified after the fact that an RNAV 'Climb Via' constraint was not met. He describes his uncertainty about the event as well as his lack of confidence in the Airbus vertical navigation system.

Narrative: On departure we were issued an RNAV departure from Runway 16 left. To the best of my recollection we were climbing via the SID and contacted departure control. Shortly after contacting departure control we were cleared to 'climb and maintain' an altitude above the climb via profile restrictions. I was the PF (pilot flying) and followed the SOP in selecting the new altitude. Since it was a 'climb and maintain' clearance I confirmed with the First Officer (FO) and he agreed that we did not have to comply with the climb via altitude restrictions.I do not recall being advised that we had missed any of the altitude restrictions on the SID. Unfortunately the intervening period between the event and the many other flights leaves me at a loss to recall in more detail the specific particulars of this alleged incident. Because of the relative newness of the Climb Via procedures I am very cautious to confirm that the FMS indicates CLB and that the restrictions are still present on the ND and the MCDU. This is part of our Airbus CAMI (Confirm; Monitor; Activate; Intervene) procedures. CAMI procedures were implemented in order to ameliorate the profound deficiencies of the Airbus vertical navigation system. If such an event occurred and I were advised of its occurrence at the time I probably would have been able to make such determination to the cause. We are required; by company procedures; to use Level 4 automation as much as possible. Many times the automation is wholly inadequate (specifically the vertical navigation component) and safety in compromised because the automation does not perform as expected. At this point the automation becomes a distraction and does not enhance safety but actually compromises it.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.