Narrative:

I was the relief pilot. I had come off of my rest break; received a briefing from the captain and then the captain went on break. We were east of 50W; established on nat track U when we got a master caution EICAS message: right strut duct leak with right engine bleed and right pack off sub messages. I ran the checklist from the QRH. We called the captain back to the flight deck and briefed him on the situation. A satcom call was established to dispatch and we eventually had dispatch; maintenance control and a duty manager on the line. The satcom call worked well initially but then dropped several times making communications very lengthy and cumbersome. Discussions ensued regarding ETOPS legality; suitable diversion airports and; ultimately; our plan of action. We were not in ETOPS airspace at the time the strut leak occurred. However; by the time we ran the checklist; discussed the situation with dispatch; maintenance; and amongst ourselves; we were well into ETOPS airspace. The checklist states; 'avoid icing conditions.' this was of particular concern because we were in the dead of winter over the north atlantic and the entire east coast of north america was experiencing a winter storm. Gander (cyqx) was the only suitable alternate behind us. My main concern was a situation where we would to need to descend while on the nat due to pressurization or engine issues. In this scenario we might well find ourselves in icing conditions for an extended period of time. Ultimately; the decision was made to continue to destination with a suitable enroute alternate (without icing) at lpla (lajes). Later in the flight we received an ACARS message from dispatch suggesting a diversion to ZZZZ (clear wx) as our destination was now experiencing and expecting icing conditions for our time of arrival. We were told that there would be an airplane available in ZZZZ to take our passengers on (not true). We then coordinated the diversion with shannon control and eventually landed there. I felt as though dispatch; maintenance control and a duty manager were pushing us to continue. In retrospect; I don't feel like any of the aforementioned parties had the whole picture/situation. I found the FM and QRH to be deficient in helping us determine 'what happens' when a strut duct leak is detected. I.e. What valves close etc. I eventually found information that confirmed my thoughts that we would not have engine a/I available in this situation (maintenance control insisted we would). The QRH should state; 'flight into icing conditions prohibited'; rather than; 'avoid icing conditions.' the latter does not convey the gravity of the condition. I also found the fom to be deficient in referencing a 'short list' of items needed for ETOPS entry (not dispatch/flight planning but actual real world entry).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B767 flight crew experiences an 'R STRUT DUCT LEAK' EICAS message entering the North Atlantic Track (NAT) eastbound. The QRH advises to remain clear of icing and a major snowstorm is impacting the Northeastern U.S. and by the time consultation with the company is complete the best choice is to press on with a new alternate. Destination weather deteriorates and a diversion to an ice free alternate is executed.

Narrative: I was the Relief Pilot. I had come off of my rest break; received a briefing from the Captain and then the Captain went on break. We were East of 50W; established on NAT track U when we got a master caution EICAS message: R STRUT DUCT LEAK with R ENGINE BLEED and R PACK OFF sub messages. I ran the checklist from the QRH. We called the Captain back to the flight deck and briefed him on the situation. A satcom call was established to dispatch and we eventually had dispatch; Maintenance Control and a Duty Manager on the line. The satcom call worked well initially but then dropped several times making communications very lengthy and cumbersome. Discussions ensued regarding ETOPS legality; suitable diversion airports and; ultimately; our plan of action. We were not in ETOPS airspace at the time the strut leak occurred. However; by the time we ran the checklist; discussed the situation with dispatch; maintenance; and amongst ourselves; we were well into ETOPS airspace. The checklist states; 'Avoid Icing Conditions.' This was of particular concern because we were in the dead of winter over the North Atlantic and the entire East coast of North America was experiencing a winter storm. Gander (CYQX) was the only suitable alternate behind us. My main concern was a situation where we would to need to descend while on the NAT due to pressurization or engine issues. In this scenario we might well find ourselves in icing conditions for an extended period of time. Ultimately; the decision was made to continue to destination with a suitable enroute alternate (without icing) at LPLA (Lajes). Later in the flight we received an ACARS message from dispatch suggesting a diversion to ZZZZ (clear wx) as our destination was now experiencing and expecting icing conditions for our time of arrival. We were told that there would be an airplane available in ZZZZ to take our passengers on (not true). We then coordinated the diversion with Shannon Control and eventually landed there. I felt as though dispatch; Maintenance Control and a Duty Manager were pushing us to continue. In retrospect; I don't feel like any of the aforementioned parties had the whole picture/situation. I found the FM and QRH to be deficient in helping us determine 'what happens' when a Strut Duct Leak is detected. i.e. what valves close etc. I eventually found information that confirmed my thoughts that we would not have engine A/I available in this situation (Maintenance Control insisted we would). The QRH should state; 'Flight into icing conditions PROHIBITED'; rather than; 'Avoid Icing Conditions.' The latter does not convey the gravity of the condition. I also found the FOM to be deficient in referencing a 'short list' of items needed for ETOPS entry (not dispatch/flight planning but actual real world entry).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.