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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1231914 |
Time | |
Date | 201501 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Parked |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence |
Narrative:
Upon driving to the airport; I noticed that it was starting to lightly snow. I looked my release on my phone and noticed that the dispatcher planned us to operate the flight with enough fuel to land with approximately 2500-2600 pounds. I also noted that there was only 76 pounds of fuel in extra. I called the dispatcher and said we were going to have to raise the fuel so we would have enough to deice. After some discussion; he raised my taxi fuel to 500 pounds and extra to 100 pounds. That was sufficient since it was a slow period for ramp operations at that time. We also had a discussion about a new policy where dispatch is to not put fuel in the extra column. I explained to him that without fuel in the extra column of the release; it is impossible to leave the gate legally unless you are over-fueled. We need that gas to start engines as well as run the APU during boarding at the many stations that don't hook up ground power. He just said that is changing and to deal with it and to email my chief pilot. After arriving at the airport and looking at the release a little closer; I noticed that at our arrival time at destination the taf at that time showed 008OVC up until XA00Z and then improving to 020OVC. It was currently 006OVC; lower than the taf indicated. I called the dispatcher back and requested an alternate. He then proceeded to argue with me that I didn't need it. I explained that; while 020OVC technically didn't require an alternate; I thought it a prudent idea. The weather in the mountains is fairly unpredictable; especially in the winter and at night; the taf's change often. If the taf didn't hold up; I would have zero options. In hindsight; the taf required an alternate since we were within the '+/- 2 hours' part of the regulation requiring one. An hour prior showed 008OVC. The dispatcher continued to argue with me. I inquired about gjt or dro. He told me he couldn't because their weather was too low. I told him that he was making my point for me. After several minutes of back and forth and arguing; he said something like 'fine. I'll show airport ZZZ but you are wasting a ton of fuel and you can explain to the two people you are going to have to kick off.' I thanked him and hung up. As we pushed back; we saw the taf change to show 004 ovc. As we flew to airport ZZZ1; we listened to the AWOS continuously. The weather continued to deteriorate. By the time we hit the FAF for the ILS 17; the AWOS called for 002OVC and 3/4sm. When we landed it was at 1/2sm. I just happened to see the runway a split second before the first officer started to call the missed approach. The threats here as I see it; are the fuel policy and dispatch. When pilots call and request fuel for good reasons; we should not have to plead and argue with a dispatcher that wants to dictate the flight to the crew; as opposed to working with the crew to operate the flight safely and legally. I feel the only reason I got the fuel I got from the dispatcher was because I refused to hang up the phone until he did it. I should not be made to feel guilty and use passengers as leverage to not take fuel when necessary. I also should not have to argue if we are truly using the 'most conservative approach prevails' policy. I had valid reasons why the fuel was necessary; that should have been the end of the discussion. If I had let the dispatcher have his way; I would have arrived at ZZZ for an ILS with a decent chance at a missed approach and nowhere to go. I would have landed at our alternate with less than 100 pounds; I avoided an undesired aircraft state because I stood my ground. What would have happened if it were another captain that is more easily persuaded.the company needs to revise their policies on putting the absolute minimum gas on flights. Too often; dispatchers will want us to drop holding fuel before takeoff if taxiing gets too tight; or other measures to trim the gas. While I understand the intent of what they are trying to accomplish; why put the flight crew in a position of painting ourselves into a corner before we even leave the ground. While we have many fantastic dispatchers; we need to rid ourselves of the philosophy that some have where dispatch dictates terms on a release and we are to just be happy and fly it. When a PIC has a legitimate concern; the most conservative approach prevails.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: EMB145 Captain reports having to cajole his Dispatcher into providing enough fuel to safely fly his flight to an IMC destination.
Narrative: Upon driving to the airport; I noticed that it was starting to lightly snow. I looked my release on my phone and noticed that the dispatcher planned us to operate the flight with enough fuel to land with approximately 2500-2600 pounds. I also noted that there was only 76 pounds of fuel in EXTRA. I called the dispatcher and said we were going to have to raise the fuel so we would have enough to deice. After some discussion; he raised my TAXI fuel to 500 pounds and EXTRA to 100 pounds. That was sufficient since it was a slow period for ramp operations at that time. We also had a discussion about a new policy where dispatch is to not put fuel in the EXTRA column. I explained to him that without fuel in the EXTRA column of the release; it is impossible to leave the gate legally unless you are over-fueled. We need that gas to start engines as well as run the APU during boarding at the many stations that don't hook up ground power. He just said that is changing and to deal with it and to email my chief pilot. After arriving at the airport and looking at the release a little closer; I noticed that at our arrival time at destination the TAF at that time showed 008OVC up until XA00Z and then improving to 020OVC. It was currently 006OVC; lower than the TAF indicated. I called the dispatcher back and requested an alternate. He then proceeded to argue with me that I didn't need it. I explained that; while 020OVC technically didn't require an alternate; I thought it a prudent idea. The weather in the mountains is fairly unpredictable; especially in the winter and at night; the TAF's change often. If the TAF didn't hold up; I would have ZERO options. In hindsight; the TAF required an alternate since we were within the '+/- 2 hours' part of the regulation requiring one. An hour prior showed 008OVC. The dispatcher continued to argue with me. I inquired about GJT or DRO. He told me he couldn't because their weather was too low. I told him that he was making my point for me. After several minutes of back and forth and arguing; he said something like 'Fine. I'll show Airport ZZZ but you are wasting a ton of fuel and you can explain to the two people you are going to have to kick off.' I thanked him and hung up. As we pushed back; we saw the TAF change to show 004 OVC. As we flew to Airport ZZZ1; we listened to the AWOS continuously. The weather continued to deteriorate. By the time we hit the FAF for the ILS 17; the AWOS called for 002OVC and 3/4sm. When we landed it was at 1/2sm. I just happened to see the runway a split second before the First Officer started to call the missed approach. The threats here as I see it; are the fuel policy and dispatch. When pilots call and request fuel for good reasons; we should not have to plead and argue with a dispatcher that wants to dictate the flight to the crew; as opposed to working with the crew to operate the flight safely and legally. I feel the only reason I got the fuel I got from the dispatcher was because I refused to hang up the phone until he did it. I should not be made to feel guilty and use passengers as leverage to not take fuel when necessary. I also should not have to argue if we are truly using the 'most conservative approach prevails' policy. I had valid reasons why the fuel was necessary; that should have been the end of the discussion. If I had let the dispatcher have his way; I would have arrived at ZZZ for an ILS with a decent chance at a missed approach and nowhere to go. I would have landed at our alternate with less than 100 pounds; I avoided an undesired aircraft state because I stood my ground. What would have happened if it were another captain that is more easily persuaded.The company needs to revise their policies on putting the absolute minimum gas on flights. Too often; dispatchers will want us to drop holding fuel before takeoff if taxiing gets too tight; or other measures to trim the gas. While I understand the intent of what they are trying to accomplish; why put the flight crew in a position of painting ourselves into a corner before we even leave the ground. While we have many fantastic dispatchers; we need to rid ourselves of the philosophy that some have where dispatch dictates terms on a release and we are to just be happy and fly it. When a PIC has a legitimate concern; the most conservative approach prevails.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.