Narrative:

During descent at approximately 20;000 feet and 30 minutes from landing; the crew experienced what felt like momentary turbulence that lasted one to two seconds and was gone; similar to wake turbulence. The crew; including the jumpseater; commented that we had no idea where that came from since the air was clear that day and smooth. Then the first officer (first officer) noticed the left engine itt was around 880 and climbing. The first officer was the pilot flying (PF) so I took the QRH as I reduced the thrust on the left engine to attempt to bring the itt down (now above 900). Reducing the thrust made no change at all. There was no change in the itt or any N1 or N2 change; there was also no change in yaw. Up to this point I thought the engine was just overheating; when reducing the thrust made no change I realized the engine had failed. I believe since we were at a relatively low power setting during the descent; there was no noticeable yaw when the engine failed and that's why we didn't realize it was a failure right away. I told the first officer to declare an emergency while I ran the QRH. The jumpseater offered to help with anything we needed. The only cas message was low oil pressure; so I chose to go with the engine failure QRH item. By this time; the itt had exceeded 999 and changed to '---' but the fuel flow indication was 0 on that engine. When I moved the thrust lever to shutoff as guided by the QRH; the itt immediately began cooling. I did not expect this since the fuel flow indication was already 0. I continued with the QRH and reached the portion that says 'if severe engine damage is expected' and directs you to restart or continue with a single engine. At this point; the engine itt had cooled to 70C and there was positive N1 rotation; positive N2 rotation; and positive oil pressure. We had not heard any loud explosions or anything from the engine. We had no idea what caused it to fail. We discussed that it could have possibly been a flameout or a compressor stall and the engine itself was potentially still capable of running. I mentioned that if we attempted a restart and it overtemped again that we could shut off the fuel and would be no worse off than we already were. Additionally; if it caught on fire; we still had the fire push switchlight as well as the fire bottles available to use; so I felt safe attempting a restart. I asked the first officer and jumpseater if they agreed or had any other thoughts and they both agreed with me. I attempted a restart of the left engine and was prepared to abort the start if it looked like things were going wrong. The engine seemed to start without issue. There was a vibration during the start that subsided as RPM increased; however; we all seemed to remember feeling a similar vibration when doing an in air restart in the sim. I watched the vib gauge and it rose to a maximum of 1.7 (within the acceptable range) and decreased as the start progressed. We did not consider this a problem at this time. As the engine neared the normal operating RPM ranges; the itt was rising at a normal rate as would be expected during a normal start on the ground. However; the itt never stopped and continued to increase to redline. I shut off the fuel and I think the itt peaked around 905 during the restart attempt. At this point; the itt reduced again just as it had the first time and there was no fire indication at any time during this incident. I continued with the QRH for a single engine landing. We were already on the downwind leg of the arrival so we decided to land there. ATC asked us our desired runway and we chose the longest runway. When I had completed the QRH down to the descent checklist; I told the first officer and jumpseater that I needed to call the flight attendant and tell the passengers something. Since we didn't know the engine had failed at first; we fully expected that the passengers didn't know. I consulted with the first officer and jump seater on what I should say to the passengers to avoid them becoming unnecessarily alarmed when they sawrescue vehicles on the ground. We agreed to tell them we had a mechanical issue that we wanted rescue vehicles to observe just as a precaution and there was no need to be alarmed. I called the flight attendant using the normal flight attendant call button to avoid her becoming alarmed; as we had plenty of time and were not in a rush. I told her that we had an engine failure and were planning a single engine landing. We did not expect to evacuate and everything was going to be normal except a higher approach speed. At this time I discussed with the first officer that I would like to take controls and perform the landing myself. We rebriefed the approach since we had previously prepared prior to the engine failure. We then told approach that we were ready to commence the approach and requested rescue vehicles to be standing by. I performed a completely uneventful landing with no problems at all. We taxied off the runway slowly with rescue vehicles following us. ATC wanted to know when we would like to terminate the emergency. I told them I wanted to have the rescue vehicles take a closer look before we canceled it. We taxied to the west hardstand for closer inspection. I told the passengers that everything was ok and we were just having the rescue vehicles take a closer look outside since we couldn't see outside ourselves. After a few minutes; the rescue personnel gave us the all clear and we continued taxi to the gate. The passengers were grateful for us getting them on the ground safely and were completely unaware that an engine had failed. After passengers had deplaned; maintenance met us at the gate for an unrelated reason and we informed them what had happened. I then contacted the chief pilot; dispatch; and union to make sure all required reports were made. Overall; the crew is completely unaware of what caused the engine to fail and we do not believe we did anything that caused the engine to fail. We were at a moderately low power setting during the failure as we were descending and there were no power changes just prior to the failure.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ 200 Flight Crew experiences an engine failure during descent that is initially not detected but is felt as turbulence. The ITT is then noticed to be rising above limits and the engine is shut down. After shutdown all indications are normal and the Captain believes a restart should be attempted. The First Officer agrees and a restart is attempted; followed by another ITT exceedance and shutdown. A single engine landing ensues.

Narrative: During descent at approximately 20;000 feet and 30 minutes from landing; the crew experienced what felt like momentary turbulence that lasted one to two seconds and was gone; similar to wake turbulence. The crew; including the jumpseater; commented that we had no idea where that came from since the air was clear that day and smooth. Then the First Officer (FO) noticed the Left Engine ITT was around 880 and climbing. The FO was the Pilot Flying (PF) so I took the QRH as I reduced the thrust on the left engine to attempt to bring the ITT down (now above 900). Reducing the thrust made no change at all. There was no change in the ITT or any N1 or N2 change; there was also no change in yaw. Up to this point I thought the engine was just overheating; when reducing the thrust made no change I realized the engine had failed. I believe since we were at a relatively low power setting during the descent; there was no noticeable yaw when the engine failed and that's why we didn't realize it was a failure right away. I told the FO to declare an emergency while I ran the QRH. The jumpseater offered to help with anything we needed. The only CAS message was Low Oil Pressure; so I chose to go with the Engine Failure QRH Item. By this time; the ITT had exceeded 999 and changed to '---' but the fuel flow indication was 0 on that engine. When I moved the thrust lever to shutoff as guided by the QRH; the ITT immediately began cooling. I did not expect this since the fuel flow indication was already 0. I continued with the QRH and reached the portion that says 'if severe engine damage is expected' and directs you to restart or continue with a single engine. At this point; the engine ITT had cooled to 70C and there was positive N1 rotation; positive N2 rotation; and positive oil pressure. We had not heard any loud explosions or anything from the engine. We had no idea what caused it to fail. We discussed that it could have possibly been a flameout or a compressor stall and the engine itself was potentially still capable of running. I mentioned that if we attempted a restart and it overtemped again that we could shut off the fuel and would be no worse off than we already were. Additionally; if it caught on fire; we still had the fire PUSH switchlight as well as the fire bottles available to use; so I felt safe attempting a restart. I asked the FO and jumpseater if they agreed or had any other thoughts and they both agreed with me. I attempted a restart of the left engine and was prepared to abort the start if it looked like things were going wrong. The engine seemed to start without issue. There was a vibration during the start that subsided as RPM increased; however; we all seemed to remember feeling a similar vibration when doing an in air restart in the sim. I watched the VIB gauge and it rose to a maximum of 1.7 (within the acceptable range) and decreased as the start progressed. We did not consider this a problem at this time. As the engine neared the normal operating RPM ranges; the ITT was rising at a normal rate as would be expected during a normal start on the ground. However; the ITT never stopped and continued to increase to redline. I shut off the fuel and I think the ITT peaked around 905 during the restart attempt. At this point; the ITT reduced again just as it had the first time and there was no fire indication at any time during this incident. I continued with the QRH for a single engine landing. We were already on the downwind leg of the arrival so we decided to land there. ATC asked us our desired runway and we chose the longest runway. When I had completed the QRH down to the descent checklist; I told the FO and jumpseater that I needed to call the FA and tell the passengers something. Since we didn't know the engine had failed at first; we fully expected that the passengers didn't know. I consulted with the FO and Jump seater on what I should say to the passengers to avoid them becoming unnecessarily alarmed when they sawrescue vehicles on the ground. We agreed to tell them we had a mechanical issue that we wanted rescue vehicles to observe just as a precaution and there was no need to be alarmed. I called the FA using the normal FA call button to avoid her becoming alarmed; as we had plenty of time and were not in a rush. I told her that we had an engine failure and were planning a single engine landing. We did not expect to evacuate and everything was going to be normal except a higher approach speed. At this time I discussed with the FO that I would like to take controls and perform the landing myself. We rebriefed the approach since we had previously prepared prior to the engine failure. We then told approach that we were ready to commence the approach and requested rescue vehicles to be standing by. I performed a completely uneventful landing with no problems at all. We taxied off the runway slowly with rescue vehicles following us. ATC wanted to know when we would like to terminate the emergency. I told them I wanted to have the rescue vehicles take a closer look before we canceled it. We taxied to the west hardstand for closer inspection. I told the passengers that everything was ok and we were just having the rescue vehicles take a closer look outside since we couldn't see outside ourselves. After a few minutes; the rescue personnel gave us the all clear and we continued taxi to the gate. The passengers were grateful for us getting them on the ground safely and were completely unaware that an engine had failed. After passengers had deplaned; maintenance met us at the gate for an unrelated reason and we informed them what had happened. I then contacted the chief pilot; dispatch; and union to make sure all required reports were made. Overall; the crew is completely unaware of what caused the engine to fail and we do not believe we did anything that caused the engine to fail. We were at a moderately low power setting during the failure as we were descending and there were no power changes just prior to the failure.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.