Narrative:

I was working local control (local control) and had been in position for about ten minutes. Shortly after I took the position; the controller in charge (controller in charge) combined controller in charge with ground control (ground control). This is a common occurrence at bur; especially at night; as our current staffing does not allow for all of our positions to be staffed without someone being on position for over two hours. We often have no supervisor for a shift; and we never have a supervisor past xa:00 local; so the controller in charge position must be staffed by a controller from the front line. By having controller in charge combined with ground control; luaw (line up and wait) operations were suspended; as luaw is not allowed if controller in charge is combined with a control position.aircraft X was on about a four-mile final and cleared to land runway 8 (visual approach) when I got an IFR release on aircraft Y; who was at the end of taxiway alpha and prepared to depart from runway 15. Normally I would luaw the departing aircraft and evaluate the situation; but luaw was suspended due to controller in charge being combined with ground control. I asked aircraft Y if he was ready to go and he replied in the affirmative. I advised him of company traffic on final for runway 8 and cleared him for takeoff without delay on runway 15. Prior to clearing him for takeoff; I re-evaluated the situation and was confident due to the arriving aircraft's distance and airspeed (140 knots groundspeed). This was within my comfort zone and I have had similar situations work out just fine in the past. (The intersection of runway 8/15 is about a mile from the runway 15 threshold). I continued monitoring the situation and I became less and less comfortable as it unfolded. The departing aircraft took longer to roll than I had anticipated (the turn from taxiway alpha onto runway 15 is almost 180 degrees); and as aircraft Y was about 1;000 feet into his takeoff roll I cancelled his takeoff clearance. The pilot informed me that he was already in takeoff roll and unable to abort. I realized that the situation would be much tighter than I had anticipated; but it was going to work out and the departing aircraft would be through the intersection prior to the arriving aircraft crossing the runway 8 threshold. After hearing this exchange; the pilot of aircraft X; now on about a one-mile final; executed a pilot-initiated go-around. I now had an aircraft rolling runway 15 and starting his rotation and an aircraft executing a go-around for runway 8; which made the situation much worse. I have filed numerous reports in the past about the dangerous situation with bur's missed approach procedures. About a year ago we were informed that due to the lack of a dva (diverse vector area) at bur; we cannot vector missed approaches (which we had been doing safely for decades) and that in the event of a go-around; an aircraft on an instrument approach must only be issued the published map (which turns them 180 degrees and puts them right into the face of anyone on approach behind them). In the case of a go-around on a visual approach; we have been instructed that we may only tell the aircraft to make right traffic to runway 8 and we must then re-sequence the aircraft to the airport ourselves; which puts the aircraft in direct conflict with vny airspace and departures; as vny is only five miles west of bur. The pilot of aircraft X asked me what to do; and I had no good answer for him. The only thing I was allowed to do was tell him to make right traffic back to runway 8; and if I gave him that instruction there was a good chance that he would collide with company who was departing off runway 15 and turning to a 210 heading for his SID. I told aircraft X to start a climb to 4;000 and to offset to the left as soon as able; as company was rolling on runway 15. This was the only way I could keep the airplanes apart. The ground control/controller in charge jumped on the line with TRACON and informed them of the missed approach and said that we wanted to ship aircraft X back to them to be re-sequenced; as there was another aircraft now on about a 5-mile final to runway 8. If I followed our procedure and kept aircraft X in right traffic I would have to extend him to about ten miles outside of our airspace in order to re-sequence him to runway 8; and I would have to violate vny's airspace to do that; which could have also put aircraft X into conflict with any releases off vny; not to mention any VFR traffic in vny's airspace. TRACON said he would take the aircraft back. After the departing aircraft Y was off the runway and turning to his SID heading; I told aircraft X to make right traffic to runway 8; as I needed him to turn right and I wasn't allowed to issue him a vector. At that point TRACON jumped on the shout line and asked me why I wasn't putting aircraft X on a 210 heading (the SID heading); which is the old procedure that we used to have but has been illegal for a year. I told the TRACON controller that I wasn't allowed to do that; and asked him if that was what he was requesting. He answered in the affirmative. I then issued aircraft X a 210 heading and a climb to 4;000. I had both aircraft in sight out the window and at that point they had more than 1;000 feet vertical separation. When the departing aircraft Y was out of 5;000; I shipped aircraft X back to TRACON.there are two main issues here: (1) I have been filing report after report about how dangerous the situation with the bur map (or lack thereof) is. We are not able to control IFR aircraft that go around at bur. We can only issue them the published map (if they're on the ILS); which turns them 180 degrees and makes them climb through anyone else who is on approach to the airport; and if they're on a visual approach; we can only tell them to make right traffic back to the runway. We cannot give any instructions other than that. In tonight's case; issuing the only instructions I was allowed to issue the aircraft would have put them together.my recommendation is the same as it has been in the numerous other reports that I have filed: we need to be able to vector aircraft in the airspace like we had been doing for years and years before. The previous procedure was to issue the go-around aircraft the SID heading and altitude; which essentially turned it into a 'departure' and gave it to TRACON for re-sequencing. If a dva is necessary to make that happen; then get us a dva and get it to us now. I am an air traffic controller; let me control the aircraft in my airspace. Telling me that I can only do one thing with an aircraft that is going around; especially when that one thing will put the aircraft in direct conflict with other aircraft; is an incredibly dangerous procedure. If I didn't have my hands tied by these procedures; I would have been able to tell aircraft X to overfly the airport; then given him a 120 heading (the SID heading off runway 8) just to get him turning; then ultimately put him back on a 210 heading once I had space with the departing aircraft Y. As it is; by telling him to make right traffic back to the airport (the only way I can turn him; since I can't issue him a heading); he turned right back toward the departing aircraft.(2) staffing at bur has been an issue for quite some time. As I mentioned before; it is commonplace for the controller in charge to have to combine with ground control in order to keep people from being on position for more than two hours. This is a constant at nighttime; but it also happens during the daytime; as there are many times when a controller has to be pulled from the front line to staff controller in charge because a supervisor isn't able to be in the cab. In my opinion; the controller in charge position should only be combined with ground control if absolutely necessary and it should not be a common practice just to keep breaks going. We lose luaw every time we combine controller in charge with ground control. This should not be the norm. It should be something that happens rarely and only when we have absolutely no other choice. On my end; I will be running traffic much more conservatively from now on when I don't have luaw. As I mentioned; as the situation started out; it was well within my comfort zone; but it dissolved rapidly; and this was an example of how quickly such a thing can happen.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BUR Tower Controller describes an operation where a departure was slow to get airborne causing an aircraft on short final for a crossing runway to go-around. Now; the conflict is worsened by having no missed approach procedures to separate the aircraft.

Narrative: I was working Local Control (LC) and had been in position for about ten minutes. Shortly after I took the position; the CIC (Controller in Charge) combined CIC with Ground Control (GC). This is a common occurrence at BUR; especially at night; as our current staffing does not allow for all of our positions to be staffed without someone being on position for over two hours. We often have no supervisor for a shift; and we never have a supervisor past XA:00 Local; so the CIC position must be staffed by a controller from the front line. By having CIC combined with GC; LUAW (Line Up and Wait) operations were suspended; as LUAW is not allowed if CIC is combined with a control position.Aircraft X was on about a four-mile final and cleared to land RWY 8 (Visual Approach) when I got an IFR release on Aircraft Y; who was at the end of Taxiway Alpha and prepared to depart from RWY 15. Normally I would LUAW the departing aircraft and evaluate the situation; but LUAW was suspended due to CIC being combined with GC. I asked Aircraft Y if he was ready to go and he replied in the affirmative. I advised him of company traffic on final for RWY 8 and cleared him for takeoff without delay on RWY 15. Prior to clearing him for takeoff; I re-evaluated the situation and was confident due to the arriving aircraft's distance and airspeed (140 knots groundspeed). This was within my comfort zone and I have had similar situations work out just fine in the past. (The intersection of RWY 8/15 is about a mile from the RWY 15 threshold). I continued monitoring the situation and I became less and less comfortable as it unfolded. The departing aircraft took longer to roll than I had anticipated (the turn from Taxiway Alpha onto runway 15 is almost 180 degrees); and as Aircraft Y was about 1;000 feet into his takeoff roll I cancelled his takeoff clearance. The pilot informed me that he was already in takeoff roll and unable to abort. I realized that the situation would be much tighter than I had anticipated; but it was going to work out and the departing aircraft would be through the intersection prior to the arriving aircraft crossing the RWY 8 threshold. After hearing this exchange; the pilot of Aircraft X; now on about a one-mile final; executed a pilot-initiated go-around. I now had an aircraft rolling RWY 15 and starting his rotation and an aircraft executing a go-around for RWY 8; which made the situation much worse. I have filed numerous reports in the past about the dangerous situation with BUR's missed approach procedures. About a year ago we were informed that due to the lack of a DVA (Diverse Vector Area) at BUR; we cannot vector missed approaches (which we had been doing safely for decades) and that in the event of a go-around; an aircraft on an instrument approach must only be issued the published MAP (which turns them 180 degrees and puts them right into the face of anyone on approach behind them). In the case of a go-around on a Visual Approach; we have been instructed that we may only tell the aircraft to make right traffic to RWY 8 and we must then re-sequence the aircraft to the airport ourselves; which puts the aircraft in direct conflict with VNY airspace and departures; as VNY is only five miles west of BUR. The pilot of Aircraft X asked me what to do; and I had no good answer for him. The only thing I was allowed to do was tell him to make right traffic back to RWY 8; and if I gave him that instruction there was a good chance that he would collide with company who was departing off RWY 15 and turning to a 210 heading for his SID. I told Aircraft X to start a climb to 4;000 and to offset to the left as soon as able; as company was rolling on RWY 15. This was the only way I could keep the airplanes apart. The GC/CIC jumped on the line with TRACON and informed them of the missed approach and said that we wanted to ship Aircraft X back to them to be re-sequenced; as there was another aircraft now on about a 5-mile final to RWY 8. If I followed our procedure and kept Aircraft X in right traffic I would have to extend him to about ten miles outside of our airspace in order to re-sequence him to RWY 8; and I would have to violate VNY's airspace to do that; which could have also put Aircraft X into conflict with any releases off VNY; not to mention any VFR traffic in VNY's airspace. TRACON said he would take the aircraft back. After the departing Aircraft Y was off the runway and turning to his SID heading; I told Aircraft X to make right traffic to RWY 8; as I needed him to turn right and I wasn't allowed to issue him a vector. At that point TRACON jumped on the shout line and asked me why I wasn't putting Aircraft X on a 210 heading (the SID heading); which is the old procedure that we used to have but has been illegal for a year. I told the TRACON controller that I wasn't allowed to do that; and asked him if that was what he was requesting. He answered in the affirmative. I then issued Aircraft X a 210 heading and a climb to 4;000. I had both aircraft in sight out the window and at that point they had more than 1;000 feet vertical separation. When the departing Aircraft Y was out of 5;000; I shipped Aircraft X back to TRACON.There are two main issues here: (1) I have been filing report after report about how dangerous the situation with the BUR MAP (or lack thereof) is. We are not able to control IFR aircraft that go around at BUR. We can only issue them the published MAP (if they're on the ILS); which turns them 180 degrees and makes them climb through anyone else who is on approach to the airport; and if they're on a Visual Approach; we can only tell them to make right traffic back to the runway. We cannot give any instructions other than that. In tonight's case; issuing the only instructions I was allowed to issue the aircraft would have put them together.My recommendation is the same as it has been in the numerous other reports that I have filed: We need to be able to vector aircraft in the airspace like we had been doing for years and years before. The previous procedure was to issue the go-around aircraft the SID heading and altitude; which essentially turned it into a 'departure' and gave it to TRACON for re-sequencing. If a DVA is necessary to make that happen; then get us a DVA and get it to us now. I am an air traffic controller; let me control the aircraft in my airspace. Telling me that I can only do one thing with an aircraft that is going around; especially when that one thing will put the aircraft in direct conflict with other aircraft; is an incredibly dangerous procedure. If I didn't have my hands tied by these procedures; I would have been able to tell Aircraft X to overfly the airport; then given him a 120 heading (the SID heading off RWY 8) just to get him turning; then ultimately put him back on a 210 heading once I had space with the departing Aircraft Y. As it is; by telling him to make right traffic back to the airport (the only way I can turn him; since I can't issue him a heading); he turned right back toward the departing aircraft.(2) Staffing at BUR has been an issue for quite some time. As I mentioned before; it is commonplace for the CIC to have to combine with GC in order to keep people from being on position for more than two hours. This is a constant at nighttime; but it also happens during the daytime; as there are many times when a controller has to be pulled from the front line to staff CIC because a supervisor isn't able to be in the cab. In my opinion; the CIC position should only be combined with GC if absolutely necessary and it should not be a common practice just to keep breaks going. We lose LUAW every time we combine CIC with GC. This should not be the norm. It should be something that happens rarely and only when we have absolutely no other choice. On my end; I will be running traffic much more conservatively from now on when I don't have LUAW. As I mentioned; as the situation started out; it was well within my comfort zone; but it dissolved rapidly; and this was an example of how quickly such a thing can happen.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.