Narrative:

We set up and briefed for the ILS 28R; sfo as reported on the hourly ATIS. Upon checking in with norcal approach control we were informed that there was a new ATIS and we would be flying the lda prm runway 28R. So we initiated the lda brief passing approximately FL190.the 28R lda prm approach requires us to be the following aircraft and visually identify the aircraft on 28L before we can continue past intersection darne; 3.4 miles from the end of the runway and a decision altitude of 1;140 feet.approach control had us intercept the lda for 28R and was clearing us for descent 1;000 feet at a time; roughly the same as the published altitudes but late enough that we were above the glideslope for most of the approach. A lot was happening during this time so some of the altitudes and speeds may be off but it is my best recollection. We were slowed to 160 kts around hegot so as not to overtake the twin turboprop on approach to 28L. After wasop we were cleared to 3;000 feet and cleared for the approach. The autopilot and autothrottle had been engaged since TOD. We reached 3;000 feet before intercepting the glideslope so the aircraft leveled off. The pilot flying disconnected the autopilot and autothrottle and continued the descent in an attempt to catch the glideslope. The flight director (FD) bars were in altitude hold so they were directing a pitch up. The pilot flying (PF) apparently did not completely disregard the FD because the airspeed got slow enough for the oral 'airspeed slow' warning to sound. He added power and adjusted pitch to regain our assigned speed. We then configured for landing; slowed to target speed; and descended to the glideslope. During this time there was a discussion as to whether a go around should be executed. We were on speed; course; glideslope; configured for landing before 1;000 feet; and we both felt landing was as safe as going around so we landed.some contributing factors.a rushed brief.early morning pick up; home base time.approach controller with late descent and approach clearance. Pilot not flying (PNF) late with lower altitude set in the altitude window.lots of distractions; in and out of IMC; looking for traffic; radio communications and frequency changes.some thoughts on how this might have been avoided.a more thorough briefing. We were inside of miuke so 1;800 feet was the minimum altitude. The PNF did not set 1;800 feet which would have allowed the aircraft to continue descending without leveling off at 3;000 feet. Better monitoring of aircraft performance by both pilots.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 flight crew describes mistakes that occurred during an ILS PRM 28R approach into SFO and indicates the following contributing factors: fatigue and ATC stepping the flight down 1;000 feet at a time.

Narrative: We set up and briefed for the ILS 28R; SFO as reported on the hourly ATIS. Upon checking in with NORCAL Approach Control we were informed that there was a new ATIS and we would be flying the LDA PRM RWY 28R. So we initiated the LDA brief passing approximately FL190.The 28R LDA PRM approach requires us to be the following aircraft and visually identify the aircraft on 28L before we can continue past intersection DARNE; 3.4 miles from the end of the runway and a Decision Altitude of 1;140 feet.Approach control had us intercept the LDA for 28R and was clearing us for descent 1;000 feet at a time; roughly the same as the published altitudes but late enough that we were above the glideslope for most of the approach. A lot was happening during this time so some of the altitudes and speeds may be off but it is my best recollection. We were slowed to 160 kts around HEGOT so as not to overtake the twin turboprop on approach to 28L. After WASOP we were cleared to 3;000 feet and cleared for the approach. The autopilot and autothrottle had been engaged since TOD. We reached 3;000 feet before intercepting the glideslope so the aircraft leveled off. The pilot flying disconnected the autopilot and autothrottle and continued the descent in an attempt to catch the glideslope. The Flight Director (FD) bars were in altitude hold so they were directing a pitch up. The pilot flying (PF) apparently did not completely disregard the FD because the airspeed got slow enough for the oral 'Airspeed Slow' Warning to sound. He added power and adjusted pitch to regain our assigned speed. We then configured for landing; slowed to target speed; and descended to the glideslope. During this time there was a discussion as to whether a go around should be executed. We were on speed; course; glideslope; configured for landing before 1;000 feet; and we both felt landing was as safe as going around so we landed.Some contributing factors.A rushed Brief.Early morning pick up; home base time.Approach controller with late descent and approach clearance. Pilot not flying (PNF) late with lower altitude set in the altitude window.Lots of distractions; in and out of IMC; looking for traffic; radio communications and frequency changes.Some thoughts on how this might have been avoided.A more thorough briefing. We were inside of MIUKE so 1;800 feet was the minimum altitude. The PNF did not set 1;800 feet which would have allowed the aircraft to continue descending without leveling off at 3;000 feet. Better monitoring of aircraft performance by both pilots.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.