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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1238399 |
Time | |
Date | 201502 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Gulfstream IV / G350 / G450 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | Takeoff |
Route In Use | SID ZZZ |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Turbine Engine |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Instrument Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Flight Crew Multiengine |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 56 Flight Crew Total 5640 Flight Crew Type 2400 |
Person 2 | |
Function | Pilot Not Flying First Officer |
Qualification | Flight Crew Multiengine Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Flight Crew Instrument |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50 Flight Crew Total 8200 Flight Crew Type 2750 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown |
Narrative:
I was the PIC and the flying pilot. I started the engines and called for the after start check list. I performed a 'thru flight' flight control check and everything felt normal (no binding or resistance issues) and the control forces seemed normally loaded. A takeoff brief was given and the taxi checklist was performed. Once take off clearance was given; we performed a line up checklist and I lined the aircraft up in position on runway 25. I advanced the throttle thru 1.25 EPR and engaged the auto-throttles; released the brakes and began the takeoff roll. At approximately 70-80 knots; I heard an audible 3 bong warning and saw the red master caution warning light illuminate. I immediately called the abort and pulled the throttles to idle. A light amount of braking pressure was applied. We coasted to the end of the runway and exited [the runway]. My copilot and I discussed possible causes for the warning and both agreed that we did not see any cass message to help us determine the probable cause. My copilot pulled up the exceedance page and we agreed there was no exceedance recorded. I then asked my copilot to check the circuit breakers in the cockpit for any that may have tripped. His cursory inspection did not reveal any tripped circuit breakers. We then discussed what I thought may have been the cause and suggested that perhaps we had an lp exceedance. I believed it was in fact the cause; and we elected to return for another takeoff attempt. I briefed my copilot that I would set the takeoff power manually. We performed another lineup checklist and were cleared for takeoff. I lined up the airplane on runway 25 and firmly held the brakes while I advanced the throttles to takeoff power; my copilot verified that takeoff power was set and I released the brakes. We accelerated through 70-80 knots when again we had the three bong and master caution warning; I quickly looked at the engine instrument and observed that the lp [engine low pressure bleed] had gone into the yellow arc and reduced the power slightly back into the white arc. We continued accelerating through V1 and then at vr I attempted to rotate the nose up. As I pulled back on the yoke; the flight controls did not respond normally to my input. The controls had no noticeable pressure resistance and felt unloaded with hydraulic pressure. I moved the yoke forward and then back further aft and still had the same result. I immediately told my copilot I had no flight controls and began the abort. I pulled the throttles to idle and applied maximum braking and then initiated full reverse thrust and called for speed brakes. Once aircraft was at a slow speed we advised tower of our rejected takeoff and proceeded to exit runway and brought the plane to a stop on taxiway 'a' facing east and shut down both engines. We had very hot brakes and they should approach with caution. The incident commander then came over the radio and advised that there was smoke rising from the right main landing gear. I then asked my copilot to contact FBO and organize a tug to tow us. While we were doing this the incident commander stated 'captain; evacuate the aircraft now; you have a fire on the right landing gear'. The copilot and I both jumped out of the seat and I instructed passengers to evacuate the aircraft now while copilot cleared and opened the main cabin door. Once the passengers and copilot were off the airplane; I exited and advised the responders that the aircraft was clear and everyone was off. The passengers were escorted to a waiting van and were taken back to the FBO. My copilot and I were both instructed by incident commander to sit in his truck while they initiated fire suppression. Once the scene and aircraft were secured the plane was moved to a secure hangar and locked.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A GLFIV flight crew rejected their first takeoff attempt from runway 25 at ZZZ due to an unexplained master caution and aural warning. When no cause for the warning was evident they attempted another takeoff. They then received and disregarded the same warning; and when back pressure was applied at Vr there was no pitch response. A second rejected takeoff was initiated at very high speed. The aircraft was brought to a near stop and exited at the far end of the runway.
Narrative: I was the PIC and the flying pilot. I started the engines and called for the after start check list. I performed a 'thru flight' flight control check and everything felt normal (no binding or resistance issues) and the control forces seemed normally loaded. A takeoff brief was given and the taxi checklist was performed. Once take off clearance was given; we performed a line up checklist and I lined the aircraft up in position on runway 25. I advanced the throttle thru 1.25 EPR and engaged the auto-throttles; released the brakes and began the takeoff roll. At approximately 70-80 knots; I heard an audible 3 bong warning and saw the red master caution warning light illuminate. I immediately called the abort and pulled the throttles to idle. A light amount of braking pressure was applied. We coasted to the end of the runway and exited [the runway]. My Copilot and I discussed possible causes for the warning and both agreed that we did not see any CASS message to help us determine the probable cause. My Copilot pulled up the exceedance page and we agreed there was no exceedance recorded. I then asked my copilot to check the circuit breakers in the cockpit for any that may have tripped. His cursory inspection did not reveal any tripped circuit breakers. We then discussed what I thought may have been the cause and suggested that perhaps we had an LP exceedance. I believed it was in fact the cause; and we elected to return for another takeoff attempt. I briefed my Copilot that I would set the takeoff power manually. We performed another lineup checklist and were cleared for takeoff. I lined up the airplane on runway 25 and firmly held the brakes while I advanced the throttles to takeoff power; my copilot verified that takeoff power was set and I released the brakes. We accelerated through 70-80 knots when again we had the three bong and master caution warning; I quickly looked at the engine instrument and observed that the LP [engine Low Pressure bleed] had gone into the yellow arc and reduced the power slightly back into the white arc. We continued accelerating through V1 and then at Vr I attempted to rotate the nose up. As I pulled back on the yoke; the flight controls did not respond normally to my input. The controls had no noticeable pressure resistance and felt unloaded with hydraulic pressure. I moved the yoke forward and then back further aft and still had the same result. I immediately told my copilot I had no flight controls and began the abort. I pulled the throttles to idle and applied maximum braking and then initiated full reverse thrust and called for speed brakes. Once aircraft was at a slow speed we advised tower of our rejected takeoff and proceeded to exit runway and brought the plane to a stop on taxiway 'A' facing east and shut down both engines. We had very hot brakes and they should approach with caution. The Incident Commander then came over the radio and advised that there was smoke rising from the right main landing gear. I then asked my copilot to contact FBO and organize a tug to tow us. While we were doing this the Incident Commander stated 'Captain; evacuate the aircraft now; you have a fire on the right landing gear'. The copilot and I both jumped out of the seat and I instructed passengers to evacuate the aircraft now while copilot cleared and opened the main cabin door. Once the passengers and copilot were off the airplane; I exited and advised the responders that the aircraft was clear and everyone was off. The passengers were escorted to a waiting van and were taken back to the FBO. My Copilot and I were both instructed by Incident Commander to sit in his truck while they initiated fire suppression. Once the scene and aircraft were secured the plane was moved to a secure hangar and locked.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.