Narrative:

During preflight; the captain and I looked at radar imagery and discussed a massive area of storms moving across our planned STAR; as well as a smaller scattered area of storms popping up near our destination. Our planned arrival fuel was 7;000 lbs. An alternate was neither required by regulations nor filed. The captain coordinated with dispatch to add another 2;000 lbs. Of fuel.during cruise; we monitored the destination ATIS. It alternated between VFR/no precipitation; and IMC/tsra. We were filed and cleared for the aybid transition of the FRWAY5 arrival. Due to weather; jacksonville center re-cleared us direct hurde; which was on the omn transition of the FRWAY5 arrival. We advised dispatch. As we approached hurde; there was a large area of moderate/heavy precipitation west of the arrival; broken areas of moderate precipitation southeast of us; and scattered areas of light/moderate precipitation with some turbulence markers in front of us along the arrival. There was a thunderstorm over pbi; with other scattered areas of thunderstorms moving toward it as well. Our plan was to pick our way through the weather; then hold until the storm over pbi moved; or divert to fll. Fll was VFR and no weather was south of pbi.in rapid succession; the following happened:-ATC advised us of another airline flight reporting severe turbulence while attempting to arrive at pbi. We instructed the flight attendants to take their seats.-ATC advised us of hail in a large cell 20 nm southwest of hurde; which was moving toward hurde due to wind.-another airline flight in the area reported moderate turbulence and turned around.-another airline flight on the arrival started asking for large deviations around weather.we asked for a 30 degree left turn to avoid a cell in front of us. As soon as we turned; we encountered continuous moderate turbulence; moderate rain; and st. Elmo's fire. We had not yet even entered any of the precipitation painting on our radar. The gaps in the weather in front of us were closing up; and we were surrounded by weather on both the left and right sides. We asked for and were cleared for a left 180 degree turn to the north. I advised dispatch that we had to turn around and may need to divert. We were offshore; and weather extended up the east coast of florida (off our left now) all the way up to just south of daytona. No matter what we did next; we would need to go up to abeam daytona before turning west. We discussed that we could possibly go north to abeam daytona; west to the west coast of florida; south around the weather; then east into pbi. The problem was that this would leave us with little extra fuel to hold or divert to fll if the thunderstorm over pbi had not moved off.we discussed the situation and the captain decided we were diverting to mco. I advised dispatch. I then saw that in response to my previous message; dispatch sent us several messages instructing us to work our way west through the weather. The worst weather was west of our position; and again; there was no way to go west until we went back north to abeam daytona. I then was very busy reprogramming the FMC; and talking to ATC; the flight attendants; passengers; and mco ops. The captain was very busy working our way around weather to join the arrival into mco.I was not able to coordinate with pbi ops because they do not answer the radio. On a flight on the previous day; on this flight prior to our diversion; and later on this day on a subsequent flight; pbi ops did not answer the radio on the ground or in flight. I later confirmed with pbi ops in person that the frequency on our airport data page is correct and they claim the radio does work.when we were set up for the diversion; I had time to look at received messages from dispatch again. I saw there were numerous messages asking us to again pick our way through the weather west (incorrectly claiming it was clear that way); to divert to fll if a diversion was necessary; and then to confirm our intentions (I had already clearly stated that we were diverting to mco). This added to our stress because of previous management inquiry into and threat of discipline toward other pilots who have made decisions to divert contrary to company guidance.I messaged dispatch one last time; stating we were not able to comply with their request due to weather; that we were diverting to mco; and that we would call them when we were on the ground. We were approaching 10;000 feet. We decided that the numerous; excessive messages from dispatch were becoming a serious distraction; and that we had to wait to communicate with them further until after we parked.we diverted to mco without further difficulty and landed with; I believe; about 10;000 lbs of fuel. After parking; we checked the pbi ATIS and radar imagery. We saw there was still a storm over pbi and weather in between us and pbi. We believed we could possibly have overflown mco arrived in the pbi area with 6;000-7;000 lbs of fuel; and then gotten into a bad situation with no further extra fuel to hold and minimal fuel to divert to fll. This was exactly the scenario we were concerned about; and this confirmed our decision to divert to mco.I saw there were several more messages from dispatch similar to the previous ones; and then finally a message with an amendment for our diversion to mco based on 'the captain using authority.' the captain then called our dispatcher while I did the walk-around. The captain described the dispatcher's response to the captain's attempt to explain our concerns and decision-making. He described the dispatcher's response as rude and dismissive.we coordinated with dispatch and mco ops regarding weather; passenger concerns; use of the tarmac delay snack kit; etc. After refueling and a brief delay for maintenance; we continued to pbi. All of the precipitation had moved off to the east by the time we departed mco. Dispatch sent us several messages about the weather moving away during our flight to pbi. We completed the rest of our trip without further incident within our normal fdp.pbi ops must answer the radio. Dispatch should have seen the massive area of weather moving across our arrival and the scattered area of storms over pbi and originally planned for us to arrive with more than 7;000 lbs of fuel. Dispatch could have filed us for the WLACE2 arrival into pbi to come in around the back side of the storms; which were moving east. We could have asked to be re-filed for the WLACE2 arrival. Dispatch could have kept us updated about the weather while we were enroute. We could have asked for updates about the weather while enroute. However; based on past experience; it is hit-or-miss whether dispatch will respond to such requests. Dispatch provided us no information prior to our message stating we had to turn around for weather. A proactive suggestion to request a re-route would have improved our situation. Instead; dispatch later provided us a distracting overload of information in an attempt to avoid a diversion. They attempted to convince us to follow a plan that would have burned all of our extra fuel and put us in a position with no remaining good options. The company culture causing this reversal of priorities needs to be improved.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air Carrier First Officer reports diverting to an alternate airport due to thunderstorms over and in the vicinity of their destination airport; against the wishes of their Dispatcher.

Narrative: During preflight; the Captain and I looked at radar imagery and discussed a massive area of storms moving across our planned STAR; as well as a smaller scattered area of storms popping up near our destination. Our planned arrival fuel was 7;000 lbs. An alternate was neither required by regulations nor filed. The Captain coordinated with dispatch to add another 2;000 lbs. of fuel.During cruise; we monitored the destination ATIS. It alternated between VFR/no precipitation; and IMC/TSRA. We were filed and cleared for the AYBID transition of the FRWAY5 arrival. Due to weather; Jacksonville Center re-cleared us direct HURDE; which was on the OMN transition of the FRWAY5 arrival. We advised dispatch. As we approached HURDE; there was a large area of moderate/heavy precipitation west of the arrival; broken areas of moderate precipitation southeast of us; and scattered areas of light/moderate precipitation with some turbulence markers in front of us along the arrival. There was a thunderstorm over PBI; with other scattered areas of thunderstorms moving toward it as well. Our plan was to pick our way through the weather; then hold until the storm over PBI moved; or divert to FLL. FLL was VFR and no weather was south of PBI.In rapid succession; the following happened:-ATC advised us of another airline flight reporting severe turbulence while attempting to arrive at PBI. We instructed the flight attendants to take their seats.-ATC advised us of hail in a large cell 20 nm SW of HURDE; which was moving toward HURDE due to wind.-Another airline flight in the area reported moderate turbulence and turned around.-Another airline flight on the arrival started asking for large deviations around weather.We asked for a 30 degree left turn to avoid a cell in front of us. As soon as we turned; we encountered continuous moderate turbulence; moderate rain; and St. Elmo's fire. We had not yet even entered any of the precipitation painting on our radar. The gaps in the weather in front of us were closing up; and we were surrounded by weather on both the left and right sides. We asked for and were cleared for a left 180 degree turn to the north. I advised dispatch that we had to turn around and may need to divert. We were offshore; and weather extended up the east coast of Florida (off our left now) all the way up to just south of Daytona. No matter what we did next; we would need to go up to abeam Daytona before turning west. We discussed that we could possibly go north to abeam Daytona; west to the west coast of Florida; south around the weather; then east into PBI. The problem was that this would leave us with little extra fuel to hold or divert to FLL if the thunderstorm over PBI had not moved off.We discussed the situation and the captain decided we were diverting to MCO. I advised dispatch. I then saw that in response to my previous message; dispatch sent us several messages instructing us to work our way west through the weather. The worst weather was west of our position; and again; there was no way to go west until we went back north to abeam Daytona. I then was very busy reprogramming the FMC; and talking to ATC; the flight attendants; passengers; and MCO ops. The captain was very busy working our way around weather to join the arrival into MCO.I was not able to coordinate with PBI ops because they do not answer the radio. On a flight on the previous day; on this flight prior to our diversion; and later on this day on a subsequent flight; PBI ops did not answer the radio on the ground or in flight. I later confirmed with PBI ops in person that the frequency on our airport data page is correct and they claim the radio does work.When we were set up for the diversion; I had time to look at received messages from dispatch again. I saw there were numerous messages asking us to again pick our way through the weather west (incorrectly claiming it was clear that way); to divert to FLL if a diversion was necessary; and then to confirm our intentions (I had already clearly stated that we were diverting to MCO). This added to our stress because of previous management inquiry into and threat of discipline toward other pilots who have made decisions to divert contrary to company guidance.I messaged dispatch one last time; stating we were not able to comply with their request due to weather; that we were diverting to MCO; and that we would call them when we were on the ground. We were approaching 10;000 feet. We decided that the numerous; excessive messages from dispatch were becoming a serious distraction; and that we had to wait to communicate with them further until after we parked.We diverted to MCO without further difficulty and landed with; I believe; about 10;000 lbs of fuel. After parking; we checked the PBI ATIS and radar imagery. We saw there was still a storm over PBI and weather in between us and PBI. We believed we could possibly have overflown MCO arrived in the PBI area with 6;000-7;000 lbs of fuel; and then gotten into a bad situation with no further extra fuel to hold and minimal fuel to divert to FLL. This was exactly the scenario we were concerned about; and this confirmed our decision to divert to MCO.I saw there were several more messages from dispatch similar to the previous ones; and then finally a message with an amendment for our diversion to MCO based on 'the captain using authority.' The captain then called our dispatcher while I did the walk-around. The captain described the dispatcher's response to the captain's attempt to explain our concerns and decision-making. He described the dispatcher's response as rude and dismissive.We coordinated with dispatch and MCO ops regarding weather; passenger concerns; use of the tarmac delay snack kit; etc. After refueling and a brief delay for maintenance; we continued to PBI. All of the precipitation had moved off to the east by the time we departed MCO. Dispatch sent us several messages about the weather moving away during our flight to PBI. We completed the rest of our trip without further incident within our normal FDP.PBI Ops must answer the radio. Dispatch should have seen the massive area of weather moving across our arrival and the scattered area of storms over PBI and originally planned for us to arrive with more than 7;000 lbs of fuel. Dispatch could have filed us for the WLACE2 arrival into PBI to come in around the back side of the storms; which were moving east. We could have asked to be re-filed for the WLACE2 arrival. Dispatch could have kept us updated about the weather while we were enroute. We could have asked for updates about the weather while enroute. However; based on past experience; it is hit-or-miss whether dispatch will respond to such requests. Dispatch provided us no information prior to our message stating we had to turn around for weather. A proactive suggestion to request a re-route would have improved our situation. Instead; dispatch later provided us a distracting overload of information in an attempt to avoid a diversion. They attempted to convince us to follow a plan that would have burned all of our extra fuel and put us in a position with no remaining good options. The company culture causing this reversal of priorities needs to be improved.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.