Narrative:

My first officer was flying this last leg of our 3 day trip. The clearance went as follows: 'cleared to sea as filed, maintain 6000, contact center on 124.1, squawk XXXX'. The takeoff roll was normal and the rotation was adequate. Where everything started to go wrong was when I realized that I had not given my first officer explicit enough instructions to navigate the filed routing. After the 400' call with the climb almost stabilized, I reminded my first officer to turn direct the VOR. My first officer asked for the radial to the VOR, I came back and gave the departure procedure in these words 'direct the VOR then 271 degree outbound'. At the same time I was talking to seattle center asking which runway was in use at sea and requested a new routing rather than our normal routing. I can't remember the exact clearance that I was given but I recall 'reaching or leaving 6000' (I can't remember which term) turn to 260 degree then direct eln when able, V2 to sea.' unfortunately, my first officer hasn't learned how to take instructions, as we immediately turned to 271 degree about 4 NM prior to reaching the VOR. This is where I got behind the airplane. I became too involved with her gross error in navigation that I missed both the 1000' callout and stopping at 6000'. We were at 7000' before I asked center to confirm that we were cleared to 16,000'. We were not cleared to 16,000' but at that time we were immediately cleared to 9000'. By this time I had the situation under control but the atmosphere in the cockpit was by this time extremely tense. Contributing factors: fatigue and incompetence are only contributing factors in this situation. My first officer is so incompetent that I wouldn't recommend that a private license be retained. I had spent 11 days of flying trying to teach basic flying skills and was unable to do so (I had also spent 5 seeks with the same first officer eight months earlier and had similar problems). I was so fatigued at the end of each day that I was making many more errors than was safe and my first officer was incapable to back me up because all errors went unnoticed. There were no corrective actions that could be taken other than to advise center that we were unsure of the altitude we were cleared to. My mistake was accepting another 3 day trip with this first officer after the previous 8 days. I had written my evaluation but was asked to give this first officer a chance to improve where needed and I agreed to one more trip. My company is in error for letting such incompetence out on the line. There was the assumption by the training department that this first officer would become more proficient on the line, which was not the case.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ALT DEVIATION OCCURS AS CHECK PLT IS DISTRACTED BY TASK INVOLVED IN TRAINING FO.

Narrative: MY F/O WAS FLYING THIS LAST LEG OF OUR 3 DAY TRIP. THE CLRNC WENT AS FOLLOWS: 'CLRED TO SEA AS FILED, MAINTAIN 6000, CONTACT CENTER ON 124.1, SQUAWK XXXX'. THE TKOF ROLL WAS NORMAL AND THE ROTATION WAS ADEQUATE. WHERE EVERYTHING STARTED TO GO WRONG WAS WHEN I REALIZED THAT I HAD NOT GIVEN MY F/O EXPLICIT ENOUGH INSTRUCTIONS TO NAVIGATE THE FILED ROUTING. AFTER THE 400' CALL WITH THE CLIMB ALMOST STABILIZED, I REMINDED MY F/O TO TURN DIRECT THE VOR. MY F/O ASKED FOR THE RADIAL TO THE VOR, I CAME BACK AND GAVE THE DEP PROC IN THESE WORDS 'DIRECT THE VOR THEN 271 DEG OUTBOUND'. AT THE SAME TIME I WAS TALKING TO SEATTLE CENTER ASKING WHICH RWY WAS IN USE AT SEA AND REQUESTED A NEW ROUTING RATHER THAN OUR NORMAL ROUTING. I CAN'T REMEMBER THE EXACT CLRNC THAT I WAS GIVEN BUT I RECALL 'REACHING OR LEAVING 6000' (I CAN'T REMEMBER WHICH TERM) TURN TO 260 DEG THEN DIRECT ELN WHEN ABLE, V2 TO SEA.' UNFORTUNATELY, MY F/O HASN'T LEARNED HOW TO TAKE INSTRUCTIONS, AS WE IMMEDIATELY TURNED TO 271 DEG ABOUT 4 NM PRIOR TO REACHING THE VOR. THIS IS WHERE I GOT BEHIND THE AIRPLANE. I BECAME TOO INVOLVED WITH HER GROSS ERROR IN NAVIGATION THAT I MISSED BOTH THE 1000' CALLOUT AND STOPPING AT 6000'. WE WERE AT 7000' BEFORE I ASKED CENTER TO CONFIRM THAT WE WERE CLRED TO 16,000'. WE WERE NOT CLRED TO 16,000' BUT AT THAT TIME WE WERE IMMEDIATELY CLRED TO 9000'. BY THIS TIME I HAD THE SITUATION UNDER CONTROL BUT THE ATMOSPHERE IN THE COCKPIT WAS BY THIS TIME EXTREMELY TENSE. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: FATIGUE AND INCOMPETENCE ARE ONLY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IN THIS SITUATION. MY F/O IS SO INCOMPETENT THAT I WOULDN'T RECOMMEND THAT A PRIVATE LICENSE BE RETAINED. I HAD SPENT 11 DAYS OF FLYING TRYING TO TEACH BASIC FLYING SKILLS AND WAS UNABLE TO DO SO (I HAD ALSO SPENT 5 SEEKS WITH THE SAME F/O EIGHT MONTHS EARLIER AND HAD SIMILAR PROBLEMS). I WAS SO FATIGUED AT THE END OF EACH DAY THAT I WAS MAKING MANY MORE ERRORS THAN WAS SAFE AND MY F/O WAS INCAPABLE TO BACK ME UP BECAUSE ALL ERRORS WENT UNNOTICED. THERE WERE NO CORRECTIVE ACTIONS THAT COULD BE TAKEN OTHER THAN TO ADVISE CENTER THAT WE WERE UNSURE OF THE ALT WE WERE CLRED TO. MY MISTAKE WAS ACCEPTING ANOTHER 3 DAY TRIP WITH THIS F/O AFTER THE PREVIOUS 8 DAYS. I HAD WRITTEN MY EVALUATION BUT WAS ASKED TO GIVE THIS F/O A CHANCE TO IMPROVE WHERE NEEDED AND I AGREED TO ONE MORE TRIP. MY COMPANY IS IN ERROR FOR LETTING SUCH INCOMPETENCE OUT ON THE LINE. THERE WAS THE ASSUMPTION BY THE TRAINING DEPT THAT THIS F/O WOULD BECOME MORE PROFICIENT ON THE LINE, WHICH WAS NOT THE CASE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.