Narrative:

I had taken the position after coming back from break. Traffic was not very heavy and we closed the glnr. The position was combined as vlyr/pasr/glnr. Towards the end of the session it was clear the weather was getting worse despite any updates on the saids [systems atlanta information display system]. It was reported as 'hazy' and aircraft going to both vny and smo were requesting to pick up an IFR for the approach. I had a [small] aircraft that was inbound to hhr who needed to go eastbound via V186 descending out of 11;000; a sli transition at 9;000; a smo inbound from pmd at 8;000; a vny inbound from pomr at 6;000; and a whp departure [eastbound] climbing to 5;000 eastbound V186. The smo lander was a J class and informed me he could not do the GPS-a. I knew the haze was restricting a good view of the airport until they got about to darts and down to 3000. Aircraft X [eastbound] checked on during this time; which I acknowledged but didn't pay close attention to. I had to vector the jet out for descent and down to 7000 versus the vny arrival at 6000 as well as the high MVA terrain clearance so that I could then turn him back to make his descent. I was cutting the vny arrival in on incremental vectors trying to avoid the higher MVA to the north and shorten the crossing point between him and the jet in order to descend him. At this time I noticed aircraft X climbing through 5200. For some reason; I interpreted his data block as VFR and he had the vny arrival traffic opposite direction at 6000. I instructed him to 'maintain VFR at or below 5500'. I believe he read that back; but I don't recall if he questioned the clearance until later. At this point; the jet and the vny arrival were beginning to cross and I issued a descent to 6000 for the jet smo arrival. That is when the specialist working flight data (FD); who was watching; informed me he believes aircraft X is IFR not VFR; which was obvious when I refocused on the aircraft. I issued aircraft X a descent to 5000. He queried me about the altitude saying this would put him back in 'soup'; which to me indicated he had taken the VFR clearance. And I replied; verify you are 'IFR'; to which he replied 'affirmative'. I told him he could expect higher with the next controller. I stopped the smo arrival's descent at 6500 since he would have been traffic for aircraft X as well. Once he was clear; I vectored the smo arrival back around and he reported the airport in sight once he got down and closer. Closest point was 5500 for aircraft X versus the vny arrival. I admit I was a bit worn out coming into this shift. I am the training rep for our area and need to maintain 16 hours a month for currency. Due to training needs; I was not able to secure much time earlier in the month. I had worked 4 straight morning shifts from roughly XA30 to XK30; and then a morning ot shift yesterday. I had to get up early this today for an event for my son and came straight from it to work. It is possible the confluence of low time on the position; fatigue from working a number of shifts in a row; the early non-work related start of the day with the sudden rise in traffic volume and decreasing weather were factors in me not recognizing the IFR state of the aircraft on initial contact. We have lots of VFR traffic that flow through this route out east; and the non-socal destination may have also led to the incorrect assumption on my part. If the aircraft had not climbed to 5200; it is likely I would have been wary of the altitude on second glance; but once the pilot continued to climb past 5000; using the VFR assumption; I gave him the 'VFR' restriction.part of the problem is the topography of the sector itself. We can't get smo and eastbound traffic down quickly due to the terrain so almost all activity takes place around darts. That said; recognizing the aircraft as IFR on initial contact would have prevented the situation as I was not unaware of his presence; just his status. Including myself; we had 2 overtime workers this shift. The bur area has been clamoring for more developmentals for years; and since the number of incoming trainees has not been steady; we are faced with constant shift shortages as our numbers are depleted by retirements. It is not uncommon for everyone in our area to be scheduled one or more overtimes and we are going to be in a constant state of 'catch-up' because any new trainees we get now are simply going to be too late due to the amount of training time it takes to get certified.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SCT TRACON Burbank area Controller reports of a busy shift; lack of staffing and a combined position he is working. Controller almost has a loss of separation due to thinking an aircraft is VFR while actually it is IFR.

Narrative: I had taken the position after coming back from break. Traffic was not very heavy and we closed the GLNR. The position was combined as VLYR/PASR/GLNR. Towards the end of the session it was clear the weather was getting worse despite any updates on the SAIDS [Systems Atlanta Information Display System]. It was reported as 'hazy' and aircraft going to both VNY and SMO were requesting to pick up an IFR for the approach. I had a [small] aircraft that was inbound to HHR who needed to go eastbound via V186 descending out of 11;000; a SLI transition at 9;000; a SMO inbound from PMD at 8;000; a VNY inbound from POMR at 6;000; and a WHP departure [eastbound] climbing to 5;000 eastbound V186. The SMO lander was a J class and informed me he could not do the GPS-A. I knew the haze was restricting a good view of the airport until they got about to DARTS and down to 3000. Aircraft X [eastbound] checked on during this time; which I acknowledged but didn't pay close attention to. I had to vector the jet out for descent and down to 7000 versus the VNY arrival at 6000 as well as the high MVA terrain clearance so that I could then turn him back to make his descent. I was cutting the VNY arrival in on incremental vectors trying to avoid the higher MVA to the north and shorten the crossing point between him and the jet in order to descend him. At this time I noticed Aircraft X climbing through 5200. For some reason; I interpreted his data block as VFR and he had the VNY arrival traffic opposite direction at 6000. I instructed him to 'Maintain VFR at or below 5500'. I believe he read that back; but I don't recall if he questioned the clearance until later. At this point; the jet and the VNY arrival were beginning to cross and I issued a descent to 6000 for the jet SMO arrival. That is when the specialist working Flight Data (FD); who was watching; informed me he believes Aircraft X is IFR not VFR; which was obvious when I refocused on the aircraft. I issued Aircraft X a descent to 5000. He queried me about the altitude saying this would put him back in 'soup'; which to me indicated he had taken the VFR clearance. And I replied; verify you are 'IFR'; to which he replied 'affirmative'. I told him he could expect higher with the next controller. I stopped the SMO arrival's descent at 6500 since he would have been traffic for Aircraft X as well. Once he was clear; I vectored the SMO arrival back around and he reported the airport in sight once he got down and closer. Closest point was 5500 for Aircraft X versus the VNY arrival. I admit I was a bit worn out coming into this shift. I am the Training Rep for our area and need to maintain 16 hours a month for currency. Due to training needs; I was not able to secure much time earlier in the month. I had worked 4 straight morning shifts from roughly XA30 to XK30; and then a morning OT shift yesterday. I had to get up early this today for an event for my son and came straight from it to work. It is possible the confluence of low time on the position; fatigue from working a number of shifts in a row; the early non-work related start of the day with the sudden rise in traffic volume and decreasing weather were factors in me not recognizing the IFR state of the aircraft on initial contact. We have lots of VFR traffic that flow through this route out east; and the non-SoCal destination may have also led to the incorrect assumption on my part. If the aircraft had not climbed to 5200; it is likely I would have been wary of the altitude on second glance; but once the pilot continued to climb past 5000; using the VFR assumption; I gave him the 'VFR' restriction.Part of the problem is the topography of the sector itself. We can't get SMO and eastbound traffic down quickly due to the terrain so almost all activity takes place around DARTS. That said; recognizing the aircraft as IFR on initial contact would have prevented the situation as I was not unaware of his presence; just his status. Including myself; we had 2 Overtime workers this shift. The BUR Area has been clamoring for more developmentals for years; and since the number of incoming trainees has not been steady; we are faced with constant shift shortages as our numbers are depleted by retirements. It is not uncommon for everyone in our area to be scheduled one or more overtimes and we are going to be in a constant state of 'catch-up' because any new trainees we get now are simply going to be too late due to the amount of training time it takes to get certified.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.