Narrative:

After being pushed back and starting our engines prior to de-icing I noticed that the de-ice truck had a significant amount of smoke coming from the back area where the heat exchanger is on the de-ice truck. I asked the de-ice crew over the radio what was going on and what their plans are. The response I received was that they were 'waiting for the hydraulic fluid that was spilt on the heat exchanger exhaust to burn off'. They also said; 'our mechanic has already looked at it and said it will clear soon'.I observed the de-ice crew then opening the rear access doors to the truck and when they opened them it appear to give whatever was burning a lot more oxygen and the smoke intensity increased significantly. After that observation I pleaded with them over the radio to not use the truck and shut it off based on my prior experience operating that type of equipment. They again re-affirmed that everything is fine based on what there mechanic told them and that 'a manager' had cleared them to use the truck.we had the aircraft configured for de-ice prior to these conversations. Before I could get another word in the de-ice crew jumped in the burning truck and proceeded to de-ice our aircraft. The crew would not respond to my radio calls for them to stop until I told them that I could smell the fumes in the cabin.as the deiced truck passed the captain's side of the aircraft I observed flames coming from inside the de-ice truck (the rear access doors were left open by the de-ice crew the whole time; which in itself is a safety risk and not a standard operating procedure for anyone). The crew eventually moved the truck away from the aircraft. After I observed the flames I radioed ground control to call the fire department; as the de-ice crew was still not addressing the situation. After the fire department showed up; the de-ice crew came back on the radio and said they would be getting a different truck.it is still snowing and the same crew showed up with the new de-ice truck and started to de-ice us from the point they stopped with the old truck; and at a speed that would not make it possible to properly de-ice the aircraft. Before I could ask them what they were doing and why they did not start the process over again they were telling us over the radio that they were done and our aircraft was clean. There was no possible way that they could have cleared the aircraft of the old failed fluid; and re-applied new type I and iv.I explained to them that they would have to start the process over. The crew was getting very aggressive over the radio. Another flight then radioed 'this is (XXX); we will take it any way you want to give it'. The truck then left us and de-iced them. We had to then wait for the de-ice crew to return and de-ice us properly. The threat was the complete lack of understanding of the situation by the ground crew. That signal threat made it impossible for myself to accept the de-icing job they were doing.during this event I was on the phone multiple times with my dispatcher and the hub coordinator. Other than to talk to the dispatcher to explain why we were delayed; and to adjust the release and account for the additional fuel burned on the ground during the delay; I as the captain should not have to request that the ground crew do their job properly. I should never have had to debate and plead with the ground crew not to take risks with their safety; as well as mine and the passengers. The risks they took were completely unacceptable.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB-145LR flight crew reported while they were getting de-iced they noticed smoke coming from the de-ice truck and became concerned about fire danger to their aircraft. They also reported seemingly substandard de-ice procedures by the same de-ice crew.

Narrative: After being pushed back and starting our engines prior to de-icing I noticed that the de-ice truck had a significant amount of smoke coming from the back area where the heat exchanger is on the de-ice truck. I asked the de-ice crew over the radio what was going on and what their plans are. The response I received was that they were 'waiting for the hydraulic fluid that was spilt on the heat exchanger exhaust to burn off'. They also said; 'Our mechanic has already looked at it and said it will clear soon'.I observed the de-ice crew then opening the rear access doors to the truck and when they opened them it appear to give whatever was burning a lot more oxygen and the smoke intensity increased significantly. After that observation I pleaded with them over the radio to not use the truck and shut it off based on my prior experience operating that type of equipment. They again re-affirmed that everything is fine based on what there mechanic told them and that 'a manager' had cleared them to use the truck.We had the aircraft configured for de-ice prior to these conversations. Before I could get another word in the de-ice crew jumped in the burning truck and proceeded to de-ice our aircraft. The crew would not respond to my radio calls for them to stop until I told them that I could smell the fumes in the cabin.As the deiced truck passed the Captain's side of the aircraft I observed flames coming from inside the de-ice truck (the rear access doors were left open by the de-ice crew the whole time; which in itself is a safety risk and not a standard operating procedure for anyone). The crew eventually moved the truck away from the aircraft. After I observed the flames I radioed ground control to call the fire department; as the de-ice crew was still not addressing the situation. After the fire department showed up; the de-ice crew came back on the radio and said they would be getting a different truck.It is still snowing and the same crew showed up with the new de-ice truck and started to de-ice us from the point they stopped with the old truck; and at a speed that would not make it possible to properly de-ice the aircraft. Before I could ask them what they were doing and why they did not start the process over again they were telling us over the radio that they were done and our aircraft was clean. There was no possible way that they could have cleared the aircraft of the old failed fluid; and re-applied new type I and IV.I explained to them that they would have to start the process over. The crew was getting very aggressive over the radio. Another flight then radioed 'this is (XXX); we will take it any way you want to give it'. The truck then left us and de-iced them. We had to then wait for the de-ice crew to return and de-ice us properly. The threat was the complete lack of understanding of the situation by the ground crew. That signal threat made it impossible for myself to accept the de-icing job they were doing.During this event I was on the phone multiple times with my dispatcher and the hub coordinator. Other than to talk to the dispatcher to explain why we were delayed; and to adjust the release and account for the additional fuel burned on the ground during the delay; I as the captain should not have to request that the ground crew do their job properly. I should never have had to debate and plead with the ground crew not to take risks with their safety; as well as mine and the passengers. The risks they took were completely unacceptable.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.