Narrative:

I was the pilot flying (PF). During cruise flight at FL360 enroute the fire suppression system (FSS) discharge lights illuminated on the captain and first officers (first officer) glare shields. At the same time the jumpseaters (two) in the courier compartment notified us via intercom that the FSS display by the L1 door indicated that the FSS had discharged into the container at position 1R. Position 1R contained the accessible dangerous goods (air driven generator). They also told us that they could not see or smell any indications of fire or smoke. I assumed the worst case. ZZZ was the closest suitable divert (approximately 80 NM south of our position). We [advised ATC of our situation]; started turning back toward ZZZ and were soon given direct ZZZ with a descent to 16;000 feet. I remained the PF; concentrating on getting the aircraft expeditiously; but safely on the deck. My first officer coordinated with ATC; our jumpseaters; operations; and ground personnel via ACARS. He reviewed the quick reference handbook (QRH) for any applicable checklists and we reviewed the evacuation checklist. We initially planned runway 30R (ATIS active runway) but were offered and accepted runway 12L which was the closest runway. We accomplished all normal checklists and landed on RWY12L with men and equipment standing by. We notified ZZZ tower of our intention to exit the runway and then evacuate the aircraft. We exited runway 12L at taxiway K; stopped; heading 030 degrees at the intersection of taxiways K and F and initiated an evacuation in accordance with the QRH. I made the decision to evacuate through the L1 door in the following order: first officer; jumpseaters x two; then me. The first officer blew the door and the slide inflated. There was a slight hesitation on his part but after a quick exchange with the on-scene firemen he jumped onto the slide like we are trained to do. I was at the back of the line and the next thing I hear is one of the jumpseaters saying that the first officer was injured and that he was not going to go down the slide. I looked out the door and saw the first officer lying on the taxiway unattended to and in distress; not at the bottom of the slide; but approximately 20 feet left of the fuselage centerline and 20 feet forward of the L1 door. I don't know how he ended up at that location. The firemen were directing us to continue the evacuation on that slide; however; the slide did not look right. From my vantage point all I could say at that time is that it appeared inflated and was resting on the taxiway; but the gradient was very steep and the end of the slide appeared closer to the aircraft than it normally would be. I considered trying the R1 exit; however; the firemen wanted us to continue out L1. They had pulled the bottom of the slide away from the aircraft so that the gradient wasn't as steep; directed us to sit at the top of the slide and use the hand straps in the center of the slide about a foot below the level of the door to lower ourselves onto the slide; and then ride the slide down with them in position to catch us. I elected to follow their guidance and was the next to evacuate. The jumpseaters followed me. While the jumpseaters evacuated I checked on the first officer who was still not being attended to. He told me that when his feet contacted the taxiway his face impacted his knees and he felt like his back was injured. I would say it took the emts approximately 10-15 minutes to respond; attend to his injuries; and transport him to the hospital. One other point; until the emts arrived; the jumpseaters did their best to attend to the first officer including trying to keep him warm. He was lying on the concrete in his uniform leather jacket in freezing temperatures and physically started shivering before somebody broke out a blanket to cover him with. After the evacuation of the aircraft all I can say is that I think it should have been handled better by the fire department. I briefed them that we had indications of deployment of the FSS into the air driven generator contra with no other fire or smoke indications; and gave them our copy of the dangerous goods summary (the dangerous goods manifest was still on the flight deck). I assumed their first priority would be to board the aircraft and determine the status of the container. Instead; I was asked if maintenance or myself were going to ride the brakes on the flight deck so the aircraft could be towed to the operation ramp and they could re-open the taxiway. I politely told them that wasn't going to happen until we determined the status of the air driven generator container at 1R. I gathered from our conversation that they were unfamiliar with the location of 1R and how to access the main cargo deck through the courier compartment. Soon after the evacuation and after my initial conversations with the first officer and the fire captain the jumpseaters asked me to look at the L1 slide. The top side of the slide looked somewhat normal; however; all of the vertical and horizontal support chambers on the bottom side of the slide were either not inflated or partially inflated at best. When the fire department procured some stairs; I led them on board through the L1 door; opened the cargo deck access door and pointed them to the air driven generator container. They opened the container and determined that the FSS had deployed into the air driven generator container; however; they saw no residual fire or smoke indications. I grabbed the dangerous goods manifest on the flight deck and gave it to the fire captain which he returned to me later. The fire captain then released the aircraft to maintenance who detached the slide and towed the aircraft to the ramp. Throughout this event I had multiple phone conversations with the duty officer to keep him in the loop and to determine the status of the first officer at the hospital. After arriving at the ramp office I made two entries in the aircraft maintenance log (aml): the in-flight FSS deployment and the failure of the L1 door evacuation slide to properly deploy. On a final note; I would like to commend the performance of first officer. I wasn't keeping track but one of the jumpseaters informed me it was 14 minutes from FSS activation to evacuation. Suffice it to say that I did the easy part and flew the jet; while he backed me up and did everything else to get us safely on the deck and out the door.the fire suppression system (FSS) deployed into the accessible dangerous goods (air driven generator) container at pos 1R with no post-flight inspection indications of fire or smoke. The evacuation slide in the L1 door did not deploy properly. See the please describe what happened narrative for more detail.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A flight crew elected to divert to the closest suitable airport after the Fire Suppression System deployed into the Accessible Dangerous Goods container. The diversion was flown effectively but the First Officer was injured during the subsequent evacuation when the Evacuation Slide did not deploy properly.

Narrative: I was the Pilot Flying (PF). During cruise flight at FL360 enroute the Fire Suppression System (FSS) discharge lights illuminated on the Captain and First Officers (FO) glare shields. At the same time the jumpseaters (two) in the courier compartment notified us via intercom that the FSS display by the L1 door indicated that the FSS had discharged into the container at position 1R. Position 1R contained the Accessible Dangerous Goods (ADG). They also told us that they could not see or smell any indications of fire or smoke. I assumed the worst case. ZZZ was the closest suitable divert (approximately 80 NM south of our position). We [advised ATC of our situation]; started turning back toward ZZZ and were soon given direct ZZZ with a descent to 16;000 feet. I remained the PF; concentrating on getting the aircraft expeditiously; but safely on the deck. My First Officer coordinated with ATC; our jumpseaters; Operations; and ground personnel via ACARS. He reviewed the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) for any applicable checklists and we reviewed the Evacuation Checklist. We initially planned RWY 30R (ATIS active runway) but were offered and accepted RWY 12L which was the closest runway. We accomplished all normal checklists and landed on RWY12L with men and equipment standing by. We notified ZZZ Tower of our intention to exit the runway and then evacuate the aircraft. We exited RWY 12L at taxiway K; stopped; heading 030 degrees at the Intersection of Taxiways K and F and initiated an evacuation in accordance with the QRH. I made the decision to evacuate through the L1 door in the following order: FO; jumpseaters x two; then me. The FO blew the door and the slide inflated. There was a slight hesitation on his part but after a quick exchange with the on-scene firemen he jumped onto the slide like we are trained to do. I was at the back of the line and the next thing I hear is one of the jumpseaters saying that the FO was injured and that he was not going to go down the slide. I looked out the door and saw the FO lying on the taxiway unattended to and in distress; not at the bottom of the slide; but approximately 20 feet left of the fuselage centerline and 20 feet forward of the L1 door. I don't know how he ended up at that location. The firemen were directing us to continue the evacuation on that slide; however; the slide did not look right. From my vantage point all I could say at that time is that it appeared inflated and was resting on the taxiway; but the gradient was very steep and the end of the slide appeared closer to the aircraft than it normally would be. I considered trying the R1 exit; however; the firemen wanted us to continue out L1. They had pulled the bottom of the slide away from the aircraft so that the gradient wasn't as steep; directed us to sit at the top of the slide and use the hand straps in the center of the slide about a foot below the level of the door to lower ourselves onto the slide; and then ride the slide down with them in position to catch us. I elected to follow their guidance and was the next to evacuate. The jumpseaters followed me. While the jumpseaters evacuated I checked on the FO who was still not being attended to. He told me that when his feet contacted the taxiway his face impacted his knees and he felt like his back was injured. I would say it took the EMTs approximately 10-15 minutes to respond; attend to his injuries; and transport him to the hospital. One other point; until the EMTs arrived; the jumpseaters did their best to attend to the FO including trying to keep him warm. He was lying on the concrete in his uniform leather jacket in freezing temperatures and physically started shivering before somebody broke out a blanket to cover him with. After the evacuation of the aircraft all I can say is that I think it should have been handled better by the Fire Department. I briefed them that we had indications of deployment of the FSS into the ADG contra with no other fire or smoke indications; and gave them our copy of the Dangerous Goods Summary (the Dangerous Goods Manifest was still on the flight deck). I assumed their first priority would be to board the aircraft and determine the status of the container. Instead; I was asked if maintenance or myself were going to ride the brakes on the flight deck so the aircraft could be towed to the operation ramp and they could re-open the taxiway. I politely told them that wasn't going to happen until we determined the status of the ADG container at 1R. I gathered from our conversation that they were unfamiliar with the location of 1R and how to access the main cargo deck through the courier compartment. Soon after the evacuation and after my initial conversations with the FO and the Fire Captain the jumpseaters asked me to look at the L1 slide. The top side of the slide looked somewhat normal; however; all of the vertical and horizontal support chambers on the bottom side of the slide were either not inflated or partially inflated at best. When the Fire Department procured some stairs; I led them on board through the L1 door; opened the cargo deck access door and pointed them to the ADG container. They opened the container and determined that the FSS had deployed into the ADG container; however; they saw no residual fire or smoke indications. I grabbed the Dangerous Goods Manifest on the flight deck and gave it to the Fire Captain which he returned to me later. The Fire Captain then released the aircraft to maintenance who detached the slide and towed the aircraft to the Ramp. Throughout this event I had multiple phone conversations with the Duty Officer to keep him in the loop and to determine the status of the FO at the hospital. After arriving at the Ramp Office I made two entries in the Aircraft Maintenance Log (AML): The in-flight FSS deployment and the failure of the L1 Door Evacuation Slide to properly deploy. On a final note; I would like to commend the performance of First Officer. I wasn't keeping track but one of the jumpseaters informed me it was 14 minutes from FSS activation to evacuation. Suffice it to say that I did the easy part and flew the jet; while he backed me up and did everything else to get us safely on the deck and out the door.The Fire Suppression System (FSS) deployed into the Accessible Dangerous Goods (ADG) container at Pos 1R with no post-flight inspection indications of fire or smoke. The Evacuation Slide in the L1 Door did not deploy properly. See the Please Describe What Happened narrative for more detail.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.