Narrative:

After a normal flight we were cleared to fly the FMS bridge visual 28R into sfo. VMC prevailed. LNAV and VNAV was selected with approximately 180-190 KIAS selected in the MCP. The autopilot was on. Everything was normal until around 1100 feet. The flying pilot had commanded landing gear down at 1500 MSL and 180 knots; which I knew was going to make fully configuring by 1000 difficult. I was in the middle of the landing checklist; waiting on the final flaps; around 1200 MSL when norcal app switched us to the tower. I dialed the frequency and was looking at our DME when it seemed we were unusually low for being 5 miles out. I computed that we should be at least 500-600 feet higher than we were; and looked at the MCP. It was in flch instead of the VNAV that it had been before; and our speed was at 180. The throttles were at idle. I called out 'you're in flight level change!' just as the tower called our flight; in the blind; to advise us of a low altitude alert and to check our altitude immediately. The flying pilot leveled off at 650 MSL. I told him that we were still at 180; and needed final flaps still. He seemed confused at first; but then slowed and called for flaps 25 and then 30. We rejoined the ILS 28R glideslope from below; and all checklists were complete before 500 feet MSL. Not helping matters was the tone this captain had set during the previous five days. He was prone to anger quickly; and did little to foster any type of 'crew concept.' instead; there was quite a hierarchical divide between us. I felt as if I was a 'required nuisance' to him. It made communication difficult since I felt that my input was not wanted nor appreciated.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 flight crew describes a FMS Bridge Visual Approach; which in their perspective becomes unstable and is allowed to get too low. The Tower issues a low altitude alert on final and the flying Captain regains the glideslope and completes configuration for landing. CRM issues were described by the First Officer.

Narrative: After a normal flight we were cleared to fly the FMS BRIDGE VISUAL 28R into SFO. VMC prevailed. LNAV and VNAV was selected with approximately 180-190 KIAS selected in the MCP. The autopilot was on. Everything was normal until around 1100 feet. The flying pilot had commanded landing gear down at 1500 MSL and 180 knots; which I knew was going to make fully configuring by 1000 difficult. I was in the middle of the landing checklist; waiting on the final flaps; around 1200 MSL when NORCAL APP switched us to the tower. I dialed the frequency and was looking at our DME when it seemed we were unusually low for being 5 miles out. I computed that we should be at least 500-600 feet higher than we were; and looked at the MCP. It was in FLCH instead of the VNAV that it had been before; and our speed was at 180. The throttles were at idle. I called out 'You're in flight level change!' just as the tower called our flight; in the blind; to advise us of a low altitude alert and to check our altitude immediately. The flying pilot leveled off at 650 MSL. I told him that we were still at 180; and needed final flaps still. He seemed confused at first; but then slowed and called for flaps 25 and then 30. We rejoined the ILS 28R glideslope from below; and all checklists were complete before 500 feet MSL. Not helping matters was the tone this captain had set during the previous five days. He was prone to anger quickly; and did little to foster any type of 'crew concept.' Instead; there was quite a hierarchical divide between us. I felt as if I was a 'required nuisance' to him. It made communication difficult since I felt that my input was not wanted nor appreciated.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.