Narrative:

A cessna 421C having undergone a complete and thorough annual with overhauled/rebuilt engines; props; landing gear actuators and several other items was taken on a test flight for any issues resulting from the extensive disassembly and reassembly of parts and panels.the following are the facts:my director of maintenance (dom) for the newly purchased part 135 air charter and I had done most of the work on the aircraft during long days and nights trying to get it ready for an FAA inspection to be put back in service in march. As the owner of the air charter I called our principal operations inspector (poi) at the local FSDO and let him/her know we were not going to meet the deadline in march and that we were going to wait until late april for the inspection; but nonetheless my dom pushed to complete the remaining repairs by staying very late at night and into the wee morning hours; sometimes exceeding 16-hours of continuous work.my director of maintenance called on the chief pilot and the former director of operations to act as pilot and copilot on a short test run from north ZZZ1 to ZZZ2; and we both rode as passengers to observe aircraft gauges and look for general performance issues.at ZZZ2 we inspected the aircraft and noticed some minor hydraulic leaks from reservoir; engine oil leak from left engine; and some other minor issues that were not serious enough to be a problem for a return flight for further service. We filled all fuel tanks to the top to check for leaks.during run-up; brakes felt like they were not releasing well and a low hydraulic pressure light illuminated. Consensus among the three seasoned aviators was to free up the brakes by fiddling with the parking brake and hydraulic valve and fly back with the landing gear down the whole way in case the low hydraulic warning was in fact an indication of hydraulic issues; which may prevent the landing gears from dropping down for landing.my aviation repair experience is short and limited but I had the opportunity to read the chapter on human factors and the chain of events that generally lead to an incident/accident; and the importance of recognizing that and breaking that chain of events to prevent a catastrophe. However; hearing the three veterans of aviation conferring and deciding to continue to fly the aircraft; against my better judgment; I chose to remain silent and opted to be more vigilant of the aircraft gauges and look out the windows for signs of the hydraulic and engine oil leak from becoming too severe (as if that would be a lot of help at 9;000 feet).even though the following incident didn't result from any of the issues noted above; the fact that the pilot in command (PIC) and the second in command (sic) felt no need to be extra vigilant during the pre flight and/or to question the quality of workmanship during the annual inspection and ensuing repairs; in my opinion; was the 'missed opportunity' to break the chain of events that led to the incident below.upon landing at the home ZZZ1 airfield; the front gear actuator broke just past the jam-nut; which had not been safety wired; as was the left gear. Both these actuators had been sent out to be rebuilt and reinstalled due to leaks; but not safety wired. The recently overhauled engines and props and additionally the nose of the aircraft were severely damaged; when the nose gear collapsed and the aircraft slid down the runway for over 1;200 feet. Fortunately there were no injuries to anyone onboard.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A student mechanic and an Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) report about a Nose Landing Gear (NLG) on a Cessna 421C aircraft that had collapsed on landing damaging both overhauled engines; props; and nose section. Nose Gear Retract Actuator had broken at the actuator rod end where a jam nut was found not safety tied. The aircraft had slid down the runway 1200 feet.

Narrative: A Cessna 421C having undergone a complete and thorough Annual with overhauled/rebuilt engines; props; landing gear actuators and several other items was taken on a test flight for any issues resulting from the extensive disassembly and reassembly of parts and panels.The following are the facts:My Director of Maintenance (DOM) for the newly purchased Part 135 Air Charter and I had done most of the work on the aircraft during long days and nights trying to get it ready for an FAA inspection to be put back in service in March. As the owner of the air charter I called our Principal Operations Inspector (POI) at the local FSDO and let him/her know we were not going to meet the deadline in March and that we were going to wait until late April for the inspection; but nonetheless my DOM pushed to complete the remaining repairs by staying very late at night and into the wee morning hours; sometimes exceeding 16-hours of continuous work.My Director of Maintenance called on the Chief Pilot and the former Director of Operations to act as pilot and copilot on a short test run from North ZZZ1 to ZZZ2; and we both rode as passengers to observe aircraft gauges and look for general performance issues.At ZZZ2 we inspected the aircraft and noticed some minor hydraulic leaks from reservoir; engine oil leak from left engine; and some other minor issues that were not serious enough to be a problem for a return flight for further service. We filled all fuel tanks to the top to check for leaks.During run-up; brakes felt like they were not releasing well and a low hydraulic pressure light illuminated. Consensus among the three seasoned aviators was to free up the brakes by fiddling with the parking brake and hydraulic valve and fly back with the landing gear down the whole way in case the low hydraulic warning was in fact an indication of hydraulic issues; which may prevent the landing gears from dropping down for landing.My aviation repair experience is short and limited but I had the opportunity to read the chapter on human factors and the chain of events that generally lead to an incident/accident; and the importance of recognizing that and breaking that chain of events to prevent a catastrophe. However; hearing the three veterans of aviation conferring and deciding to continue to fly the aircraft; against my better judgment; I chose to remain silent and opted to be more vigilant of the aircraft gauges and look out the windows for signs of the hydraulic and engine oil leak from becoming too severe (as if that would be a lot of help at 9;000 feet).Even though the following incident didn't result from any of the issues noted above; the fact that the Pilot in Command (PIC) and the Second in Command (SIC) felt no need to be extra vigilant during the pre flight and/or to question the quality of workmanship during the Annual Inspection and ensuing repairs; in my opinion; was the 'missed opportunity' to break the chain of events that led to the incident below.Upon landing at the home ZZZ1 airfield; the front gear actuator broke just past the jam-nut; which had not been safety wired; as was the left gear. Both these actuators had been sent out to be rebuilt and reinstalled due to leaks; but not safety wired. The recently overhauled engines and props and additionally the nose of the aircraft were severely damaged; when the nose gear collapsed and the aircraft slid down the runway for over 1;200 feet. Fortunately there were no injuries to anyone onboard.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.