Narrative:

Crew of 4; captain was the flying pilot. Weather at arrival airport was approximately 1300 ovc 10 miles; winds light out of the northwest; temperature +5 I believe the aircraft was free of mechanical discrepancies; landing weight 545;000 approximately 36000 pounds [of] fuel. CAT 1 ILS approach flown by the autopilot/autothrottles. Lithium batteries as reported hazmat. Event occurred at the very end of a scheduled 12 hour flight. The aircraft went into electrical isolation at 1500 RA (radar altimeter) on the autopilot flown approach; the primary EICAS came alive with numerous alert and advisory messages along with the loss of the autopilot and autothrottles. The gear was down and the captain had just asked for flaps 30. I immediately scanned the overhead electrical panel as well as the electrical synoptic page and noticed no apparent electrical failures. At about that time while descending on the glidepath the runway was coming into view. A scan of the EICAS messages showed antiskid and autobrake failures; flaps primary; yaw damper upr; crew oxy low along with a long list of status messages indicating te flaps; park brake valve; elec; bcu 1; ee clng card; fuel X feed 4;3;2;1; yaw damper; localizer and GS antenna left; stall warning sys; no land 3.initially I think the captains as well as my reaction was there is the runway let us get this aircraft with failing systems on the ground. Again we asked out loud 'what do we have' and another quick scan of the messages and flap indicator showed numerous brake and flap issues at which point the first officer said he thought we should go around. The captain called for the go-around which had to be hand flown and was commenced at approximately 700 feet AGL. I reached forward and helped advance the thrust levers as the captain called for flaps 20 and gear up. The first officer notified ATC and instructions were given to fly the missed approach as published. It was at this point the captain realized that he was not able to hear ATC and that his audio panel was inoperative. The first officer began using the number 2 communication and turned up his speaker volume while the captain removed his headset so as to hear communications. We were given a climb to 5;000 feet and we selected LNAV and began to fly the missed approach course. The autopilot was reselected which helped to reduce the captain's workload as we flew the airplane away from the ground. We elected to leave the flaps at 20 and climbed up to 5;000 feet. Reaching altitude the after takeoff checklist was performed followed by the flaps primary checklist. We decided that we would land in a flaps 25 configuration and consulted landing distance charts for our given configuration and determined that we had adequate runway distance to try another approach and landing. We worked together analyzing what we had and what we did not have systems wise and decided that we were ready for another approach. ATC was notified of our situation and we requested another approach. The approach checklist was read and during the decent we put the gear out early and then ran the flaps down to 25. The remainder of the approach and landing were uneventful and we were able to taxi to the ramp. The aircraft was shut down and secured and the voice recorder circuit breaker was pulled. It was very beneficial in this stressful situation to have the extra crewmembers to divide up tasks. The captain focused on flying the aircraft; the first officer handled communications while myself and the other international relief officer ran checklists and looked up performance data. One of the difficulties we faced was the loss of autothrottles which takes a concentrated effort by the flying pilot to keep airspeed trends in his/her scan. Also the loss of communications for the captain/flying pilot was a big distraction until we got the first officer's speaker turned up and the captain's noise canceling headset removed. Apparently this aircraft has had several previous electrical problems of this nature unbeknownst to this operating crew.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B747 relief pilot reports his aircraft going into electrical isolation at 1500 RA on an autopilot flown approach; the primary EICAS came alive with numerous alerts and advisory messages along with the loss of the autopilot and autothrottles. With too many faults to count the crew elects to go-around and assess the situation. The second approach; with many faults still displayed; is successful. The aircraft had a history of similar incidents.

Narrative: Crew of 4; Captain was the flying pilot. Weather at arrival airport was approximately 1300 OVC 10 miles; winds light out of the northwest; temperature +5 I believe the aircraft was free of mechanical discrepancies; Landing weight 545;000 approximately 36000 LBS [of] fuel. CAT 1 ILS approach flown by the autopilot/autothrottles. Lithium batteries as reported Hazmat. Event occurred at the very end of a scheduled 12 hour flight. The aircraft went into electrical isolation at 1500 RA (Radar Altimeter) on the autopilot flown approach; the primary EICAS came alive with numerous alert and advisory messages along with the loss of the autopilot and autothrottles. The gear was down and the captain had just asked for flaps 30. I immediately scanned the overhead electrical panel as well as the electrical synoptic page and noticed no apparent electrical failures. At about that time while descending on the glidepath the runway was coming into view. A scan of the EICAS messages showed antiskid and autobrake failures; flaps primary; yaw damper upr; crew oxy low along with a long list of status messages indicating TE flaps; park brake valve; ELEC; BCU 1; EE CLNG CARD; Fuel X feed 4;3;2;1; Yaw damper; LOC and GS antenna L; Stall Warning sys; No land 3.Initially I think the captains as well as my reaction was there is the runway let us get this aircraft with failing systems on the ground. Again we asked out loud 'what do we have' and another quick scan of the messages and flap indicator showed numerous brake and flap issues at which point the first officer said he thought we should go around. The captain called for the go-around which had to be hand flown and was commenced at approximately 700 feet AGL. I reached forward and helped advance the thrust levers as the captain called for flaps 20 and gear up. The FO notified ATC and instructions were given to fly the missed approach as published. It was at this point the captain realized that he was not able to hear ATC and that his audio panel was INOP. The FO began using the number 2 COM and turned up his speaker volume while the captain removed his headset so as to hear communications. We were given a climb to 5;000 feet and we selected LNAV and began to fly the missed approach course. The autopilot was reselected which helped to reduce the captain's workload as we flew the airplane away from the ground. We elected to leave the flaps at 20 and climbed up to 5;000 feet. Reaching altitude the after takeoff checklist was performed followed by the flaps primary checklist. We decided that we would land in a flaps 25 configuration and consulted landing distance charts for our given configuration and determined that we had adequate runway distance to try another approach and landing. We worked together analyzing what we had and what we did not have systems wise and decided that we were ready for another approach. ATC was notified of our situation and we requested another approach. The approach checklist was read and during the decent we put the gear out early and then ran the flaps down to 25. The remainder of the approach and landing were uneventful and we were able to taxi to the ramp. The aircraft was shut down and secured and the voice recorder circuit breaker was pulled. It was very beneficial in this stressful situation to have the extra crewmembers to divide up tasks. The captain focused on flying the aircraft; the first officer handled communications while myself and the other IRO ran checklists and looked up performance data. One of the difficulties we faced was the loss of autothrottles which takes a concentrated effort by the flying pilot to keep airspeed trends in his/her scan. Also the loss of communications for the captain/flying pilot was a big distraction until we got the FO's speaker turned up and the captain's noise canceling headset removed. Apparently this aircraft has had several previous electrical problems of this nature unbeknownst to this operating crew.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.