Narrative:

About 20 minutes after takeoff while being radar vectored we leveled off at our final cruise altitude of FL340. Shortly after arriving at our final cruise altitude; we heard a triple chime; accompanied by a brake ovht red warning message on ed (EICAS display) 1. We immediately responded to the message with the captain assigning me the task of maintaining the flight controls of the aircraft; since I was the pilot flying; along with the radio communications with ATC; while the captain proceeded with the task of following the QRH. The first item was to slow the aircraft so that the landing gear could be extended. The captain referenced the speed card; and determined that at our current altitude it would be unsafe to slow; and asked me to contact ATC for a descent. ATC assigned us a descent to FL300; so I proceeded to descend; while simultaneously slowing the aircraft. We then extended the landing gear; and within approximately 30 seconds or so; the brake ovht message was extinguished. We looked at various indications and discussed the possibilities of the occurrence being an actual fire. At which time; we then proceeded to retract the landing gear. At this time the captain was preparing to contact company when we encountered the same indications and message approximately 30-45 seconds after retracting the landing gear. (Triple chime; and brake ovht msg.)I immediately proceeded to slow the aircraft once again; while the captain commenced with the operations of the QRH. Following the extension of the landing gear for the second time; the message did not extinguish this time; and after discussing the possibilities we concluded that it would be best to [notify ATC of situation] and ask for a diversion to ZZZ.while I was in communications with ATC; and setting up for an arrival to ZZZ; the captain was communicating with the flight attendants going over the test items; and briefing the passengers. He then communicated with the company; at which time; company asked if we could divert to ZZZ1 instead since it was a maintenance base. We discussed the event; and although I had not noticed a change in the red btms (brake temperature monitoring system) indication; the captain said he had noticed twice that it momentarily flashed amber dashes; and felt that it was probably a faulty sensor indication. In addition; I believe that the captain did indeed verify with the flight attendants that there was not any strange noise or abnormality in the cabin area that would lead us to believe otherwise. The captain checked our distance from our present position in the FMS to both ZZZ and ZZZ1; and deemed it safe to change our destination to ZZZ1; and I concurred with this decision.at this time we asked ATC for a change in destination to ZZZ1; announcing our request for an approach to runway xy; and as a precaution; to roll the fire trucks; being that we were unaware of any potential damage to the landing gear. We proceeded to ZZZ1 with the landing gear down; not exceeding 220 knots along the way; while we changed our flight plan in the FMS; set up for the arrival and continued with all checklists; and preparations for arrival into ZZZ1. We continued to discuss the occurrence; and although I have seen faulty btms indicators in the past; I have never seen one remain red; only amber dashes when they are failed. So in the interest of safety; we felt that we could set up for a left downwind to runway xy; by preceding it with a low approach to runway X; so that ATC could look at our left landing gear from the control tower to ensure that we did not indeed have and evidence of fire damage; a deflated main landing gear tire; or anything that could have come loose that would have caused the warning message in the first place.the tower stated that 'everything appeared to be normal'; so we continued with a visual approach to landing on runway xy with the fire trucks on standby. Once the fire trucks confirmed no damage; we proceeded to taxi to the gate with no further incident.upon inspection from the aircraft mechanics in ZZZ1; it was determined that there had been a missed/communication link in the computer system which I saw displayed on ED2 in their diagnostic review. They MEL'd (btms 1); and returned the aircraft to service.I have always felt that we as pilots learn more from reading and/or listening to occurrences experienced by other pilots. I would like to suggest some kind of monthly report that is generated by both pilots and the maintenance department which discusses certain messages or malfunctions and their causes; diagnostics; and remedies. I believe that this continual education will only benefit our pilot group; by providing a better connection between our knowledge of the aircraft we fly; and our maintenance personnel.also; I would like to add; that after personally reviewing this occurrence; and considering what we could have done differently; along with seeing the diagnostic message that maintenance displayed in their review of the btms failure; that perhaps there should be some kind of directive; either in the QRH or from company maintenance that would have us display the diagnostic page in flight to further elaborate an occurrence of this nature.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ900 First Officer experiences a BRAKE OVHT Red Warning Message on EICAS Display 1 at FL340. The crew elects to descend to a lower altitude and extend the gear in compliance with QRH procedures. The warning is extinguished but returns when the gear is retracted. The gear is extended a second time but the warning remains displayed and the crew elects to divert to a suitable airport. Maintenance determines that the Brake Temperature Monitoring System (BTMS) 1 is at fault and MELd.

Narrative: About 20 minutes after takeoff while being radar vectored we leveled off at our final cruise altitude of FL340. Shortly after arriving at our final cruise altitude; we heard a Triple Chime; accompanied by a BRAKE OVHT Red Warning Message on ED (EICAS Display) 1. We immediately responded to the message with the Captain assigning me the task of maintaining the flight controls of the aircraft; since I was the Pilot Flying; along with the radio communications with ATC; while the Captain proceeded with the task of following the QRH. The first item was to slow the aircraft so that the Landing Gear could be extended. The Captain referenced the Speed Card; and determined that at our current altitude it would be unsafe to slow; and asked me to contact ATC for a descent. ATC assigned us a descent to FL300; so I proceeded to descend; while simultaneously slowing the aircraft. We then extended the Landing Gear; and within approximately 30 seconds or so; the BRAKE OVHT Message was extinguished. We looked at various indications and discussed the possibilities of the occurrence being an actual fire. At which time; we then proceeded to retract the landing gear. At this time the Captain was preparing to contact company when we encountered the same indications and message approximately 30-45 seconds after retracting the landing gear. (Triple Chime; and BRAKE OVHT Msg.)I immediately proceeded to slow the aircraft once again; while the Captain commenced with the operations of the QRH. Following the extension of the Landing Gear for the second time; the message DID NOT Extinguish this time; and after discussing the possibilities we concluded that it would be best to [notify ATC of situation] and ask for a diversion to ZZZ.While I was in communications with ATC; and setting up for an arrival to ZZZ; the Captain was communicating with the Flight Attendants going over the TEST items; and briefing the passengers. He then communicated with the Company; at which time; Company asked if we could divert to ZZZ1 instead since it was a maintenance base. We discussed the event; and although I had not noticed a change in the RED BTMS (Brake Temperature Monitoring System) indication; the Captain said he had noticed twice that it momentarily flashed Amber Dashes; and felt that it was probably a faulty sensor indication. In addition; I believe that the Captain did indeed verify with the Flight Attendants that there was not any strange noise or abnormality in the cabin area that would lead us to believe otherwise. The Captain checked our distance from our present position in the FMS to both ZZZ and ZZZ1; and deemed it safe to change our destination to ZZZ1; and I concurred with this decision.At this time we asked ATC for a change in destination to ZZZ1; announcing our request for an approach to RWY XY; and as a precaution; to roll the Fire Trucks; being that we were unaware of any potential damage to the landing gear. We proceeded to ZZZ1 with the landing gear down; not exceeding 220 knots along the way; while we changed our flight plan in the FMS; set up for the arrival and continued with all checklists; and preparations for arrival into ZZZ1. We continued to discuss the occurrence; and although I have seen faulty BTMS indicators in the past; I have never seen one remain RED; only Amber Dashes when they are failed. So in the interest of safety; we felt that we could set up for a Left Downwind to RWY XY; by preceding it with a Low Approach to RWY X; so that ATC could look at our Left Landing Gear from the Control Tower to ensure that we did not indeed have and evidence of Fire Damage; a Deflated Main Landing Gear Tire; or anything that could have come loose that would have caused the Warning Message in the first place.The Tower stated that 'everything appeared to be normal'; so we continued with a Visual Approach to Landing on RWY XY with the Fire Trucks on Standby. Once the fire trucks confirmed no damage; we proceeded to taxi to the gate with no further incident.Upon inspection from the Aircraft Mechanics in ZZZ1; it was determined that there had been a missed/communication link in the computer system which I saw displayed on ED2 in their diagnostic review. They MEL'd (BTMS 1); and returned the aircraft to service.I have always felt that we as pilots learn more from reading and/or listening to occurrences experienced by other pilots. I would like to suggest some kind of monthly report that is generated by both pilots and the maintenance department which discusses certain messages or malfunctions and their causes; diagnostics; and remedies. I believe that this continual education will only benefit our pilot group; by providing a better connection between our knowledge of the aircraft we fly; and our maintenance personnel.Also; I would like to add; that after personally reviewing this occurrence; and considering what we could have done differently; along with seeing the diagnostic message that maintenance displayed in their review of the BTMS failure; that perhaps there should be some kind of directive; either in the QRH or from Company Maintenance that would have us display the Diagnostic Page in flight to further elaborate an occurrence of this nature.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.