Narrative:

Aircraft was coming out of maintenance. The crew discussed/performed a thorough preflight due to being a post maintenance flight. The pilot in command (PIC) preformed the exterior and cabin preflight and second in command (sic) preformed the interior (flight deck) preflight. Everything checked normal and crew continued all normal checklists/operations through line up checklist. Aircraft departed and within a minute or two an EICAS message appeared; indicating an issue with right and left pitot heat. Crew continued climb to safe altitude; asked ATC for heading and altitude to access the issue. Pilot flying (PF) called for appropriate checklist for the indicated EICAS message. Pilot not flying (PNF) located checklist and read out loud. The sole action item was to select ovrd on probe heat switch which the PNF did. During this time the PF looked at circuit breaker panel to see if anything was abnormal but did not notice anything (one debrief item that the crew would of done different is verbalize the thought about the circuit breakers and have PNF look at them more thoroughly).at approximately this time the left (#1) side airspeed began to deteriorate and an IAS message was displayed on primary flight display (pfd). Crew immediately requested vectors back to [departure airport] for the ILS 11 approach. While turning and descending to assigned altitude/heading; the crew cross checked all instruments and determined right side indications were normal and transferred controls to sic. Air data computer reversion was selected on PIC side and determined transferred information was accurate and PIC took back control of aircraft.sometime during the PNF running approach checklists; setting up the FMS and PF briefing approach; the airspeed on both the right (#2) air data computer and standby airspeed indicator quickly decreased to zero and crew quickly discussed and decided to disregard all airspeed indications. Vectors for ILS approach [were] continued with ATC giving constant airspeed and altitude updates from radar. PF flew using pitch; power; altitude indications with ATC information and vectors to get established on the ILS. Once on the ILS; crew used power settings and ATC as resource to keep the aircraft in stable approach and landed without incident.upon parking and shutting down the aircraft. The crew began debriefing. What caused it; what could have been done differently; was anything missed; etc. It was discovered during this time that the cbs were popped on both pitot tube heats and then the preflight was discussed thoroughly. Both pilots checked the cbs individually and the sic did the ovrd probe heat test which would of displayed EICAS messages if circuit breaker were out during the preflight.the crew came to three main conclusions that they would have done differently: 1. Going forward the crew will do the entire preflight (exterior and interior) together on post maintenance flights (in case something was missed) 2. As previously mentioned; a discussion on double checking the cbs while running the left and right pitot heat EICAS checklist. While it did not call for that action; it makes sense to deliberately check them. 3. A discussion about the possibility of being able to exit IMC and find a VFR airport should have occurred. It does not seem like there was many options at the time but ATC could have been asked for tops reports; weather at surrounding airports; etc.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A G200 flight crew reports picking up an aircraft out of maintenance and performing a very thorough preflight. Once airborne the Captain's airspeed fails and is followed shortly by the First Officer's airspeed failing. The crew returns to the departure airport using pitch and power with ATC providing ground speed and altitude reports. The post flight reveals that both of the pitot heat circuit breakers are tripped.

Narrative: Aircraft was coming out of maintenance. The crew discussed/performed a thorough preflight due to being a post maintenance flight. The Pilot in Command (PIC) preformed the exterior and cabin preflight and Second in Command (SIC) preformed the interior (flight deck) preflight. Everything checked normal and crew continued all normal checklists/operations through Line Up checklist. Aircraft departed and within a minute or two an EICAS message appeared; indicating an issue with Right and Left Pitot heat. Crew continued climb to safe altitude; asked ATC for heading and altitude to access the issue. Pilot Flying (PF) called for appropriate checklist for the indicated EICAS message. Pilot Not Flying (PNF) located checklist and read out loud. The sole action item was to select OVRD on Probe Heat switch which the PNF did. During this time the PF looked at circuit breaker panel to see if anything was abnormal but did not notice anything (one debrief item that the crew would of done different is verbalize the thought about the circuit breakers and have PNF look at them more thoroughly).At approximately this time the Left (#1) side airspeed began to deteriorate and an IAS message was displayed on Primary Flight Display (PFD). Crew immediately requested vectors back to [departure airport] for the ILS 11 approach. While turning and descending to assigned altitude/heading; the crew cross checked all instruments and determined Right side indications were normal and transferred controls to SIC. ADC reversion was selected on PIC side and determined transferred information was accurate and PIC took back control of aircraft.Sometime during the PNF running approach checklists; setting up the FMS and PF briefing approach; the airspeed on both the right (#2) ADC and standby airspeed indicator quickly decreased to zero and crew quickly discussed and decided to disregard all airspeed indications. Vectors for ILS approach [were] continued with ATC giving constant airspeed and altitude updates from radar. PF flew using pitch; power; altitude indications with ATC information and vectors to get established on the ILS. Once on the ILS; crew used power settings and ATC as resource to keep the aircraft in stable approach and landed without incident.Upon parking and shutting down the aircraft. The crew began debriefing. What caused it; what could have been done differently; was anything missed; etc. It was discovered during this time that the CBs were popped on both pitot tube heats and then the preflight was discussed thoroughly. Both pilots checked the CBs individually and the SIC did the OVRD Probe Heat test which would of displayed EICAS messages if CB were out during the preflight.The crew came to three main conclusions that they would have done differently: 1. Going forward the crew will do the entire preflight (exterior and interior) together on post maintenance flights (in case something was missed) 2. As previously mentioned; a discussion on double checking the CBs while running the L and R Pitot Heat EICAS checklist. While it did not call for that action; it makes sense to deliberately check them. 3. A discussion about the possibility of being able to exit IMC and find a VFR airport should have occurred. It does not seem like there was many options at the time but ATC could have been asked for tops reports; weather at surrounding airports; etc.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.