Narrative:

Lexington TRACON controller gave us a 'direct saddl' and 'maintain 11000' clearance while approaching lex from the northeast. A few minutes later controller gave a 'cleared ILS 22' clearance with no further descend clearance attached. Controller was questioned about receiving a clearance to descend to a lower altitude. Controller became agitated and said that when he gave us the approach clearance; that allowed us to descend on our own to the altitude published on the approach; in this case; presumably 3200 feet. I responded that that was incorrect. Controller indicated that was his expectation for us to follow the clearance as given and descend now and not wait until passing saddl (thus being on a published portion of the approach rather than on a off airway/direct clearance to saddl). Rather than argue with him; I requested a descent to 3200 feet; twice; and received the clearance and completed the descent; approach and landing normally.I phoned the lex TRACON after securing the plane on the ramp and spoke with the controller. He indicated that he was using guidance contained within '.65' and that it was his belief that if I was cleared direct to a fix on an approach that I could descend to the first altitude on the published portion of the approach. I told him that is not correct and both the far and aim guidance provided pilots indicates that his statement is only true if the aircraft was established on a published portion of the approach. He kept reiterating that it's 'all up to interpretation' and that's why he didn't 'withhold' the requested clearance to descend to 3200 feet. I responded that we would just have to agree to disagree because in 26 years of flying airplanes and 10 years of flying into lex on a regular basis; I have never been given a clearance the way he did except when I was in a non-radar environment or when I was cleared direct to an IAF on an RNAV approach that utilized a terminal arrival area (taa) format.it doesn't appear that this controllers philosophy or interpretation is the norm throughout the NAS. The confusion in communication this scenario presented between the crew and controller was managed with success. However; left high and rapidly approaching an IAF isn't the most ideal place to workout the details of the controllers expectations. From my point of view; far 91.175(i); the details; findings and resulting procedural changes surrounding the crash outside of iad many years ago; and aim guidance speak for themselves. Clarity needs to be brought to the proper way to give an approach clearance in this situation. Directionally; this is an altitude 'bust'; TCAS/near miss event; or CFIT accident waiting to happen.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Pilot reports of a disagreement between pilot and ATC when issued an approach clearance.

Narrative: Lexington TRACON controller gave us a 'direct SADDL' and 'maintain 11000' clearance while approaching LEX from the northeast. A few minutes later controller gave a 'cleared ILS 22' clearance with no further descend clearance attached. Controller was questioned about receiving a clearance to descend to a lower altitude. Controller became agitated and said that when he gave us the approach clearance; that allowed us to descend on our own to the altitude published on the approach; in this case; presumably 3200 feet. I responded that that was incorrect. Controller indicated that was his expectation for us to follow the clearance as given and descend now and not wait until passing SADDL (thus being on a published portion of the approach rather than on a off airway/direct clearance to SADDL). Rather than argue with him; I requested a descent to 3200 feet; twice; and received the clearance and completed the descent; approach and landing normally.I phoned the LEX TRACON after securing the plane on the ramp and spoke with the controller. He indicated that he was using guidance contained within '.65' and that it was his belief that if I was cleared direct to a fix on an approach that I could descend to the first altitude on the published portion of the approach. I told him that is not correct and both the FAR and AIM guidance provided pilots indicates that his statement is only true if the aircraft was established on a published portion of the approach. He kept reiterating that it's 'all up to interpretation' and that's why he didn't 'withhold' the requested clearance to descend to 3200 feet. I responded that we would just have to agree to disagree because in 26 years of flying airplanes and 10 years of flying into LEX on a regular basis; I have never been given a clearance the way he did except when I was in a non-radar environment or when I was cleared direct to an IAF on an RNAV approach that utilized a terminal arrival area (TAA) format.It doesn't appear that this controllers philosophy or interpretation is the norm throughout the NAS. The confusion in communication this scenario presented between the crew and controller was managed with success. However; left high and rapidly approaching an IAF isn't the most ideal place to workout the details of the controllers expectations. From my point of view; FAR 91.175(i); the details; findings and resulting procedural changes surrounding the crash outside of IAD many years ago; and AIM guidance speak for themselves. Clarity needs to be brought to the proper way to give an approach clearance in this situation. Directionally; this is an altitude 'bust'; TCAS/near miss event; or CFIT accident waiting to happen.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.