Narrative:

Runways 27R/27L advertised and runway 35L for instrument arrivals unable to accept runway 27R due to operational need. **Note - I personally was on break but came up to relieve the controller in position shortly after the event occurred; therefore events noted further are primarily based on recorded tapes. During the time of the event; the certified professional controller (cpc) working was combined local; working all runways (27R/left & 35L - this intersecting operation is a recurring systemic issue that has been reported with no resolution); with aircraft X operating closed traffic on runway 27L. In between gaps on the upwind of runway 27L; aircraft Y landed runway 35L and the next time through the pattern aircraft X was instructed to remain on the downwind. Followed by aircraft Y on approach to runway 35L is aircraft Z. During this time there is traffic operating on runway 27R; aircraft Y landing roll runway 35L; aircraft a departing runway 27L and a helicopter operating closed traffic on victor sod. Additionally there are numerous vehicles operating on local's frequency culminating in an extremely complex situation. As aircraft Y is told to exit runway 35L and 'taxi south runway correction taxiway alpha hold short.' at this moment it is quite apparent the controller is very behind and the controller in charge (controller in charge) has done nothing to remedy the situation. Had the controller in charge been monitoring where the local controller was not looking; the next event would not have occurred. As it appears on the tape and based on direct witness statements; aircraft X said 'aircraft a but [aircraft X's numbers] going around'....'aircraft X'. Around 30 seconds later; the controller notices the near midair with aircraft Z and aircraft X and instructs aircraft X to 'climb as high as you can.'first recommendation - make grand forks regional airport authority conduct maintenance operations during low to no traffic times; i.e.; at night. It is cheaper to pay the overtime than to go to court for the worst case scenario that no one wants to see.second recommendation - construct runway 27R to allow heavy aircraft operations in order to eliminate the intersecting operation we so often find ourselves being forced to work through every time we are in an east or west configuration.third recommendation - remove the controller in charge from the tower cab as this particular individual is tied to a few incidents now; one of which has gone to a national level for a procedural drift caused by this individual's actions (or lack thereof). Had this person been scanning where local was not; and recognized that the controller was falling behind; they could have and should have taken appropriate action to get assistance up to the tower in order to eliminate the over load this controller was experiencing. Understanding that the responsibility relies mostly on the controller to speak up when they need help; sometimes it may be too late and in this case I believe this is where the controller was; making it now the prerogative of controller in charge to ensure the position is either split or relief is brought up immediately to help the controller out. This event could have been prevented.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A GFK Controller reports of a near midair caused by traffic using the wrong call sign and one that is similar to an aircraft in the pattern. This causes the Controller working local to become more confused. Additionally; the Controller was working combined locals.

Narrative: Runways 27R/27L advertised and runway 35L for instrument arrivals unable to accept runway 27R due to operational need. **NOTE - I personally was on break but came up to relieve the controller in position shortly after the event occurred; therefore events noted further are primarily based on recorded tapes. During the time of the event; the Certified Professional Controller (CPC) working was combined local; working all runways (27R/L & 35L - this intersecting operation is a recurring systemic issue that has been reported with no resolution); with Aircraft X operating closed traffic on runway 27L. In between gaps on the upwind of runway 27L; Aircraft Y landed runway 35L and the next time through the pattern Aircraft X was instructed to remain on the downwind. Followed by Aircraft Y on approach to runway 35L is Aircraft Z. During this time there is traffic operating on runway 27R; Aircraft Y landing roll runway 35L; Aircraft A departing runway 27L and a helicopter operating closed traffic on VICTOR SOD. Additionally there are numerous vehicles operating on Local's frequency culminating in an extremely complex situation. As Aircraft Y is told to exit runway 35L and 'taxi south runway correction taxiway alpha hold short.' At this moment it is quite apparent the controller is very behind and the Controller in Charge (CIC) has done nothing to remedy the situation. Had the CIC been monitoring where the local controller was not looking; the next event would not have occurred. As it appears on the tape and based on direct witness statements; Aircraft X said 'Aircraft A but [Aircraft X's numbers] going around'....'Aircraft X'. Around 30 seconds later; the controller notices the near midair with Aircraft Z and Aircraft X and instructs Aircraft X to 'climb as high as you can.'First recommendation - Make Grand Forks Regional Airport Authority conduct maintenance operations during low to no traffic times; i.e.; at night. It is cheaper to pay the overtime than to go to court for the worst case scenario that no one wants to see.Second recommendation - Construct runway 27R to allow heavy aircraft operations in order to eliminate the intersecting operation we so often find ourselves being forced to work through every time we are in an east or west configuration.Third recommendation - Remove the CIC from the tower cab as this particular individual is tied to a few incidents now; one of which has gone to a national level for a procedural drift caused by this individual's actions (or lack thereof). Had this person been scanning where local was not; and recognized that the controller was falling behind; they could have and should have taken appropriate action to get assistance up to the tower in order to eliminate the over load this controller was experiencing. Understanding that the responsibility relies mostly on the controller to speak up when they need help; sometimes it may be too late and in this case I believe this is where the controller was; making it now the prerogative of CIC to ensure the position is either split or relief is brought up immediately to help the controller out. This event could have been prevented.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.