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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1261129 |
Time | |
Date | 201505 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | N90.TRACON |
State Reference | NY |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | A321 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Initial Approach |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Flying Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Person 2 | |
Function | Pilot Not Flying First Officer |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence |
Narrative:
Approaching jfk near midnight; we were told that weather has immediately gone down to 1800RVR and the active runway has been changed from 31L/right to 22L. We were also told that center line lighting to runway 22L was inoperative. There was a lot of commotion in the air as crew after crew was trying to figure out their requirements for an approach or to go to an alternate. Approach control asked us what we wanted to do. We asked to be vectored while we looked things up. The first officer (first officer) was pilot monitoring; began to input the runway change as I looked into the manuals and charts. I found out that we could shoot a CAT ii with 1;200 foot ceiling and no centerline lights. I briefed it; made the appropriate pas and we shot the approach with auto-land and landed uneventfully. The next day as I was pulling out the paper work for the [next] leg; I noticed that in the notams there is a line in the approach section at the bottom that said starting may 2015 cat ii and III operations to runway 22L are prohibited until further notice (ufn). There was no other indication of this restriction anywhere else in the paperwork; on ATIS or anywhere else. And even though this NOTAM was on the release of my flight the day after the landing; I am assuming that the release on the previous day had the same restriction. The change in the runway and approach was made very late. In fact we were informed of this just as we were abeam kennedy and had begun to configure. Myself and my first officer were both instantly overwhelmed by the amount of work that had to be done. To the best of my knowledge; we did everything correctly and made a CAT ii approach uneventfully. But we missed the note at the bottom of the release. I guess the way to avoid this would have been to take even longer and study all the notes. But at the end of three legs and at midnight; with all of this going on; going through the release just didn't seem like a priority. Studying the release is something that I always do; but apparently I didn't do a good enough job or I would have seen it before the flight. Another suggestion is that dispatch could have done a better job being aware of the changes as well. When approach control first announced the change in runway; weather conditions and center line lighting; we could hear several [company] crews not sure what to do. Everyone seemed concerned with the RVR and center line lights being out. If the runway in use during CAT ii or III operations is restricted for these approaches; some heads up time would have saved a lot of anxiety as well as the agony of sending a bunch of airplanes to [an] alternate at midnight.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A321 flight crew reported missing an important NOTAM that would have precluded their approach to runway 22L at JFK; citing workload resulting from a late runway change as contributing.
Narrative: Approaching JFK near midnight; we were told that weather has immediately gone down to 1800RVR and the active runway has been changed from 31L/R to 22L. We were also told that center line lighting to runway 22L was inoperative. There was a lot of commotion in the air as crew after crew was trying to figure out their requirements for an approach or to go to an alternate. Approach control asked us what we wanted to do. We asked to be vectored while we looked things up. The First Officer (FO) was pilot monitoring; began to input the runway change as I looked into the manuals and charts. I found out that we could shoot a CAT II with 1;200 foot ceiling and no centerline lights. I briefed it; made the appropriate PAs and we shot the approach with auto-land and landed uneventfully. The next day as I was pulling out the paper work for the [next] leg; I noticed that in the NOTAMs there is a line in the approach section at the bottom that said starting May 2015 Cat II and III operations to runway 22L are prohibited Until Further Notice (UFN). There was no other indication of this restriction anywhere else in the paperwork; on ATIS or anywhere else. And even though this NOTAM was on the release of my flight the day after the landing; I am assuming that the release on the previous day had the same restriction. The change in the runway and approach was made very late. In fact we were informed of this just as we were abeam Kennedy and had begun to configure. Myself and my FO were both instantly overwhelmed by the amount of work that had to be done. To the best of my knowledge; we did everything correctly and made a CAT II approach uneventfully. But we missed the note at the bottom of the release. I guess the way to avoid this would have been to take even longer and study all the notes. But at the end of three legs and at midnight; with all of this going on; going through the release just didn't seem like a priority. Studying the release is something that I always do; but apparently I didn't do a good enough job or I would have seen it before the flight. Another suggestion is that dispatch could have done a better job being aware of the changes as well. When approach control first announced the change in runway; weather conditions and center line lighting; we could hear several [Company] crews not sure what to do. Everyone seemed concerned with the RVR and center line lights being out. If the runway in use during CAT II or III operations is restricted for these approaches; some heads up time would have saved a lot of anxiety as well as the agony of sending a bunch of airplanes to [an] alternate at midnight.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.