Narrative:

During the first stage of climb just after gear retraction we received a windshear warning message. I was the pilot monitoring (pm) (captain). However; due to my first officer's lack of response I had to push the thrust levers to max thrust and stated max thrust. I then read off our airspeed and altitude trends until we were clear of conflict. I saw our itt as high as 912-913 degrees C; due to the high altitude there was not much excess thrust. I chose not to divert back to the departure airport because of the current conditions.upon approach at the destination we were cleared for the visual; however; the first officer (first officer) was waiting on the automation to turn from base to final. Which we had not sequenced when we turned from downwind to base using the autopilot heading mode just a moment before. I asked him if he saw the far north runway and he said yes. I then said are you going to turn in? He said he was waiting on the autopilot to intercept the final. I said that we need to set it up in the FMS and be on navigation mode for that to happen. I told him to turn in and turn off the auto pilot so we do not over shoot; he was hesitant and we almost overshot. Once on final we were stabilized but just above the runway the first officer made incorrect inputs which would have resulted in a wing strike if I did not take the controls at 5 feet off the ground. There was less than a 5 knot cross wind and this should not have been an issue. I believe the root cause is due to several issues. 1. Due to the current make-up within the industry we are now receiving more inexperienced first officers who meet standards yet are weak in flying ability. 2. Again due to staffing we shipping our fos and ca across the system to unfamiliar places with extend duty times due to the 18 hour limit allowed by far 117 with respect to reserves. 3. There seems to be an over reliance on automation. Given that there is an undeniable pilot shortage within the regional airline industry; events like this are going to become commonplace. The first officer had a great attitude and a willingness to do the job correctly; however; being in an unfamiliar environment (tdy); with low time in the aircraft; combined with long duty days permitted by far 117 loopholes; I am fearful that we are faced with a decrease in safety due to inability to staff with more experienced pilots. I do not have a resolution for this event; which is why I am filling out this safety report in hopes to bring more attention to the issue.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-200 Captain laments the experience level of new First Officers that the company is hiring and believes that they are trained to be overly reliant on automation.

Narrative: During the first stage of climb just after gear retraction we received a windshear warning message. I was the Pilot Monitoring (PM) (Captain). However; due to my FO's lack of response I had to push the thrust levers to max thrust and stated max thrust. I then read off our airspeed and altitude trends until we were clear of conflict. I saw our ITT as high as 912-913 degrees C; due to the high altitude there was not much excess thrust. I chose not to divert back to the departure airport because of the current conditions.Upon approach at the destination we were cleared for the visual; however; the First Officer (FO) was waiting on the automation to turn from base to final. Which we had not sequenced when we turned from downwind to base using the autopilot HDG mode just a moment before. I asked him if he saw the far North runway and he said yes. I then said are you going to turn in? He said he was waiting on the autopilot to intercept the final. I said that we need to set it up in the FMS and be on NAV mode for that to happen. I told him to turn in and turn off the auto pilot so we do not over shoot; he was hesitant and we almost overshot. Once on final we were stabilized but just above the runway the FO made incorrect inputs which would have resulted in a wing strike if I did not take the controls at 5 feet off the ground. There was less than a 5 knot cross wind and this should not have been an issue. I believe the root cause is due to several issues. 1. Due to the current make-up within the industry we are now receiving more inexperienced first officers who meet standards yet are weak in flying ability. 2. Again due to staffing we shipping our FOs and CA across the system to unfamiliar places with extend duty times due to the 18 hour limit allowed by FAR 117 with respect to reserves. 3. There seems to be an over reliance on automation. Given that there is an undeniable pilot shortage within the regional airline industry; events like this are going to become commonplace. The first officer had a great attitude and a willingness to do the job correctly; however; being in an unfamiliar environment (TDY); with low time in the aircraft; combined with long duty days permitted by FAR 117 loopholes; I am fearful that we are faced with a decrease in safety due to inability to staff with more experienced pilots. I do not have a resolution for this event; which is why I am filling out this safety report in hopes to bring more attention to the issue.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.