Narrative:

A series of distractions set up an error on my part departing ord on the last leg of a 2 day trip. A delay at the gate by a minor cabin maintenance issue followed by traffic in the alley created concern about making an estimated departure clearance time (edct). An unfamiliar runway configuration also helped to create time compression issues. The departure ATIS called for runway 10L; 22L or 9R for departure. We initially planned for and briefed a 22L departure. Upon check-in with ground; with approximately 10 minutes to our edct; we were assigned runway 9R via taxiway a; east; cross 4L; H hold short of J; a fairly short; complicated taxi. As the captain taxied I went heads down to request the takeoff data for the departure runway. Unfortunately; at this point; years of flying out of ord under the old runway naming conventions and very little recency with the new (maybe 3 times) combined with all the other references to 'left' runways (10L; 22L and crossing 4L) led me to request data for and load 9L. As the data came in requiring a configuration change to flaps 15; we were cleared into position. We were both distracted by a regional jet taxiing at fairly high speed on J approaching us and the entry to 9R. The regional jet stopped abruptly but left marginal wing tip clearance as we made the turn toward the runway. I believe this significantly impacted both of us not catching the discrepancy during the before takeoff checklist and runway verification. I believe I said 9L during the checklist read out and remember looking at the 9 next to the runway as I said it. I believe the left may have been obscured by TCAS info from a departing aircraft. Also; in my mind; 9L was the correct runway. Neither of us noticed the aircraft was not lined up on the runway display until after the 100 knot call. When I realized the mistake I made the decision not to call for the abort because the takeoff data was for a shorter runway and the aircraft did not meet the criteria for a high speed abort. Discussing the error later with the captain; he came to the same conclusion.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 flight crew reports becoming distracted during taxi out at ORD due to an estimated departure clearance time and a departure runway change. Takeoff data for Runway 9L is inadvertently requested and used for takeoff from Runway 9R. Both crew members detect the error during the takeoff roll and elect to continue due to 9R being longer than 9L.

Narrative: A series of distractions set up an error on my part departing ORD on the last leg of a 2 day trip. A delay at the gate by a minor cabin maintenance issue followed by traffic in the alley created concern about making an estimated departure clearance time (EDCT). An unfamiliar runway configuration also helped to create time compression issues. The departure ATIS called for Runway 10L; 22L or 9R for departure. We initially planned for and briefed a 22L departure. Upon check-in with Ground; with approximately 10 minutes to our EDCT; we were assigned Runway 9R via Taxiway A; E; cross 4L; H hold short of J; a fairly short; complicated taxi. As the Captain taxied I went heads down to request the takeoff data for the departure runway. Unfortunately; at this point; years of flying out of ORD under the old runway naming conventions and very little recency with the new (maybe 3 times) combined with all the other references to 'left' runways (10L; 22L and crossing 4L) led me to request data for and load 9L. As the data came in requiring a configuration change to flaps 15; we were cleared into position. We were both distracted by a regional jet taxiing at fairly high speed on J approaching us and the entry to 9R. The regional jet stopped abruptly but left marginal wing tip clearance as we made the turn toward the runway. I believe this significantly impacted both of us not catching the discrepancy during the before takeoff checklist and runway verification. I believe I said 9L during the checklist read out and remember looking at the 9 next to the runway as I said it. I believe the L may have been obscured by TCAS info from a departing aircraft. Also; in my mind; 9L was the correct runway. Neither of us noticed the aircraft was not lined up on the runway display until after the 100 knot call. When I realized the mistake I made the decision not to call for the abort because the takeoff data was for a shorter runway and the aircraft did not meet the criteria for a high speed abort. Discussing the error later with the Captain; he came to the same conclusion.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.