Narrative:

Loud noise heard and vibration felt within moments after takeoff. Gear retracted normally and all cockpit indications were normal. Initially thought [noise] was due to continued nose wheel rotation. The noise became so loud we had to yell to fellow flight deck crewmembers. We climbed to 15;000 feet; held and limited the airspeed to 250 knots. We then slowed with the flaps out for noise and possible damage. We conferenced with dispatch; maintenance control; the chief pilot. Apparently there was history of nose wheel noise. Maintenance control was helpful in the beginning but continued to chatter on the frequency; talking amongst each other with dispatch and the chief pilot. This was distracting and it became clear that maintenance control was not going to be able to help us further and we decided we would need to return to ZZZ. As we were preparing; I asked for the fleet to be conferenced. The fleet joined after a long delay. I learned on the ground that getting the fleet required several calls going down a long list of numbers. We dumped all center tank fuel and developed a plan to land overweight but below the runway limit and performance weights. We had dispatch send us landing distances for 600;000 lbs and 516;000 lbs. We dumped to 516. I asked the purser to come to the cockpit and I briefed her; saying that I expected a normal approach and landing; but as a precaution I would like her and her crew to review the evacuation checklist. We told her that should the nose gear collapse doors-4 and likely-3 would likely be unusable due to the nose down angle. She was extremely professional and did a phenomenal job. I made several passenger announcements explaining the reason for the divert and trying to provide comfort and reduce any anxiety. We returned to ZZZ; making the overweight landing on 22R; and bringing the aircraft to stop off the high speed. We had the emergency equipment and maintenance inspect the aircraft. The right nose gear door rod was found hanging upon maintenance's inspection. Maintenance asked if we wanted to be towed in as they had a tow vehicle; so we were towed to the gate. Upon my inspection once at the gate; it appeared the rod came unscrewed from the bolt connecting the door to the nose wheel. The cockpit crew worked extremely well together; coming up with suggestions and everyone playing a role from making PA announcements to monitoring to ATC and company communications. The team effort was outstanding and everything we have trained for. On the ground; I debriefed the flight attendant crew. They expressed pleasure with my announcements but were shaken due to being asked to review the 'pink card' as they put it. I asked if there was anything I could have done to make them more comfortable and they said no. I advocated with their management for their replacement as they had been taxed by the event. I spoke with the chief pilot and explained that as much as I would have liked to go; and that while I felt very good at the moment; I knew in 13 hours I would not. The chief pilot agreed; coded the call and human factors; and thought I wouldn't feel great in a couple of hours. He was right. I left my identification at the podium not once but twice when jumpseating home. It would not have been safe to continue and fortunately I have enough experience to know the insidiousness of these situations. Fatigue was all post flight and more human factors; not during [the event]. Fatigue. Aircraft system malfunction. Landing gear. [Door] failed to retract. [Event] after liftoff.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Captain and First Officer report of a loud noise and vibration felt just after takeoff on a B777 aircraft. The noise continued and became so loud the crew had to yell at other flight deck crewmembers. Fuel was dumped and aircraft returned to departure airport. Maintenance found a connecting rod for the Nose Landing Gear (NLG) right door had disconnected from the NLG.

Narrative: Loud noise heard and vibration felt within moments after takeoff. Gear retracted normally and all cockpit indications were normal. Initially thought [noise] was due to continued nose wheel rotation. The noise became so loud we had to yell to fellow flight deck crewmembers. We climbed to 15;000 feet; held and limited the airspeed to 250 knots. We then slowed with the flaps out for noise and possible damage. We conferenced with Dispatch; Maintenance Control; the Chief Pilot. Apparently there was history of nose wheel noise. Maintenance Control was helpful in the beginning but continued to chatter on the frequency; talking amongst each other with Dispatch and the Chief Pilot. This was distracting and it became clear that Maintenance Control was not going to be able to help us further and we decided we would need to return to ZZZ. As we were preparing; I asked for the Fleet to be conferenced. The Fleet joined after a long delay. I learned on the ground that getting the Fleet required several calls going down a long list of numbers. We dumped all center tank fuel and developed a plan to land overweight but below the runway limit and performance weights. We had Dispatch send us landing distances for 600;000 lbs and 516;000 lbs. We dumped to 516. I asked the Purser to come to the cockpit and I briefed her; saying that I expected a normal approach and landing; but as a precaution I would like her and her crew to review the Evacuation checklist. We told her that should the nose gear collapse doors-4 and likely-3 would likely be unusable due to the nose down angle. She was extremely professional and did a phenomenal job. I made several passenger announcements explaining the reason for the divert and trying to provide comfort and reduce any anxiety. We returned to ZZZ; making the overweight landing on 22R; and bringing the aircraft to stop off the high speed. We had the Emergency equipment and Maintenance inspect the aircraft. The right nose gear door rod was found hanging upon maintenance's inspection. Maintenance asked if we wanted to be towed in as they had a tow vehicle; so we were towed to the gate. Upon my inspection once at the gate; it appeared the rod came unscrewed from the bolt connecting the door to the nose wheel. The cockpit crew worked extremely well together; coming up with suggestions and everyone playing a role from making PA announcements to monitoring to ATC and company communications. The team effort was outstanding and everything we have trained for. On the ground; I debriefed the Flight attendant crew. They expressed pleasure with my announcements but were shaken due to being asked to review the 'pink card' as they put it. I asked if there was anything I could have done to make them more comfortable and they said no. I advocated with their management for their replacement as they had been taxed by the event. I spoke with the Chief Pilot and explained that as much as I would have liked to go; and that while I felt very good at the moment; I knew in 13 hours I would not. The Chief Pilot agreed; coded the call and human factors; and thought I wouldn't feel great in a couple of hours. He was right. I left my ID at the podium not once but twice when jumpseating home. It would not have been safe to continue and fortunately I have enough experience to know the insidiousness of these situations. Fatigue was all post flight and more human factors; not during [the event]. Fatigue. Aircraft System Malfunction. Landing Gear. [Door] Failed to Retract. [Event] after liftoff.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.