Narrative:

Aircraft X was proceeding direct camrn and by SOP should have been issued 40 miles southeast of camrn at 14;000. Camrn arrivals need to cross camrn at 9;000 and 250kts. At the time aircraft X checked on; R66 had ten aircraft in its airspace; all of them below aircraft X's altitude at that time; and all of them above the altitude aircraft X needed to go to.shortly after aircraft X checked on; the R86 controller called and informed the RA66 controller that aircraft X did not receive any altitude restriction; because the flight could not maintain the 20 miles in trail spacing behind aircraft Y if he altered his speed; and aircraft X couldn't make the altitude restriction unless he altered his speed; so the R86 controller tossed out the altitude restriction. The R86 controller opted to maintain 20 miles in trail spacing over complying with the SOP. The quick look function was fully functional at the time; and the video display monitor was performing normally and displaying limited data; so the R86 controller certainly had the tools at his disposal to see the numerous flights he was descending aircraft X through in an unsafe and uncontrolled fashion.the RA66 controller instructed the R86 controller that we had multiple flights in conflict with aircraft X; and that the R86 controller needed to turn aircraft X and keep him out of R66's airspace until they could meet their vertical obligations. This would hurt the in-trail spacing with the flights behind aircraft X; but that is not the reason why the R86 controller couldn't comply with the instruction. The R86 controller had already shipped the flight; having chosen to inform R66 that the flight did not have the SOP restriction after transferring communications.we managed to give aircraft X a restriction for camrn at 9;000; and then vectored several flights out of his way. One flight; aircraft Z; received a 60 degree left turn to miss aircraft X. R86's slavish devotion to in-trail spacing; and his disregard of his SOP obligations; and his improper practice of transferring communications before calling and coordinating crucial information; and his inability to quick look another sector or scan limited data; all of these things added complexity to a busy sector and created a very dangerous situation.1) a briefing item to remind controllers that SOP procedures are in place for a reason and failure to comply/coordinate is an airspace violation and can be unsafe.2) a briefing item to remind controllers that necessary coordination shall be accomplished prior to transfer of communication and before entering another's airspace.3) a briefing item to remind controllers that limited data in immediately surrounding airspace can provide crucial information to aid in forming safe plans.4) a briefing item to remind controllers how the quick look function works.5) a briefing item to remind controllers that in-trail restrictions should be complied with; but not at the risk of harm to human lives.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A New York Center (ZNY) Controller reports of a SOP violation caused by another sector not descending an aircraft to the appropriate altitude which; in turn; caused multiple conflictions for the receiving Controller.

Narrative: Aircraft X was proceeding direct CAMRN and by SOP should have been issued 40 miles Southeast of CAMRN at 14;000. CAMRN arrivals need to cross CAMRN at 9;000 and 250kts. At the time Aircraft X checked on; R66 had ten aircraft in its airspace; all of them below Aircraft X's altitude at that time; and all of them above the altitude Aircraft X needed to go to.Shortly after Aircraft X checked on; the R86 controller called and informed the RA66 controller that Aircraft X did not receive any altitude restriction; because the flight could not maintain the 20 miles in trail spacing behind Aircraft Y if he altered his speed; and Aircraft X couldn't make the altitude restriction unless he altered his speed; so the R86 controller tossed out the altitude restriction. The R86 controller opted to maintain 20 miles in trail spacing over complying with the SOP. The Quick Look function was fully functional at the time; and the video display monitor was performing normally and displaying limited data; so the R86 controller certainly had the tools at his disposal to see the numerous flights he was descending Aircraft X through in an unsafe and uncontrolled fashion.The RA66 controller instructed the R86 controller that we had multiple flights in conflict with Aircraft X; and that the R86 controller needed to turn Aircraft X and keep him out of R66's airspace until they could meet their vertical obligations. This would hurt the in-trail spacing with the flights behind Aircraft X; but that is not the reason why the R86 controller couldn't comply with the instruction. The R86 controller had already shipped the flight; having chosen to inform R66 that the flight did not have the SOP restriction after transferring communications.We managed to give Aircraft X a restriction for CAMRN at 9;000; and then vectored several flights out of his way. One flight; Aircraft Z; received a 60 degree left turn to miss Aircraft X. R86's slavish devotion to in-trail spacing; and his disregard of his SOP obligations; and his improper practice of transferring communications before calling and coordinating crucial information; and his inability to Quick Look another sector or scan limited data; all of these things added complexity to a busy sector and created a very dangerous situation.1) A briefing item to remind controllers that SOP procedures are in place for a reason and failure to comply/coordinate is an airspace violation and can be unsafe.2) A briefing item to remind controllers that necessary coordination shall be accomplished prior to transfer of communication and before entering another's airspace.3) A briefing item to remind controllers that limited data in immediately surrounding airspace can provide crucial information to aid in forming safe plans.4) A briefing item to remind controllers how the Quick Look function works.5) A briefing item to remind controllers that in-trail restrictions should be complied with; but not at the risk of harm to human lives.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.