37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1278330 |
Time | |
Date | 201507 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200) |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Cruise |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Exterior Pax/Crew Door |
Person 1 | |
Function | First Officer Pilot Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
While in cruise flight an EICAS caution message for passenger dr stow appeared. As the captain (pilot monitoring) instinctively called the flight attendant to have her sit down; I (pilot flying) reached down and opened up the QRH to what I thought to be the applicable section and handed the book to him. After following the QRH procedure and not clearing the caution message we opted to divert as the QRH advised. After a subsequent diversion...and after speaking to maintenance personnel we determined that we had completed the wrong QRH procedure. We had; in fact; run the passenger dr out hndl checklist instead. Many lessons were learned from this event. First; although well-intentioned; as pilot flying it was not my duty nor was it in our best interest for me to reach for; nor be concerned with the QRH. I should have allowed the captain to work the issue without leading him down the path of an improper QRH procedure. Secondly; I feel we should have slowed-down to match the correct caution message with the applicable QRH procedure. There are many passenger dr caution messages and I mistakenly opened the QRH to the first mention of passenger dr (phase III or phase iv door determination). Lastly; although the checklist said to divert; there was a part of me that questioned whether this event would justify a diversion. I should have acted on this feeling so as to verify or possibly re-run the QRH procedure. This was a learning opportunity for both the captain and myself. I feel that although both of us wanted the safest and best outcome; we perhaps rushed the procedure rather than slowing down to assess the big picture.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: CRJ-200 flight crew made an unnecessary diversion after running the wrong QRH procedure for a PAX DR STOW warning.
Narrative: While in cruise flight an EICAS caution message for PAX DR STOW appeared. As the Captain (pilot monitoring) instinctively called the flight attendant to have her sit down; I (pilot flying) reached down and opened up the QRH to what I thought to be the applicable section and handed the book to him. After following the QRH procedure and not clearing the caution message we opted to divert as the QRH advised. After a subsequent diversion...and after speaking to maintenance personnel we determined that we had completed the wrong QRH procedure. We had; in fact; run the PAX DR OUT HNDL checklist instead. Many lessons were learned from this event. First; although well-intentioned; as pilot flying it was not my duty nor was it in our best interest for me to reach for; nor be concerned with the QRH. I should have allowed the Captain to work the issue without leading him down the path of an improper QRH procedure. Secondly; I feel we should have slowed-down to match the correct caution message with the applicable QRH procedure. There are many PAX DR caution messages and I mistakenly opened the QRH to the first mention of PAX DR (phase III or phase IV door determination). Lastly; although the checklist said to divert; there was a part of me that questioned whether this event would justify a diversion. I should have acted on this feeling so as to verify or possibly re-run the QRH procedure. This was a learning opportunity for both the Captain and myself. I feel that although both of us wanted the safest and best outcome; we perhaps rushed the procedure rather than slowing down to assess the big picture.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.