Narrative:

First officer (first officer) was flying the ILS to runway 19 to jac. Approach was normal and stable except for getting a bit above glide path inside 100 foot altitude. Touchdown would have been about 1;000 feet down runway but floated; what appeared to be inches above runway. During this time above the runway the first officer inadvertently pulled up on thrust reverser handle which triggered ECAM chime and message. Not knowing the exact position of the thrust reversers inches above the runway; I made a quick decision and elected to continue the touchdown beyond the mandatory 1;000 foot limit.the first officer and I reviewed the entire approach and go-around requirements before commencing the approach. I discussed the go-around and even went over the go-around litany so it would be familiar in case we had to do it. I made sure to brief not to get high and not too fast. Naturally; I never did brief the possibility of inadvertent thrust reverser application and its impact on our landing. I had to make a quick decision; and not knowing where our thrust reversers were; and with a nice 20 kt headwind; stopping seemed like the best choice. Looking back; I should have seen that the first officer appeared to be a little nervous doing this approach and that he was pretty new to the airplane; nevermind to one of our most challenging airports.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An A319 flight crew describes a floated landing at JAC during which the flying First Officer attempts to deploy the reversers before touch down; triggering an ECAM message.

Narrative: First Officer (FO) was flying the ILS to Runway 19 to JAC. Approach was normal and stable except for getting a bit above glide path inside 100 foot altitude. Touchdown would have been about 1;000 feet down runway but floated; what appeared to be inches above runway. During this time above the runway the FO inadvertently pulled up on thrust reverser handle which triggered ECAM chime and message. Not knowing the exact position of the thrust reversers inches above the runway; I made a quick decision and elected to continue the touchdown beyond the mandatory 1;000 foot limit.The FO and I reviewed the entire approach and go-around requirements before commencing the approach. I discussed the go-around and even went over the go-around litany so it would be familiar in case we had to do it. I made sure to brief not to get high and not too fast. Naturally; I never did brief the possibility of inadvertent thrust reverser application and its impact on our landing. I had to make a quick decision; and not knowing where our thrust reversers were; and with a nice 20 kt headwind; stopping seemed like the best choice. Looking back; I should have seen that the FO appeared to be a little nervous doing this approach and that he was pretty new to the airplane; nevermind to one of our most challenging airports.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.