Narrative:

My next flight was on IOE with a requalified captain to st. John newfoundland (cyyt). I contacted him and discussed my concerns at this airport. We met in flight ops just over 2 hours prior to departure and reviewed our flight. The ATIS at st. Johns showed approaches to runway 34 and we loaded this into the FMGC. Prior to TOD I obtained the new ATIS and we observed that the approaches were now being conducted to runway 16. We installed the approach; reviewed the landing data and briefed the approach to localizer 16. This approach requires careful review as the GS/vda is 1;620 feet at 5.5 DME from iso; not the localizer of iyt. Also with the construction at the airport the PAPI is inoperative with the displayed threshold past the intersection of runway 20/16. We flew two approaches and with no visual contact went missed approach to the southeast; it was clearer and ATC offered a contact approach to runway 34. We asked if it was possible to get a visual approach but were told that only a contact approach was available. Our fom states that [we are] not approved for contact approaches; and as such diverted to our alternate airport ZZZZ. Additionally; we were informed that the runways were being closed for construction for approximately 15 minutes.our diversion was uneventful and we were given a remote parking spot. I went to the cabin and informed my passengers as to why we were [here] and promised to update them regularly. I contacted dispatch and was asked to call back in 20 minutes as he was handling another diversion. During my 'wait' time; I discussed the options available to use. These were:1- bus passengers to st. Johns; but buses had to be ordered from st. Johns to come to [the diversion] airport2- put passengers in hotels (rooms were available) until the following day and bus them then.3- fuel and return to cyyt; not a viable option as the weather was forecast to deteriorate.I called the dispatcher 20 minutes later. His first option was a return to cyyt; however when I discussed the weather with him; he recognized that this would probably be pointless. I suggested that we get buses ordered or deplane the passengers and give them hotel rooms as this was our only viable option. I asked if there were any regulatory issues with this plan as a foreign country (canada). He asked me to call back in 20 minutes. I called in 20 minutes but he had no answer other than could we fly to cyyt; shoot an approach and if we did not get in; fly [back to the us.] I queried if we had the landing performance to attempt this; no answer to this was ever received (runway 16 landing distance available 5;900 feet).our inability to get answers as to a plan of action continued for nearly three hours. During this time either the captain or I would walk out to the aircraft every 20 - 30 minutes and update our passengers. We had the lavatories serviced and additional water; soda; and ice catered but we had no real answers for our passengers. Our passengers wanted to deplane; especially some 20 or so who lived in the vicinity of [the diversion] airport. Again and again we told them that this was not possible at this time. The level of tension was palpable; the captain and I did our best to defuse the tension but with no answers; it became increasingly difficult.approximately [3 hours] after parking with no answers from dispatch; I contacted the duty manager. I explained our situation and that at this time our only option was to deplane the passengers and put them in hotels. He had confirmed availability. The option to get buses that night was no longer available. During our conversation; we received a call from dispatch saying that we should fuel and fly to [the us.] I explained to the duty manager that this was not a good idea as the passengers were already extremely agitated and this option would not be well received and would possibly endanger my flight attendants. We then agreed to deplane and hotel accommodate all the passengers. I returned to the aircraft where the captain was dealing with two sick passengers. The passengers and bags were deplaned.we refueled and had to extend our duty to fly the aircraft to [the us.]in closing; the inability for a prompt decision to be made resulted in having to overnight the passengers rather than bus them that day to st. Johns. The inability of dispatch to generate a legal flight plan [diversion airport] - cyyt with an alternate of [the us] left us with no plan. I have yet to be informed as to whether this was possible; would we have a legal landing weight; and adequate stopping distance?

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: After diverting for weather to an off line Canadian airport the Captain reported difficulty with getting company approval to deplane the passengers and accommodate them in hotels for what was developing into a protracted weather delay.

Narrative: My next flight was on IOE with a requalified Captain to St. John Newfoundland (CYYT). I contacted him and discussed my concerns at this airport. We met in flight ops just over 2 hours prior to departure and reviewed our flight. The ATIS at St. Johns showed approaches to Runway 34 and we loaded this into the FMGC. Prior to TOD I obtained the new ATIS and we observed that the approaches were now being conducted to Runway 16. We installed the approach; reviewed the landing data and briefed the approach to LOC 16. This approach requires careful review as the GS/VDA is 1;620 feet at 5.5 DME from ISO; not the LOC of IYT. Also with the construction at the airport the PAPI is inoperative with the displayed threshold past the intersection of Runway 20/16. We flew two approaches and with no visual contact went missed approach to the southeast; it was clearer and ATC offered a contact approach to Runway 34. We asked if it was possible to get a visual approach but were told that only a contact approach was available. Our FOM states that [we are] not approved for contact approaches; and as such diverted to our alternate airport ZZZZ. Additionally; we were informed that the runways were being closed for construction for approximately 15 minutes.Our diversion was uneventful and we were given a remote parking spot. I went to the cabin and informed my passengers as to why we were [here] and promised to update them regularly. I contacted dispatch and was asked to call back in 20 minutes as he was handling another diversion. During my 'wait' time; I discussed the options available to use. These were:1- Bus passengers to St. Johns; but buses had to be ordered from St. Johns to come to [the diversion] airport2- Put passengers in hotels (rooms were available) until the following day and bus them then.3- Fuel and return to CYYT; not a viable option as the weather was forecast to deteriorate.I called the dispatcher 20 minutes later. His first option was a return to CYYT; however when I discussed the weather with him; he recognized that this would probably be pointless. I suggested that we get buses ordered or deplane the passengers and give them hotel rooms as this was our only viable option. I asked if there were any regulatory issues with this plan as a foreign country (Canada). He asked me to call back in 20 minutes. I called in 20 minutes but he had no answer other than could we fly to CYYT; shoot an approach and if we did not get in; fly [back to the US.] I queried if we had the landing performance to attempt this; no answer to this was ever received (Runway 16 landing distance available 5;900 feet).Our inability to get answers as to a plan of action continued for nearly three hours. During this time either the Captain or I would walk out to the aircraft every 20 - 30 minutes and update our passengers. We had the lavatories serviced and additional water; soda; and ice catered but we had no real answers for our passengers. Our passengers wanted to deplane; especially some 20 or so who lived in the vicinity of [the diversion] airport. Again and again we told them that this was not possible at this time. The level of tension was palpable; the Captain and I did our best to defuse the tension but with no answers; it became increasingly difficult.Approximately [3 hours] after parking with no answers from dispatch; I contacted the Duty Manager. I explained our situation and that at this time our only option was to deplane the passengers and put them in hotels. He had confirmed availability. The option to get buses that night was no longer available. During our conversation; we received a call from dispatch saying that we should fuel and fly to [the US.] I explained to the Duty Manager that this was not a good idea as the passengers were already extremely agitated and this option would not be well received and would possibly endanger my flight attendants. We then agreed to deplane and hotel accommodate all the passengers. I returned to the aircraft where the Captain was dealing with two sick passengers. The passengers and bags were deplaned.We refueled and had to extend our duty to fly the aircraft to [the US.]In closing; the inability for a prompt decision to be made resulted in having to overnight the passengers rather than bus them that day to St. Johns. The inability of dispatch to generate a legal flight plan [diversion airport] - CYYT with an alternate of [the US] left us with no plan. I have yet to be informed as to whether this was possible; would we have a legal landing weight; and adequate stopping distance?

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.