Narrative:

I was the first officer and non-flying pilot. Approximately 90 minutes into the flight we noticed the right engine oil quantity indication was at 4 and was boxed in white. All other engine indications were normal and matched the left engine; with the exception that the vibration was running on the high side varying between 3.3-3.5. In the cockpit this vibration could not be felt. We discussed these indications with maintenance control via a sat-phone patch through dispatch. We referenced our manuals while maintenance control discussed with engineering and referenced their manuals. Really the only guidance given to us at this point from maintenance control was to follow our manuals and monitor the situation. Our flight manual does not have a procedure for low oil quantity. We did ask a pass riding first officer who was riding in back to go take a look at the engine to try to determine if any oil could be seen leaking. He took pictures with his phone of both engines and returned to the cockpit. No evidence of oil leaking could be seen from the passenger cabin. At this point all agreed with the decision to continue the flight as we really could not definitively say if the quantity indication was correct or false. The oil quantity slowly crept down to 1 and remained at 1. During this time oil pressure and oil temperature indications were normal and in line with the left engine. Vibration continue to vary from 3-3.5. About 30 minutes later and still prior to the critical point we received an ACARS message that maintenance control and engineering were conferring about the higher than normal vibration. Approximately 5 minutes later; and still prior to the critical point we received another ACARS message stating that we might have to turn around. We did not receive another message until shortly after we passed the critical point asking us to sat-call dispatch. At this point we were informed that due to the vibration levels; the propulsion experts felt that for safety of flight reasons the thrust on the right engine should be reduced to idle. Dispatch initially wanted us to continue the flight to destination. We informed dispatch that with the throttle at a degraded thrust the divert decision would need to be to the nearest suitable airport and based on all factors including weather; runway length; terrain and familiarity of airport the decision was made that the safest course of action was a diversion to ZZZZ. Through cpdlc we coordinated this with ATC and all appropriate diversion procedures were followed. At this point power was slowly reduced to idle on the right engine. As power was reduced vibration increased significantly and oil pressure dropped. We followed the appropriate annunciated checklists and the engine was subsequently shut down and secured. The flight continued single engine to an uneventful landing where the flight was met by local crash and rescue. I cannot emphasize enough the excellent job of the captain throughout this flight and subsequent diversion. She encouraged input from a variety of sources including myself; a jump seating captain; a pass riding first officer; dispatch; maintenance control; and her cabin crew.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B777 flight crew describes an in flight shut down and diversion; just past the midpoint on an oceanic flight. The oil quantity had been dropping and mild engine vibration had been noted; but Maintenance Control recommended continuing. The engine is idled at Maintenance Control's suggestion; producing significant vibration and the engine is shut down.

Narrative: I was the First Officer and non-flying pilot. Approximately 90 minutes into the flight we noticed the right engine oil quantity indication was at 4 and was boxed in white. All other engine indications were normal and matched the left engine; with the exception that the vibration was running on the high side varying between 3.3-3.5. In the cockpit this vibration could not be felt. We discussed these indications with Maintenance Control via a SAT-phone patch through Dispatch. We referenced our manuals while Maintenance Control discussed with engineering and referenced their manuals. Really the only guidance given to us at this point from Maintenance Control was to follow our manuals and monitor the situation. Our flight manual does not have a procedure for low oil quantity. We did ask a pass riding First Officer who was riding in back to go take a look at the engine to try to determine if any oil could be seen leaking. He took pictures with his phone of both engines and returned to the cockpit. No evidence of oil leaking could be seen from the passenger cabin. At this point all agreed with the decision to continue the flight as we really could not definitively say if the quantity indication was correct or false. The oil quantity slowly crept down to 1 and remained at 1. During this time oil pressure and oil temperature indications were normal and in line with the left engine. Vibration continue to vary from 3-3.5. About 30 minutes later and still prior to the Critical Point we received an ACARS Message that Maintenance Control and Engineering were conferring about the higher than normal vibration. Approximately 5 minutes later; and still prior to the Critical Point we received another ACARS Message stating that we might have to turn around. We did not receive another message until shortly after we passed the Critical Point asking us to SAT-CALL Dispatch. At this point we were informed that due to the vibration levels; the propulsion experts felt that for safety of flight reasons the thrust on the right engine should be reduced to idle. Dispatch initially wanted us to continue the flight to destination. We informed Dispatch that with the throttle at a degraded thrust the divert decision would need to be to the nearest suitable airport and based on all factors including weather; runway length; terrain and familiarity of airport the decision was made that the safest course of action was a diversion to ZZZZ. Through CPDLC we coordinated this with ATC and all appropriate diversion procedures were followed. At this point power was slowly reduced to idle on the right engine. As power was reduced vibration increased significantly and oil pressure dropped. We followed the appropriate annunciated checklists and the engine was subsequently shut down and secured. The flight continued single engine to an uneventful landing where the flight was met by local crash and rescue. I cannot emphasize enough the excellent job of the Captain throughout this flight and subsequent diversion. She encouraged input from a variety of sources including myself; a jump seating Captain; a pass riding First Officer; Dispatch; Maintenance Control; and her Cabin Crew.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.