Narrative:

Several times prior to push the tug drive asked to pull electrics. Per current SOP we delayed APU start. This tug driver did not use correct verbiage and showed great impatience. [Nine] min before scheduled push he again used non standard terms and said he was ready for push; I said standby. We completed the before push and called ramp for push. During the first officers (fos) call the tug driver again asked if we would release brakes. I said I would when I received my push clearance. Less than 10 seconds later the first officer told me cleared to push spot D. He turned on the beacon I released the brakes and using intercom told the tug driver brakes released cleared to push spot D. I received no answer. I repeated the call. I then noticed the forward cargo door was opening. I told the first officer to cancel our push and reset the brakes. What I found out was the driver left the tug to help load the bags. So while the belt loader was against the airplane and ground crew was loading bags our brakes were released no chocks and no one in the tug protecting against movement. I do not consider this a safe operation. At no time did the tug driver advise loading of additional bags. He removed himself from the headset after clearing me to release brakes. I called operations and asked for a supervisor. I was told none available; all in a meeting and it would take too long. As I could not trust this pushback crew; more to the point I doubted their training and ability to conduct a safe push back; I asked for another pushback crew. Again I was told it would take too long. I said fine I would wait. They ended up rotating a wing walker for the tug driver. Neither operations or the push crew seemed to think anything was out of the ordinary. I accepted the new drive and push was normal except again verbiage was incorrect and he forgot to clear us to start number 2 engine. I am concerned that this lack of standardization found on all levels of the ramp operation will get someone badly hurt or even killed. For a very short time while men and equipment were near; on; and in the cargo area; no one no one was holding the airplane.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An A319 Captain reported what he felt were unsafe deviations from SOP during pushback.

Narrative: Several times prior to push the tug drive asked to pull electrics. Per current SOP we delayed APU start. This tug driver did not use correct verbiage and showed great impatience. [Nine] min before scheduled push he again used non standard terms and said he was ready for push; I said standby. We completed the before push and called ramp for push. During the First Officers (FOs) call the tug driver again asked if we would release brakes. I said I would when I received my push clearance. Less than 10 seconds later the FO told me cleared to push spot D. He turned on the beacon I released the brakes and using intercom told the tug driver brakes released cleared to push spot D. I received no answer. I repeated the call. I then noticed the forward cargo door was opening. I told the FO to cancel our push and reset the brakes. What I found out was the driver left the tug to help load the bags. So while the belt loader was against the airplane and ground crew was loading bags our brakes were released no chocks and no one in the tug protecting against movement. I do not consider this a safe operation. At no time did the tug driver advise loading of additional bags. He removed himself from the headset after clearing me to release brakes. I called operations and asked for a supervisor. I was told none available; all in a meeting and it would take too long. As I could not trust this pushback crew; more to the point I doubted their training and ability to conduct a safe push back; I asked for another pushback crew. Again I was told it would take too long. I said fine I would wait. They ended up rotating a wing walker for the tug driver. Neither operations or the push crew seemed to think anything was out of the ordinary. I accepted the new drive and push was normal except again verbiage was incorrect and he forgot to clear us to start number 2 engine. I am concerned that this lack of standardization found on all levels of the ramp operation will get someone badly hurt or even killed. For a very short time while men and equipment were near; on; and in the cargo area; no one NO ONE was holding the airplane.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.