Narrative:

I convinced my captain to fly the wrong SID out of okc. I cleaned and restocked the aircraft. When I returned to the plane; the captain had already picked up the clearance; and was finishing up setting up the cockpit. I read on the paper (handwritten) that we were given the THRPE1 thrpe tus.... (Later I discovered this is where I made the error; we were assigned the TRUPR1.trupr tus...). I had some difficulty reading his handwriting; and I simply had read it wrong.) I put the THRPE1 procedure into my [tablet] and saved it as the favorite (STAR). We then completed the required checklists. I think we must have used his [tablet] when we verified the route; as everything checked out between the [tablet] route and FMS (which we verified later was set up with the correct procedure.) after our taxi checklist; our SOP has the pilot flying verify the initial heading; altitude and first fix. I made a small SOP error by telling him what I thought the heading and altitude was; vs waiting for him to say what he thought it was to and me to verify. To be fair; I was convinced at this point we were flying the THRPE1; not the TRUPR1. I stated as part of the SOP; initial heading; altitude and fix that at 1;800 feet; we execute a right turn to 200. He hesitated; and then looked down at my [tablet] to verify. (My [tablet] was set on the wrong departure procedure however.). Because I showed him the plate (but the wrong one) he chose to believe the evidence I presented. I had convinced him that there was a turn at 1;800 feet and departed with the turn to 200 degrees. A few seconds after we turned; oklahoma [city] tower gave us a left turn back to 175 degrees. I said something like (I guess tower forgot to tell us a nonstandard heading.). We both then noticed the FMS showed no turn. He then asked me which procedure I was displaying on my [tablet]; as his writing said trupr. I looked again; and saw that it was trupr and not thrpe that I had thought I read. That is when we discovered I was showing him the wrong departure procedure. A second after the 175 heading was issued; we were told to contact departure. Departure never said anything about a deviation. The captain contacted the okc control tower by telephone after we landed; I was told later by the captain that the person he talked to at the tower said that there was no deviation from us that they had heard about.in the future I will ensure that the [tablet] used by the non-flying pilot is the one used during the FMS cross check. That would have lead to the discovery of the error. I should have waited for the pilot in command to give me his approaching the runway briefing (per the SOP); rather than give him mine first. The SOP procedures are all new in this fleet (about a month I think; 3rd tour using them); over time errors in 'who says what' will be corrected as we continue to use the new SOP. The previous flight has be conducted in a fairly hot cockpit. I should have taken another 5 to 10 minutes in the air conditioned FBO; as before the last flight I had been waiting in a cockpit that would not cool below 90 degrees on the ground; and still stayed warm for the previous less than an hour flight. Heat is fatiguing; which contributed to me reading his handwriting wrong. In this case the captain had obtained the clearance via pre departure clearance. I should have asked (I didn't know what way he had obtained the clearance) and if the opportunity presents itself; confirm my [tablet] directly with the printed pre departure clearance message. That would have limited the error. Either time anyone questions what they are being told by the other party; taxi the airplane to a safe position; tell ATC we need a few minutes; then resolve the problem without the distraction of taxing.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Citation crew initially flew the wrong SID. ATC noticed the error and issued a new heading.

Narrative: I convinced my captain to fly the wrong SID out of OKC. I cleaned and restocked the aircraft. When I returned to the plane; the captain had already picked up the clearance; and was finishing up setting up the cockpit. I read on the paper (handwritten) that we were given the THRPE1 THRPE TUS.... (Later I discovered this is where I made the error; we were assigned the TRUPR1.TRUPR TUS...). I had some difficulty reading his handwriting; and I simply had read it wrong.) I put the THRPE1 procedure into my [tablet] and saved it as the favorite (STAR). We then completed the required checklists. I think we must have used his [tablet] when we verified the route; as everything checked out between the [tablet] route and FMS (which we verified later was set up with the correct procedure.) After our taxi checklist; our SOP has the Pilot Flying verify the Initial Heading; Altitude and First Fix. I made a small SOP error by telling him what I thought the heading and altitude was; vs waiting for him to say what he thought it was to and me to verify. To be fair; I was convinced at this point we were flying the THRPE1; not the TRUPR1. I stated as part of the SOP; initial heading; altitude and fix that at 1;800 feet; we execute a right turn to 200. He hesitated; and then looked down at my [tablet] to verify. (My [tablet] was set on the wrong departure procedure however.). Because I showed him the plate (but the wrong one) he chose to believe the evidence I presented. I had convinced him that there was a turn at 1;800 feet and departed with the turn to 200 degrees. A few seconds after we turned; Oklahoma [City] tower gave us a left turn back to 175 degrees. I said something like (I guess tower forgot to tell us a nonstandard heading.). We both then noticed the FMS showed no turn. He then asked me which procedure I was displaying on my [tablet]; as his writing said TRUPR. I looked again; and saw that it was TRUPR and not THRPE that I had thought I read. That is when we discovered I was showing him the wrong departure procedure. A second after the 175 heading was issued; we were told to contact departure. Departure never said anything about a deviation. The captain contacted the OKC control tower by telephone after we landed; I was told later by the captain that the person he talked to at the tower said that there was no deviation from us that they had heard about.In the future I will ensure that the [tablet] used by the non-flying pilot is the one used during the FMS cross check. That would have lead to the discovery of the error. I should have waited for the Pilot in Command to give me his approaching the runway briefing (per the SOP); rather than give him mine first. The SOP procedures are all new in this fleet (about a month I think; 3rd tour using them); over time errors in 'who says what' will be corrected as we continue to use the new SOP. The previous flight has be conducted in a fairly hot cockpit. I should have taken another 5 to 10 minutes in the air conditioned FBO; as before the last flight I had been waiting in a cockpit that would not cool below 90 degrees on the ground; and still stayed warm for the previous less than an hour flight. Heat is fatiguing; which contributed to me reading his handwriting wrong. In this case the captain had obtained the clearance via PDC. I should have asked (I didn't know what way he had obtained the clearance) and if the opportunity presents itself; confirm my [tablet] directly with the printed PDC message. That would have limited the error. Either time anyone questions what they are being told by the other party; taxi the airplane to a safe position; tell ATC we need a few minutes; then resolve the problem without the distraction of taxing.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.