Narrative:

Left ZZZ right at brake release fuel. The weather along the route to detroit was checked on our cell phones prior to departure and that indicated only very widely scattered spots of showers. Dtw forecast was for thunderstorms well after our arrival. During the early cruise portion of the flight weather along the mizar arrival necessitated a re-route to the weeda arrival. This added about 120 miles to our route but the onboard fuel prediction indicated that we would land just above the reserve amount of fuel which was just over 1900 lbs. Well downrange headed toward subwy intersection we got another reroute to the gemni arrival. This added about 60 more miles to our distance. The fuel prediction on landing was now for right at reserve fuel. Enroute additional vectors and a rather early letdown increased fuel burn resulting in a prediction a 150 lbs below reserve fuel amount. The weather in dtw was still good with visibility of 10 SM and cloud bases above 4000 ft so I elected to continue. Over lake erie as we closed in on dtw we noticed a rapidly building area of cumulonimbus clouds about 5 miles south of the airport. At that time the tops were around 20;000 ft. Later as we descended on downwind; I noticed that the weather had closed with the airport to about three miles off the departure end. We got vectored well out before being turned back into the approach. Through the gaps in the clouds I could see that flint was a viable alternate in good weather if we needed it if the weather became a factor at dtw. At the base turn we were about 100 lbs below reserve fuel with about 1800 lbs on board. Dtw weather was still good so I elected to continue. About halfway down the final; still above the bases of the scattered to broken cloud layer; we lost the localizer but still had the glide slope. I waited about 15 seconds to see if it would come back and was about to ask the first officer to query the tower when the tower asked us if we had the localizer. With our negative response we were told to turn off the localizer to go around. Glancing at the fuel I saw that we were at 1690 lbs of fuel and I asked the first officer to declare a min fuel advisory since the final was so long. The tower immediately turned us back to the airport and descended us to 3000 with a directive to call the airport in sight. We broke out about 3;500 ft; saw the airport and was cleared for a visual approach. We landed with about 1600 lbs of fuel.our yaw damper was producing uncommanded minor yaws in flight with the autopilot off. We had written this up on the previous leg and the local maintenance cleared the error codes and reset the system. About ten minutes into the flight the yaw damper again began to produce uncommanded left and right yaws with associated rudder trim changes. We elected to turn off the yaw damper which in turn of course disconnected the autopilot. I was flying pilot and this significantly increased my workload to fly the aircraft manually. With the frequent reroutes and a last minute runway change we were considerably loaded up during the flight. This distracted me from paying closer attention to the fuel burn trend and the weather trends south of the detroit airport. That aside we worked well together otherwise to reduce my workload and prepare for the approach. We had 657 lbs of hold fuel; no contingency fuel; and no extra fuel. We burned the hold fuel up in the reroute.in the future; I think I will brief specific actions on the part of the npf to reduce the workload of the flying pilot. I practice a raw data approach in good weather at least once each trip but the task of hand flying for over an hour was draining when you added the additional tasks of keeping up with the numerous changes in the flight. When one pilot is having to hand fly the entire trip; I think the philosophical goal of the npf should be to load-shed the pilot flying as much as possible even to the point of accomplishing their checklist items where possible. I will say that previousingrained habits of always checking fuel status when given either holding or a route change helped me to notice the fuel issue early and keep track of its trend.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-200 Captain reported declaring minimum fuel when weather and reroutes increased his fuel burn. Reporter also cited increased workload from yaw damper failure that required hand flying the aircraft.

Narrative: Left ZZZ right at brake release fuel. The weather along the route to Detroit was checked on our cell phones prior to departure and that indicated only very widely scattered spots of showers. DTW forecast was for thunderstorms well after our arrival. During the early cruise portion of the flight weather along the Mizar arrival necessitated a re-route to the Weeda arrival. This added about 120 miles to our route but the onboard fuel prediction indicated that we would land just above the reserve amount of fuel which was just over 1900 lbs. Well downrange headed toward SUBWY intersection we got another reroute to the GEMNI arrival. This added about 60 more miles to our distance. The fuel prediction on landing was now for right at reserve fuel. Enroute additional vectors and a rather early letdown increased fuel burn resulting in a prediction a 150 lbs below reserve fuel amount. The weather in DTW was still good with visibility of 10 SM and cloud bases above 4000 ft so I elected to continue. Over Lake Erie as we closed in on DTW we noticed a rapidly building area of cumulonimbus clouds about 5 miles south of the airport. At that time the tops were around 20;000 ft. Later as we descended on downwind; I noticed that the weather had closed with the airport to about three miles off the departure end. We got vectored well out before being turned back into the approach. Through the gaps in the clouds I could see that Flint was a viable alternate in good weather if we needed it if the weather became a factor at DTW. At the base turn we were about 100 lbs below reserve fuel with about 1800 lbs on board. DTW weather was still good so I elected to continue. About halfway down the final; still above the bases of the scattered to broken cloud layer; we lost the localizer but still had the glide slope. I waited about 15 seconds to see if it would come back and was about to ask the FO to query the tower when the tower asked us if we had the localizer. With our negative response we were told to turn off the localizer to go around. Glancing at the fuel I saw that we were at 1690 lbs of fuel and I asked the FO to declare a min fuel advisory since the final was so long. The tower immediately turned us back to the airport and descended us to 3000 with a directive to call the airport in sight. We broke out about 3;500 ft; saw the airport and was cleared for a visual approach. We landed with about 1600 lbs of fuel.Our yaw damper was producing uncommanded minor yaws in flight with the autopilot off. We had written this up on the previous leg and the local maintenance cleared the error codes and reset the system. About ten minutes into the flight the yaw damper again began to produce uncommanded left and right yaws with associated rudder trim changes. We elected to turn off the yaw damper which in turn of course disconnected the autopilot. I was flying pilot and this significantly increased my workload to fly the aircraft manually. With the frequent reroutes and a last minute runway change we were considerably loaded up during the flight. This distracted me from paying closer attention to the fuel burn trend and the weather trends south of the Detroit airport. That aside we worked well together otherwise to reduce my workload and prepare for the approach. We had 657 lbs of hold fuel; no contingency fuel; and no extra fuel. We burned the hold fuel up in the reroute.In the future; I think I will brief specific actions on the part of the NPF to reduce the workload of the flying pilot. I practice a raw data approach in good weather at least once each trip but the task of hand flying for over an hour was draining when you added the additional tasks of keeping up with the numerous changes in the flight. When one pilot is having to hand fly the entire trip; I think the philosophical goal of the NPF should be to load-shed the pilot flying as much as possible even to the point of accomplishing their checklist items where possible. I will say that previousingrained habits of always checking fuel status when given either holding or a route change helped me to notice the fuel issue early and keep track of its trend.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.