Narrative:

South of ave; ATC passed a heavy 747 1;000 feet above us sequencing us behind them for runway 24L with repeated cautions for wake turbulence. Both aircraft were instructed to fly heading 065 after smo; which puts them on a downwind for 24L. The 747 had made the turn to final when ATC asked us if we had a visual on the 747. We acknowledged that we did and were cleared for the visual. At that point; separation from terrain and other aircraft are now my responsibility. We set up for a squared off base to final turn to maximize wake turbulence separation from the heavy 747. Before we intercepted the final approach course; the final approach controller issued us a heading of 230. This shortened our turn to final and our separation from the 747. After the 747 touched down; tower cleared a super A380 into position on runway 24L and then subsequently cleared him for takeoff. We had minimum traffic separation from that aircraft; and zero wake turbulence separation. A follow-up call to the tower revealed that although ATC has guidelines of 5 mile minimum separation between departing aircraft and the same standard for arriving aircraft; there is no standard separation between a departing aircraft and an arriving aircraft. Their logic in this is that the departing aircraft doesn't create wingtip vortices until rotation; which is beyond the point at which the arriving aircraft will be susceptible to wake turbulence. First; their premise is false. Vortices are being created the instant the wing begins creating lift. The amount of lift and strength of the vortices generated by the wing are proportional to the angle and velocity of the wings' relative wind. The point of rotation is only significant in that it represents a point where the wing is generating enough lift to complete a takeoff. Second; ATC's logic completely disregards the thrust wake of a 400 ton airplane at static takeoff thrust. The lax air traffic control system is continually and repeatedly violating the safety of myself; my crew; and my passengers for the simple purpose of getting a few more airplanes an hour through their airspace and in and out of their airport. They are blind to everything but trying to get 13 eggs into a carton that most certainly will someday soon be the unfortunate scene of an omelet. Despite countless [safety] reports; phone and face to face meetings with our safety management system (sms) people; they put on a friendly face and profess their willingness to cooperate. In my 35 years of professional aviation; I have yet to hear of them actually changing a process or procedure for anything other than higher traffic numbers. They blame the pilots for accepting an unacceptable clearance. Sure I could have done a go-around; now the A380 and I are both trying to escape lax in the same airspace at the same time; and I'm following a low; slow; and very heavy transport with virtually no separation. Safety relies on discipline. I can't tell the lax tower controller to not issue the takeoff clearance to the A380. I have to rely on him to provide for my safe separation. I; my crew; my passengers; and their families wish he would our survival above his airplane quota. Our sms teaches that properly assessing risk includes assessing the severity of an anticipated negative outcome of accepting the risk. Maybe the three dead guys in my challenger isn't severe enough.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: The Captain of a Bombardier Challenger aircraft reported being tightly sequenced behind a heavy Boeing 747 while in the traffic pattern at LAX. He felt this placed the corporate jet in jeopardy of encountering serious wake turbulence. The situation was further exacerbated by the Tower clearing a Super Airbus 380 for takeoff while the Challenger was still on final approach.

Narrative: South of AVE; ATC passed a heavy 747 1;000 feet above us sequencing us behind them for runway 24L with repeated cautions for wake turbulence. Both aircraft were instructed to fly heading 065 after SMO; which puts them on a downwind for 24L. The 747 had made the turn to final when ATC asked us if we had a visual on the 747. We acknowledged that we did and were cleared for the visual. At that point; separation from terrain and other aircraft are now my responsibility. We set up for a squared off base to final turn to maximize wake turbulence separation from the heavy 747. Before we intercepted the final approach course; the final approach controller issued us a heading of 230. This shortened our turn to final and our separation from the 747. After the 747 touched down; tower cleared a Super A380 into position on runway 24L and then subsequently cleared him for takeoff. We had minimum traffic separation from that aircraft; and zero wake turbulence separation. A follow-up call to the tower revealed that although ATC has guidelines of 5 mile minimum separation between departing aircraft and the same standard for arriving aircraft; there is no standard separation between a departing aircraft and an arriving aircraft. Their logic in this is that the departing aircraft doesn't create wingtip vortices until rotation; which is beyond the point at which the arriving aircraft will be susceptible to wake turbulence. First; their premise is false. Vortices are being created the instant the wing begins creating lift. The amount of lift and strength of the vortices generated by the wing are proportional to the angle and velocity of the wings' relative wind. The point of rotation is only significant in that it represents a point where the wing is generating enough lift to complete a takeoff. Second; ATC's logic completely disregards the thrust wake of a 400 ton airplane at static takeoff thrust. The LAX air traffic control system is continually and repeatedly violating the safety of myself; my crew; and my passengers for the simple purpose of getting a few more airplanes an hour through their airspace and in and out of their airport. They are blind to everything but trying to get 13 eggs into a carton that most certainly will someday soon be the unfortunate scene of an omelet. Despite countless [safety] reports; phone and face to face meetings with our Safety Management System (SMS) people; they put on a friendly face and profess their willingness to cooperate. In my 35 years of professional aviation; I have yet to hear of them actually changing a process or procedure for anything other than higher traffic numbers. They blame the pilots for accepting an unacceptable clearance. Sure I could have done a go-around; now the A380 and I are both trying to escape LAX in the same airspace at the same time; and I'm following a low; slow; and very heavy transport with virtually no separation. Safety relies on discipline. I can't tell the LAX tower controller to not issue the takeoff clearance to the A380. I have to rely on him to provide for my safe separation. I; my crew; my passengers; and their families wish he would our survival above his airplane quota. Our SMS teaches that properly assessing risk includes assessing the severity of an anticipated negative outcome of accepting the risk. Maybe the three dead guys in my Challenger isn't severe enough.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.