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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1289395 |
Time | |
Date | 201508 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | IAH.Airport |
State Reference | TX |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | Marginal |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Cruise |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Weather Radar |
Person 1 | |
Function | First Officer Pilot Not Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Person 2 | |
Function | Pilot Flying Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence |
Narrative:
While approaching the sat VOR; houston center began giving us vectors for spacing into houston and assigned us to maintain mach .75. We were passing north of a line of weather extending from cot to past houston. After passing sat; were given a turn back towards the south and handed over to the previous center controller. The line of weather was approximately 40 miles to the south of our position. The pilot flying (PF) and I agreed we would quickly need a turn. The controller cleared us to deviate right of course and proceed direct crp when able. I expected to be turned back towards houston. Rather; were being given a clearance through the weather. I asked the controller for a route to houston that didn't involve flying through the worst part of the line. He responded that we could proceed direct cot direct crp. The PF and I agreed that at least that would keep us out of the weather and give us time to coordinate with dispatch. Also; that route would provide us with many airports to divert to if necessary. We discussed the different options we had as I sent an update through ACARS to dispatch.approaching cot; there were a few small cells painting on the radar at our 10 o'clock at 25 miles. Since we had been cleared to cot and to deviate as necessary; I assumed the PF was planning on going around the western edge of the weather and then we would continue on our assigned route to crp. While it was partially imbedded; I could see the base of a smaller towering cumulus (tcu) in front of us over cot. I was also painting it on weather radar. We were in the clear and the ride was smooth. I told the PF that we needed to come farther to the right to avoid the weather in front of us. He disagreed with me and said he was beginning the turn towards the southeast. There was a clear opening in the line but there was quite a bit of blowoff which I think prevented the PF from seeing the tcu in front of us. I did not realize this at the time; but I think the PF's radar may have been angled up too high and he was only seeing the taller cells. Instead of turning right and staying in the clear as I expected; we turned left. I think he thought the weather that I was painting was farther away from us than it really was (the radar range on my display was set to 25 miles while his was at 50.) I called the flight attendant to make sure that he and the passengers were seated.the PF had the airplane slowing as we encountered severe turbulence for approximately 10 seconds. I believe that we flew through the edge of the very top of a cell which was obscured. The airplane gained about 3 hundred feet of altitude and rolled approximately 20 degrees. The autopilot disconnected and the PF had hold of the controls. We were able to quickly return the FL370.we quickly exited the weather as the part we had passed through was only about 10 miles wide (the far western edge of it.) we checked with the flight attendant to make sure that no one had been injured. He said everyone was fine. I reported the severe turbulence to ATC. We also reported our encounter to dispatch.I believe that during the turbulence we encountered super cooled droplets and the airframe picked up ice on unprotected areas of the fuselage. We did have a wing anti-ice failure which we cleared using the QRH procedure. Later on; during the descent and passing through more icing we received an ice detector 2 fail message. We followed the QRH procedure for that as well. The plane was performing as if there was ice buildup on the fuselage and we could see ice on the nose. The wing leading edges appeared free of ice. We were fairly confident that any ice on the plane would melt before the approach due to warm temperatures on the ground in houston. Additionally; we had gotten the wing anti ice failure message to clear. We ran the QRH for loss of anti-icing in icing conditions. If unsure that ice has been cleared from the wings and tail; it calls for a flaps 22 landing with an increased approach speed. In case the updrafts and a super cooled droplets had put ice on unprotected areas of the wings; flaps; and tail; we decided to follow this part of the procedure.passing through 15;000 we could see ice coming off the nose and the aircraft seemed to lose some drag and was flying normally. We still elected to land flaps 22 per the QRH procedure. The severe turbulence and anti-icing system failures were written in the aircraft logbook and reported to maintenance control.the aircraft encountered severe turbulence and super cooled droplets which attached to parts of the airframe. Additionally we deviated 300 feet from our assigned altitude. Threats included the weather and changes to ATC routing into houston. We may have had an error in our use of weather radar. There was an error in judgment in choosing to fly too close to the weather.requesting plans stated from the PF is crucial for shared mental model. If I had more warning that he intended to turn just before cot; we would have had more time to come up with a better plan together. Plans stated could have avoided that situation in the first place. For example; 'we are going to go all the way around the west side of the cells and if either of us thinks we should do otherwise; we'll both agree to it first.' time to discuss would have allowed us to trap the error in tilt management of the radar.I wish that I had asserted myself more quickly. It was clearly not our intention to fly too close to the thunderstorms and tcu. We were not experiencing any pressure to hurry to houston. The PF thought the clouds in this area were merely blow off and didn't expect anything to be embedded in it. He was not expecting us to encounter severe turbulence.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: EMB145 flight crew experienced severe turbulence en route to Houston at FL370 while deviating around thunderstorms; which the First Officer believed were avoidable. He also believed they encountered super cooled water droplets and the airframe picked up ice on unprotected areas of the fuselage. The ice was shed during descent.
Narrative: While approaching the SAT VOR; Houston Center began giving us vectors for spacing into Houston and assigned us to maintain Mach .75. We were passing north of a line of weather extending from COT to past Houston. After passing SAT; were given a turn back towards the south and handed over to the previous center controller. The line of weather was approximately 40 miles to the south of our position. The pilot flying (PF) and I agreed we would quickly need a turn. The controller cleared us to deviate right of course and proceed direct CRP when able. I expected to be turned back towards Houston. Rather; were being given a clearance through the weather. I asked the controller for a route to Houston that didn't involve flying through the worst part of the line. He responded that we could proceed direct COT direct CRP. The PF and I agreed that at least that would keep us out of the weather and give us time to coordinate with dispatch. Also; that route would provide us with many airports to divert to if necessary. We discussed the different options we had as I sent an update through ACARS to dispatch.Approaching COT; there were a few small cells painting on the radar at our 10 o'clock at 25 miles. Since we had been cleared to COT and to deviate as necessary; I assumed the PF was planning on going around the western edge of the weather and then we would continue on our assigned route to CRP. While it was partially imbedded; I could see the base of a smaller towering cumulus (TCU) in front of us over COT. I was also painting it on weather radar. We were in the clear and the ride was smooth. I told the PF that we needed to come farther to the right to avoid the weather in front of us. He disagreed with me and said he was beginning the turn towards the southeast. There was a clear opening in the line but there was quite a bit of blowoff which I think prevented the PF from seeing the TCU in front of us. I did not realize this at the time; but I think the PF's radar may have been angled up too high and he was only seeing the taller cells. Instead of turning right and staying in the clear as I expected; we turned left. I think he thought the weather that I was painting was farther away from us than it really was (the radar range on my display was set to 25 miles while his was at 50.) I called the flight attendant to make sure that he and the passengers were seated.The PF had the airplane slowing as we encountered severe turbulence for approximately 10 seconds. I believe that we flew through the edge of the very top of a cell which was obscured. The airplane gained about 3 hundred feet of altitude and rolled approximately 20 degrees. The autopilot disconnected and the PF had hold of the controls. We were able to quickly return the FL370.We quickly exited the weather as the part we had passed through was only about 10 miles wide (the far western edge of it.) We checked with the flight attendant to make sure that no one had been injured. He said everyone was fine. I reported the severe turbulence to ATC. We also reported our encounter to dispatch.I believe that during the turbulence we encountered super cooled droplets and the airframe picked up ice on unprotected areas of the fuselage. We did have a wing anti-ice failure which we cleared using the QRH procedure. Later on; during the descent and passing through more icing we received an ice detector 2 fail message. We followed the QRH procedure for that as well. The plane was performing as if there was ice buildup on the fuselage and we could see ice on the nose. The wing leading edges appeared free of ice. We were fairly confident that any ice on the plane would melt before the approach due to warm temperatures on the ground in Houston. Additionally; we had gotten the wing anti ice failure message to clear. We ran the QRH for loss of anti-icing in icing conditions. If unsure that ice has been cleared from the wings and tail; it calls for a flaps 22 landing with an increased approach speed. In case the updrafts and a super cooled droplets had put ice on unprotected areas of the wings; flaps; and tail; we decided to follow this part of the procedure.Passing through 15;000 we could see ice coming off the nose and the aircraft seemed to lose some drag and was flying normally. We still elected to land flaps 22 per the QRH procedure. The severe turbulence and anti-icing system failures were written in the aircraft logbook and reported to maintenance control.The aircraft encountered severe turbulence and super cooled droplets which attached to parts of the airframe. Additionally we deviated 300 feet from our assigned altitude. Threats included the weather and changes to ATC routing into Houston. We may have had an error in our use of weather radar. There was an error in judgment in choosing to fly too close to the weather.Requesting plans stated from the PF is crucial for shared mental model. If I had more warning that he intended to turn just before COT; we would have had more time to come up with a better plan together. Plans stated could have avoided that situation in the first place. For example; 'We are going to go all the way around the west side of the cells and if either of us thinks we should do otherwise; we'll both agree to it first.' Time to discuss would have allowed us to trap the error in tilt management of the radar.I wish that I had asserted myself more quickly. It was clearly not our intention to fly too close to the thunderstorms and TCU. We were not experiencing any pressure to hurry to Houston. The PF thought the clouds in this area were merely blow off and didn't expect anything to be embedded in it. He was not expecting us to encounter severe turbulence.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.