Narrative:

After being cleared direct to avdih the RNAV (GPS) Z runway 2 if at gpi by salt lake center we were cleared from 10;000 MSL to maintain 9;000 MSL until avdih; report established; cleared RNAV (GPS) Z runway 2 approach. We opted to use the if vs making a 180 degree course reversal over the IAF killy due to higher terrain over killy and the complexity of the course reversal. We did not anticipate the 9;000 MSL altitude assignment over avdih (published at 7;000 MSL); however; we had ample time/distance to safely get to the lpv glide path altitude of 5;200 MSL over bingq the FAF.the pilot flying (PF) acknowledged 9;000 was set in the altitude pre-selector. I; as pilot monitoring (pm); went heads down to insure the FMS was properly programed for the straight in approach both laterally and vertically. We were in heading mode with LNAV armed; altitude captured at 10;000 with the autopilot on. PF disconnected the autopilot while I was heads down and unintentionally ballooned to 10;400. I called out the altitude deviation and commanded him to descend to 9;000 while nudging the yoke forward to prevent further altitude gain. We had to slow down and make configuration changes (flap/landing gear) during the descent to 9;000. While still hand flying; the PF failed to maintain 9;000 until avdih but descended to 8;800 initially. Again; I called out the deviation and commanded him to maintain 9;000. We intercepted the final approach course outside of avdih and LNAV later guidance was captured/used.after crossing avdih; we then descended to intercept the vgp and crossed the FAF at the appropriate altitude. The rest of the approach continued normally.there were no terrain or traffic conflicts.contributing factors: PF was using the synthetic vision system display. Although he had completed simulator training with the equipment within the previous 6 months; he did not have a lot of actual experience using the equipment in the plane. We did not anticipate being 2;000 feet above the if altitude when we were cleared for the approach. The arrival direction would have made the IAF to if course reversal difficult; but would have given us more time to descend to the if altitude. PF did not have the correct vertical situational awareness for the ATC clearance issued. PF admitted to being confused/distracted by the conformal nature of the svs display leading to further loss of situational awareness. Pm went heads down before insuring the descent from 10;000 to 9;000 was properly initiated by the PF.human performance factors: the crew was well rested and flying during normal daylight wakeful hours. Both pilots have been with the company less than 1 year. PF has little flying experience outside of USAF operations and is still adjusting to civilian operations/procedures. Task saturation diminished situational awareness for both PF and pm.the event is being reviewed within our [company safety department]. Procedures will be reviewed and corrective actions will be taken to increase situational awareness and decrease workload during approaches.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A GLF5 First Officer (FO) reported the Captain experienced several altitude deviations on approach that the FO felt were caused at least in part by the use of a synthetic vision system.

Narrative: After being cleared direct to AVDIH the RNAV (GPS) Z Runway 2 IF at GPI by Salt Lake Center we were cleared from 10;000 MSL to maintain 9;000 MSL until AVDIH; report established; cleared RNAV (GPS) Z Runway 2 approach. We opted to use the IF vs making a 180 degree course reversal over the IAF KILLY due to higher terrain over KILLY and the complexity of the course reversal. We did not anticipate the 9;000 MSL altitude assignment over AVDIH (published at 7;000 MSL); however; we had ample time/distance to safely get to the LPV Glide Path altitude of 5;200 MSL over BINGQ the FAF.The pilot flying (PF) acknowledged 9;000 was set in the altitude pre-selector. I; as pilot monitoring (PM); went heads down to insure the FMS was properly programed for the straight in approach both laterally and vertically. We were in heading mode with LNAV armed; altitude captured at 10;000 with the autopilot on. PF disconnected the autopilot while I was heads down and unintentionally ballooned to 10;400. I called out the altitude deviation and commanded him to descend to 9;000 while nudging the yoke forward to prevent further altitude gain. We had to slow down and make configuration changes (flap/landing gear) during the descent to 9;000. While still hand flying; the PF failed to maintain 9;000 until AVDIH but descended to 8;800 initially. Again; I called out the deviation and commanded him to maintain 9;000. We intercepted the final approach course outside of AVDIH and LNAV later guidance was captured/used.After crossing AVDIH; we then descended to intercept the VGP and crossed the FAF at the appropriate altitude. The rest of the approach continued normally.There were no terrain or traffic conflicts.Contributing factors: PF was using the synthetic vision system display. Although he had completed simulator training with the equipment within the previous 6 months; he did not have a lot of actual experience using the equipment in the plane. We did not anticipate being 2;000 feet above the IF altitude when we were cleared for the approach. The arrival direction would have made the IAF to IF course reversal difficult; but would have given us more time to descend to the IF altitude. PF did not have the correct vertical situational awareness for the ATC clearance issued. PF admitted to being confused/distracted by the conformal nature of the SVS display leading to further loss of situational awareness. PM went heads down before insuring the descent from 10;000 to 9;000 was properly initiated by the PF.Human performance factors: The crew was well rested and flying during normal daylight wakeful hours. Both pilots have been with the company less than 1 year. PF has little flying experience outside of USAF operations and is still adjusting to civilian operations/procedures. Task saturation diminished situational awareness for both PF and PM.The event is being reviewed within our [company safety department]. Procedures will be reviewed and corrective actions will be taken to increase situational awareness and decrease workload during approaches.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.