Narrative:

Since we departed; we were told to do 310 KTS or better all the way into bos. Once we were switched to the final approach controller; she was giving us vectors and told us to maintain 250 KTS until advised and that it would be a short approach. We maintained 250 KTS until we were told to maintain 200 KTS or better and we were cleared for the visual approach into runway 27.as we were trying to slow down and get configured; I made a comment to first officer. I said; 'we may have to go around.' he understood that I was calling for a go-around. He raised the flaps from 3 to 2. Then his hand was over the landing gear lever and he made a comment that we did not have positive rate to raise the gear. At the same time; I called for flaps 5. That is when we both finally realized that we were not on the same page. He moved the flaps to 5 and I performed a normal landing in bos.because we were below 1;500 and above 1;000 feet; I decided to finish the configuration of the aircraft. Looking back at it; I should have just abandoned the approach and performed a go-around and just come back in and reconfigured. Allowing to be rushed into a visual approach and miscommunication with my first officer. The misunderstanding started because of my comment about a go-around during a very high workload moment.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB190 flight crew describes a miscommunication during approach during which the Captain states 'We may have to go around; flaps 5' (full). The First Officer hears go around; flaps 2 and selects 2 then asks about the gear. At this point the Captain conveys that he intends to land; flaps 5 is selected and the unstable approach is continued to landing.

Narrative: Since we departed; we were told to do 310 KTS or better all the way into BOS. Once we were switched to the final approach controller; she was giving us vectors and told us to maintain 250 KTS until advised and that it would be a short approach. We maintained 250 KTS until we were told to maintain 200 KTS or better and we were cleared for the visual approach into Runway 27.As we were trying to slow down and get configured; I made a comment to FO. I said; 'We may have to go around.' He understood that I was calling for a go-around. He raised the flaps from 3 to 2. Then his hand was over the landing gear lever and he made a comment that we did not have positive rate to raise the gear. At the same time; I called for flaps 5. That is when we both finally realized that we were not on the same page. He moved the flaps to 5 and I performed a normal landing in BOS.Because we were below 1;500 and above 1;000 feet; I decided to finish the configuration of the aircraft. Looking back at it; I should have just abandoned the approach and performed a go-around and just come back in and reconfigured. Allowing to be rushed into a visual approach and miscommunication with my FO. The misunderstanding started because of my comment about a go-around during a very high workload moment.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.