Narrative:

I had the opportunity to use for the first time the new 75 taxi without final weights procedure and the new before takeoff checklist. This new checklist and procedures are completely unsafe and a step back in time. The taxi checklist was eliminated in order to have the first officer more engaged in taxiing in order to reduce runway and taxiway incursions. Now we decided to put all the garbage back into a checklist and have it done right before we takeoff. I watched my very experienced first officer flip through multiple pages in the FMC and multiple pieces of paper in order to locate all the information that need to be read on the before takeoff checklist. This took a number of minutes where he was completely out of the loop and of absolute no use to me in the safe taxiing of the aircraft. Basically he was no use to me in taxiing; and I was of no use to him in confirming all the information he was reading. I found myself just saying 'set' in order for us to get through all the words and numbers that were being thrown at me. I finally stopped on the taxiway in order to make sure the aircraft was safe and configured correctly. Once the checklist was complete; we continued our taxi. I feel that having to stop on a taxiway on a clear VFR day in order to run a checklist is a clear indicator that the procedure and checklist are not practical; have no basis in human factors; and is completely unsafe. This also shows a lack of professionalism on the part of our airline. What if it was night; a congested taxi; unfamiliar airport; new first officer; single engine taxi; etc. Basically I would never utilize this procedure. I would push back; set the brake; run the 'after start checklist' followed by the 'before takeoff checklist' up to the line; before I would call for taxi.I also cannot understand why there was mandatory cbt training for [other aircraft types in our] fleet; but it was optional for the 75?it is clear that this new procedure and checklist change have nothing to do with standardization and safety; but has everything to do with load plannings inability to get accurate weights to the aircraft in a timely manner.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B757 Captain questioned his Company's new Before Takeoff Checklist procedure which takes the First Officer's full attention during taxi; leaving the Captain solo while taxiing for takeoff.

Narrative: I had the opportunity to use for the first time the new 75 taxi without final weights procedure and the new Before Takeoff Checklist. This new checklist and procedures are completely unsafe and a step back in time. The taxi checklist was eliminated in order to have the FO more engaged in taxiing in order to reduce runway and taxiway incursions. Now we decided to put all the garbage back into a checklist and have it done right before we takeoff. I watched my very experienced FO flip through multiple pages in the FMC and multiple pieces of paper in order to locate all the information that need to be read on the Before Takeoff Checklist. This took a number of minutes where he was completely out of the loop and of absolute no use to me in the safe taxiing of the aircraft. Basically he was no use to me in taxiing; and I was of no use to him in confirming all the information he was reading. I found myself just saying 'SET' in order for us to get through all the words and numbers that were being thrown at me. I finally stopped on the taxiway in order to make sure the aircraft was safe and configured correctly. Once the checklist was complete; we continued our taxi. I feel that having to stop on a taxiway on a clear VFR day in order to run a checklist is a clear indicator that the procedure and checklist are not practical; have no basis in human factors; and is completely unsafe. This also shows a lack of professionalism on the part of our airline. What if it was night; a congested taxi; unfamiliar airport; new FO; single engine taxi; etc. Basically I would never utilize this procedure. I would push back; set the brake; run the 'After Start Checklist' followed by the 'Before Takeoff Checklist' up to the LINE; before I would call for taxi.I also cannot understand why there was mandatory CBT training for [other aircraft types in our] fleet; but it was optional for the 75?It is clear that this new procedure and checklist change have nothing to do with standardization and safety; but has everything to do with Load Plannings inability to get accurate weights to the aircraft in a timely manner.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.