Narrative:

The incident occurred during the landing phase on runway 36R. We had our right thrust reverser on MEL and my captain mentioned on the approach briefing that he would only deploy the left side thrust reverser. As we were on final approach I mentioned to him as a last minute reminder that the right side thrust reverser was on MEL. As we touched down I could see in my peripheral vision the left thrust lever being pulled back into the shutdown position. As I looked down to confirm this; I noticed from the gauges that the left engine was in fact shutting down. I mentioned this to the flying pilot and asked what had happened. After some confusion; we taxied off the high speed taxiway onto the ramp while checking for any abnormalities of the engine gauges. A few seconds later; ramp control advised us 'we noticed some white smoke coming out of your engine on the rollout'. We acknowledged that statement; taxied to the gate; shut down the right engine and contacted company maintenance. This job develops a repetitive nature from day to day operations and anything that is abnormal to that nature can serve as a big distraction. With any abnormal op or MEL extra care and vigilance must be exercised to avoid a dangerous situation by not meeting the demands required. For example; during the landing phase the majority of our attention is placed outside the aircraft; so the pilot flying relies on muscle memory and specific habits such as deploying both thrust reversers. To change or go against those strong habit formations would cause a big distraction especially during critical phases of flight and ultimately reduce safety. A more thorough briefing in the future will help in situations like this.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CRJ-200 Captain shut the left engine down during the landing roll because after guarding its inoperative thrust reverser lever; 'muscle memory' combined with a pre-landing discussion about the inoperative thrust reverser allowed him to unconsciously move the thrust reverser to cutoff after guarding it.

Narrative: The incident occurred during the landing phase on Runway 36R. We had our right thrust reverser on MEL and my captain mentioned on the approach briefing that he would only deploy the left side thrust reverser. As we were on final approach I mentioned to him as a last minute reminder that the right side thrust reverser was on MEL. As we touched down I could see in my peripheral vision the left thrust lever being pulled back into the shutdown position. As I looked down to confirm this; I noticed from the gauges that the left engine was in fact shutting down. I mentioned this to the flying pilot and asked what had happened. After some confusion; we taxied off the high speed taxiway onto the ramp while checking for any abnormalities of the engine gauges. A few seconds later; ramp control advised us 'we noticed some white smoke coming out of your engine on the rollout'. We acknowledged that statement; taxied to the gate; shut down the right engine and contacted company maintenance. This job develops a repetitive nature from day to day operations and anything that is abnormal to that nature can serve as a big distraction. With any abnormal op or MEL extra care and vigilance must be exercised to avoid a dangerous situation by not meeting the demands required. For example; during the landing phase the majority of our attention is placed outside the aircraft; so the pilot flying relies on muscle memory and specific habits such as deploying both thrust reversers. To change or go against those strong habit formations would cause a big distraction especially during critical phases of flight and ultimately reduce safety. A more thorough briefing in the future will help in situations like this.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.