Narrative:

I noticed the assist bottle at door 1L lower than minimum recommendation. I then looked at all 4 doors which also were lower than required for aircraft airworthiness. I contacted the captain to contact mechanics and verify pressure on all doors. C/south (customer service) came onboard and asked if he could board. The pilot; not putting two and two together said yes. I interjected and said that they may have to fill door 1L and it was the only egress door available. The pilot agreed and we held boarding until mechanics could verify pressure on all doors. Initially; the mechanic came onboard and began to tell me that it was not my job (onboard - as he wrote on the release later). The mechanic (who in my opinion was not familiar with the system; dismissed the issue (implying it would take over 2 hours to fill all bottle - when I know in fact; it takes about 10 minutes for each bottle; by saying all doors were good). Something that is not only irresponsible; but criminal and his license should be suspended for dismissing some sensitive item and signing off on an item in which was not good to fly. At that time; the captain with knowledge of aircraft maintenance; became intrigued as new to the airbus (previous boeing pilot). He asked me and I explained how the temperature gauge and the table all plays a part on determine which level each door bottle should be. He then grabbed his calculator and a flash light and proceeded to examine the door himself. He then looked at all 4 doors and agreed that they were below minimum. Since the mechanic at this time had already signed off as good to fly. The captain called maintenance and advised that they needed to bring him the table indicating the aircraft was good to fly. About 1/2 hour later; three mechanics came on board with the specifications on the doors. The pilots and mechanics discussed the gauge and soon it was clear that all 3 mechanics did not know how to read the gauge and were seeing pressure above of what it was - I have pictures. The pilot noticed that they could not agree; and drew a picture of the gauge and proceeded to explain how the mechanics were not reading the gauge accurately. They did not agree and left the aircraft. Not saying anything; when the captain inquire they did not respond. Later on; the captain called [operations] again and had to refuse the aircraft. The mechanics never came back. A problem that could have been resolved in 1 hour was now over 105 minutes later. Pilot from the pilots' office came in and the captain explained the problem. Later the captain asked the first officer to look at the gauge and see if he would agree with the needle marking. The first officer looked at the gauge and also confirmed that in fact the needle was what it was told to the mechanics. Ops found us another plane. What transpired next is not only irresponsible but also criminal. By now C/south; and ops had changed shift and this is the only thing I would say made they think the aircraft was air worthlessness. Ops scheduled the aircraft to fly to [another destination]; now; mechanics had already signed off on the aircraft and done nothing else but disappearing. Customer service were new and they had no idea on what was going on. The captain told the new captain of the problem. But since we left; we can only hope the new pilot convinced the mechanics to fill the assist bottles. Later we checked and found out that the aircraft left. We did not know if it was fixed or left be. The negligence of these mechanics caused a chain reaction of failures that could cost someone's lives some day and for that reason all three should be reprimanded for their negligence and lack of knowledge on this aircraft.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Mechanics and Captain disagreed about the gauge display for the exit doors' pneumatic charge. Different aircraft assigned.

Narrative: I noticed the assist bottle at door 1L lower than minimum recommendation. I then looked at all 4 doors which also were lower than required for aircraft airworthiness. I contacted the captain to contact mechanics and verify pressure on all doors. C/S (Customer Service) came onboard and asked if he could board. The pilot; not putting two and two together said yes. I interjected and said that they may have to fill door 1L and it was the only egress door available. The pilot agreed and we held boarding until mechanics could verify pressure on all doors. Initially; the mechanic came onboard and began to tell me that it was not my job (onboard - as he wrote on the release later). The mechanic (who in my opinion was not familiar with the system; dismissed the issue (implying it would take over 2 hours to fill all bottle - when I know in fact; it takes about 10 minutes for each bottle; by saying all doors were good). Something that is not only irresponsible; but criminal and his license should be suspended for dismissing some sensitive item and signing off on an item in which was not good to fly. At that time; the captain with knowledge of aircraft maintenance; became intrigued as new to the Airbus (previous Boeing pilot). He asked me and I explained how the temperature gauge and the table all plays a part on determine which level each door bottle should be. He then grabbed his calculator and a flash light and proceeded to examine the door himself. He then looked at all 4 doors and agreed that they were below minimum. Since the mechanic at this time had already signed off as good to fly. The captain called maintenance and advised that they needed to bring him the table indicating the aircraft was good to fly. About 1/2 hour later; three mechanics came on board with the specifications on the doors. The pilots and mechanics discussed the gauge and soon it was clear that ALL 3 mechanics did not know how to read the gauge and were seeing pressure above of what it was - I have pictures. The pilot noticed that they could not agree; and drew a picture of the gauge and proceeded to explain how the mechanics were not reading the gauge accurately. They did not agree and left the aircraft. Not saying anything; when the captain inquire they did not respond. Later on; the captain called [operations] again and had to refuse the aircraft. The mechanics never came back. A problem that could have been resolved in 1 hour was now over 105 minutes later. Pilot from the pilots' office came in and the captain explained the problem. Later the captain asked the first officer to look at the gauge and see if he would agree with the needle marking. The first officer looked at the gauge and also confirmed that in fact the needle was what it was told to the mechanics. Ops found us another plane. What transpired next is not only irresponsible but also criminal. By now C/S; and Ops had changed shift and this is the only thing I would say made they think the aircraft was air worthlessness. Ops scheduled the aircraft to fly to [another destination]; now; mechanics had already signed off on the aircraft and done nothing else but disappearing. Customer Service were new and they had no idea on what was going on. The captain told the new captain of the problem. But since we left; we can only hope the new pilot convinced the mechanics to fill the assist bottles. Later we checked and found out that the aircraft left. We did not know if it was fixed or left be. The negligence of these mechanics caused a chain reaction of failures that could cost someone's lives some day and for that reason all three should be reprimanded for their negligence and lack of knowledge on this aircraft.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.