Narrative:

My pre-acceptance weather check indicated clear and 10 miles visibility at cvh. I accepted the flight and completed all the preflight paperwork. On the way out to the aircraft we noticed there was a layer overhead. We discussed this on the drive; commenting it was unusual based on what I had seen on my weather check. Because of the two 'clear' reportings; I didn't think this layer would impede our take-off. We launched but on climb out I ran into the bottom of the cloud layer at about 550 feet MSL. I descended back to 500; and since visibility was not an issue; continued to cvh; focused on getting to the destination. My passenger expressed concern about the clouds; to which I responded I was at 500 feet in the clear; and fully expected the weather to improve as we got closer to the airport. My passenger then expressed a concern about making contact and not being able to get to our destination by air; necessitating a ground transport. I told passenger my expectations for the weather and that I would double check the weather at our next destination before we got to the rendezvous so we could alleviate that concern before landing. About halfway to cvh the weather broke completely; and was in fact clear and 10 as reported. I double checked the weather report for our next destination and relayed it. They were also reporting clear and 10. On departure from cvh I climbed to 2500 feet MSL and went direct. There was a cloud layer on the other side of the range; but I was well above it at 2500 feet. Destination ATIS was still reporting clear; which I confirmed with the tower controller as soon as I made contact. The cloud layer ended well before our destination; allowing a normal descent to landing.when we returned to the aircraft after dropping off our passenger; the reported weather at E16 was 400 overcast; so we shifted to the [alternate] ramp for fuel and to wait for the weather to clear. I called the E16 ASOS by phone and it was reporting an 800 feet overcast layer. We launched and returned to base. By the time I arrived; I was level at 800 feet MSL and well below the cloud deck. I landed and turned over to the day pilot.in hindsight; my most grievous error was that I did not cancel the flight and return to base as soon as I realized I didn't have the 800 feet ceiling required by section 135.609 of the fars; regardless of the visibility. I realize the client's issues was not our issue despite my confidence in better weather ahead. And while I felt comfortable with continuing; I realize that decision was not within my purview to make. This lesson has been learned and will not be repeated. There was also a crew coordination issue present that was not resolved by any crewmember; myself included. As explained above; I felt like I had addressed the concerns expressed by the passenger in the back; though I believe there were other concerns that were not voiced and only came to light after our post-flight debrief. The relatively new crew member in the front seat; whether because of passenger inexperience or lack of knowledge; contributed nothing to the discussion; either in the air or during the post-flight debrief. I have told my students for years I believe communication is the most important skill of crew coordination and while I thought I was addressing the concerns of the crew; I realize I should have taken an operational pause; stepped back from my focus on getting to the passenger; and actually had a discussion with the crew about their concerns and fears.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A helicopter pilot departed after a weather review indicated clear and greater than 10 miles visibility but entered a cloud layer at 550 feet. He descended to 500 feet and continued toward the destination where the weather was in fact clear.

Narrative: My pre-acceptance weather check indicated clear and 10 miles visibility at CVH. I accepted the flight and completed all the preflight paperwork. On the way out to the aircraft we noticed there was a layer overhead. We discussed this on the drive; commenting it was unusual based on what I had seen on my weather check. Because of the two 'clear' reportings; I didn't think this layer would impede our take-off. We launched but on climb out I ran into the bottom of the cloud layer at about 550 feet MSL. I descended back to 500; and since visibility was not an issue; continued to CVH; focused on getting to the destination. My passenger expressed concern about the clouds; to which I responded I was at 500 feet in the clear; and fully expected the weather to improve as we got closer to the airport. My passenger then expressed a concern about making contact and not being able to get to our destination by air; necessitating a ground transport. I told passenger my expectations for the weather and that I would double check the weather at our next destination before we got to the rendezvous so we could alleviate that concern before landing. About halfway to CVH the weather broke completely; and was in fact clear and 10 as reported. I double checked the weather report for our next destination and relayed it. They were also reporting Clear and 10. On departure from CVH I climbed to 2500 feet MSL and went direct. There was a cloud layer on the other side of the range; but I was well above it at 2500 feet. Destination ATIS was still reporting clear; which I confirmed with the Tower Controller as soon as I made contact. The cloud layer ended well before our destination; allowing a normal descent to landing.When we returned to the aircraft after dropping off our passenger; the reported weather at E16 was 400 Overcast; so we shifted to the [alternate] ramp for fuel and to wait for the weather to clear. I called the E16 ASOS by phone and it was reporting an 800 feet Overcast layer. We launched and returned to base. By the time I arrived; I was level at 800 feet MSL and well below the cloud deck. I landed and turned over to the Day pilot.In hindsight; my most grievous error was that I did not cancel the flight and return to base as soon as I realized I didn't have the 800 feet ceiling required by section 135.609 of the FARs; regardless of the visibility. I realize the client's issues was not our issue despite my confidence in better weather ahead. And while I felt comfortable with continuing; I realize that decision was not within my purview to make. This lesson has been learned and will not be repeated. There was also a crew coordination issue present that was not resolved by any crewmember; myself included. As explained above; I felt like I had addressed the concerns expressed by the passenger in the back; though I believe there were other concerns that were not voiced and only came to light after our post-flight debrief. The relatively new crew member in the front seat; whether because of passenger inexperience or lack of knowledge; contributed nothing to the discussion; either in the air or during the post-flight debrief. I have told my students for years I believe Communication is the most important skill of Crew Coordination and while I thought I was addressing the concerns of the crew; I realize I should have taken an operational pause; stepped back from my focus on getting to the passenger; and actually had a discussion with the crew about their concerns and fears.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.