Narrative:

While parking at gate xx; the automated parking guidance and the marshaller parking guidance (should not have had both; should be one or the other) were not in agreement. Indeed; auto-guidance and marshaller guidance were one-eighty out. Furthermore; marshaller guidance was entirely non-standard signals. Indeed; none of the marshaller's signals were standard. Both first officer and I noted the guidance (auto versus human) discrepancy; and the lack of signal standardization. Situation did not inspire confidence. Prudence dictated 'stop the jet'. We stopped the jet; set parking brake; and contacted ramp. We advised ramp that marshaller guidance and auto guidance were not in agreement. Ramp directed us to shutdown engines and await tow-in. We did so. Shortly thereafter; another aircraft impacted our right horizontal stabilizer with its left winglet. We briefed flight attendants and made calming pas to passengers. We assisted maintenance; over interphone; in separating the two aircraft; by restoring hydraulic pressure; applying full nose-up trim; and applying full aft yoke. As a post-script; when checking in on crew communication system (ccs) this/following morning; I received a ccs message to contact ops. I did so. The person identified himself as a 'maintenance liaison' in ops. He advised me that in the last week; three maintenance tow-ins had reported erroneous auto-guidance at gate xx. He stated he had reported the erroneous gate xx auto-guidance up-channel.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B757 stopped short of the gate during taxi in because the autoparking and Marshaller gave conflicting directions. While waiting for a tow in; a another aircraft's ground crew pushed their aircraft to where it's winglet struck the B757's horizontal stabilizer.

Narrative: While parking at gate XX; the automated parking guidance and the marshaller parking guidance (should not have had both; should be one or the other) were not in agreement. Indeed; auto-guidance and marshaller guidance were one-eighty out. Furthermore; marshaller guidance was entirely non-standard signals. Indeed; none of the marshaller's signals were standard. Both First Officer and I noted the guidance (auto versus human) discrepancy; and the lack of signal standardization. Situation did not inspire confidence. Prudence dictated 'stop the jet'. We stopped the jet; set parking brake; and contacted Ramp. We advised Ramp that marshaller guidance and auto guidance were not in agreement. Ramp directed us to shutdown engines and await tow-in. We did so. Shortly thereafter; another aircraft impacted our right horizontal stabilizer with its left winglet. We briefed Flight Attendants and made calming PAs to passengers. We assisted Maintenance; over interphone; in separating the two aircraft; by restoring hydraulic pressure; applying full nose-up trim; and applying full aft yoke. As a post-script; when checking in on Crew Communication System (CCS) this/following morning; I received a CCS message to contact Ops. I did so. The person identified himself as a 'maintenance liaison' in Ops. He advised me that in the last week; three maintenance tow-ins had reported erroneous auto-guidance at Gate XX. He stated he had reported the erroneous Gate XX auto-guidance up-channel.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.