Narrative:

On the day in question (when the first officer found himself even closer to the airport--almost overhead at 8000') when approach turned us downwind, believing that with a little information we could better plan our approach, I asked, 'what # are we for landing?' I think I had to ask several times. When approach did answer, he said 'I haven't decided'--nothing more. I don't now if it was the words or the intonation that led me to believe that he was saying, 'I have everything under control, and I'll tell you what you need to know.' I must admit, however, that his response astonished and angered me. I said, 'well is it more than 10 or less than 10?', to which I got no answer. The first officer, who has less than a yr as first officer, was looking at me as if to ask, 'what do we do now, shall I stay clean or dirty up?' shortly thereafter we received a clearance to turn to 180 degrees (base leg). Our cleared altitude was 6000' and we were only 12 mi out. It now appeared that we would get a short approach, and we started to extend flaps in preparation for a rapid descent--when I heard 'I'm going to put you in a hold; we have 3 ahead of you and 4 behind you.' we therefore stayed clean and did not hurry the descent. We were then turned to 240 degrees and told to intercept the localizer at 4800' or above, cleared for the localizer only approach, call tower on 118.3. I rogered the clearance, then realized that we were very high (my crew members say that we were at 6000' at 9 mi from the field). When approach asked if we could make it down ok, I responded 'no, we will not accept that clearance--you will have to give us a 360 degree turn, or a hold, or something intelligent.' when he gave us a clearance using the wrong call, and then said he was sorry, I did say that I agreed. The clearance was to turn north and that we would be #5 for the approach. It sounded like a punishment clearance to me, but I did not comment. The controller said, 'maintain 180 KTS to the marker.' when he asked me how much we would be slowing, I said 'I haven't decided.' I called the approach controller supervisor when I got on the ground, and tried to explain to him that in such a situation the PIC needs certain information to plan a good approach. The second issue, I suspect, is a classic--missed communication. When I heard the controller say 'I am going to put you in a hold,' that wasn't what he said at all. He said 'hole.' he had noticed a gap in the arrs on final, and planned to put us in it. The supervisor said that since his involvement in the industry since 1960, he had never heard any facility use the expression 'I'm going to have to put you in a hold,' and he couldn't understand why I didn't understand the usage of the term 'hole,' as they use it all the time in san.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LGT FLT CREW BEING VECTORED TO APCH AT SAN HAS COMS MISUNDERSTANDING WITH APCH CTLR.

Narrative: ON THE DAY IN QUESTION (WHEN THE F/O FOUND HIMSELF EVEN CLOSER TO THE ARPT--ALMOST OVERHEAD AT 8000') WHEN APCH TURNED US DOWNWIND, BELIEVING THAT WITH A LITTLE INFO WE COULD BETTER PLAN OUR APCH, I ASKED, 'WHAT # ARE WE FOR LNDG?' I THINK I HAD TO ASK SEVERAL TIMES. WHEN APCH DID ANSWER, HE SAID 'I HAVEN'T DECIDED'--NOTHING MORE. I DON'T NOW IF IT WAS THE WORDS OR THE INTONATION THAT LED ME TO BELIEVE THAT HE WAS SAYING, 'I HAVE EVERYTHING UNDER CTL, AND I'LL TELL YOU WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW.' I MUST ADMIT, HOWEVER, THAT HIS RESPONSE ASTONISHED AND ANGERED ME. I SAID, 'WELL IS IT MORE THAN 10 OR LESS THAN 10?', TO WHICH I GOT NO ANSWER. THE F/O, WHO HAS LESS THAN A YR AS F/O, WAS LOOKING AT ME AS IF TO ASK, 'WHAT DO WE DO NOW, SHALL I STAY CLEAN OR DIRTY UP?' SHORTLY THEREAFTER WE RECEIVED A CLRNC TO TURN TO 180 DEGS (BASE LEG). OUR CLRED ALT WAS 6000' AND WE WERE ONLY 12 MI OUT. IT NOW APPEARED THAT WE WOULD GET A SHORT APCH, AND WE STARTED TO EXTEND FLAPS IN PREPARATION FOR A RAPID DSCNT--WHEN I HEARD 'I'M GOING TO PUT YOU IN A HOLD; WE HAVE 3 AHEAD OF YOU AND 4 BEHIND YOU.' WE THEREFORE STAYED CLEAN AND DID NOT HURRY THE DSCNT. WE WERE THEN TURNED TO 240 DEGS AND TOLD TO INTERCEPT THE LOC AT 4800' OR ABOVE, CLRED FOR THE LOC ONLY APCH, CALL TWR ON 118.3. I ROGERED THE CLRNC, THEN REALIZED THAT WE WERE VERY HIGH (MY CREW MEMBERS SAY THAT WE WERE AT 6000' AT 9 MI FROM THE FIELD). WHEN APCH ASKED IF WE COULD MAKE IT DOWN OK, I RESPONDED 'NO, WE WILL NOT ACCEPT THAT CLRNC--YOU WILL HAVE TO GIVE US A 360 DEG TURN, OR A HOLD, OR SOMETHING INTELLIGENT.' WHEN HE GAVE US A CLRNC USING THE WRONG CALL, AND THEN SAID HE WAS SORRY, I DID SAY THAT I AGREED. THE CLRNC WAS TO TURN N AND THAT WE WOULD BE #5 FOR THE APCH. IT SOUNDED LIKE A PUNISHMENT CLRNC TO ME, BUT I DID NOT COMMENT. THE CTLR SAID, 'MAINTAIN 180 KTS TO THE MARKER.' WHEN HE ASKED ME HOW MUCH WE WOULD BE SLOWING, I SAID 'I HAVEN'T DECIDED.' I CALLED THE APCH CTLR SUPVR WHEN I GOT ON THE GND, AND TRIED TO EXPLAIN TO HIM THAT IN SUCH A SITUATION THE PIC NEEDS CERTAIN INFO TO PLAN A GOOD APCH. THE SECOND ISSUE, I SUSPECT, IS A CLASSIC--MISSED COM. WHEN I HEARD THE CTLR SAY 'I AM GOING TO PUT YOU IN A HOLD,' THAT WASN'T WHAT HE SAID AT ALL. HE SAID 'HOLE.' HE HAD NOTICED A GAP IN THE ARRS ON FINAL, AND PLANNED TO PUT US IN IT. THE SUPVR SAID THAT SINCE HIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE INDUSTRY SINCE 1960, HE HAD NEVER HEARD ANY FAC USE THE EXPRESSION 'I'M GOING TO HAVE TO PUT YOU IN A HOLD,' AND HE COULDN'T UNDERSTAND WHY I DIDN'T UNDERSTAND THE USAGE OF THE TERM 'HOLE,' AS THEY USE IT ALL THE TIME IN SAN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.