Narrative:

There was a listed MEL associated with the flight that required maintenance (mx) action as well as a mx and flight crew 'follow up required' before each leg of flight. The system that was deferred and required action was the 'skin air outlet valve (extract valve)'; listed on the MEL. The required mx procedures had been performed at a previous time and at a previous location for the initial deferral. The ZZZ contract mechanic was summoned to the aircraft to perform the 'mx follow up required' which consisted of a 'aevc test' which was required to be performed before each flight. The captain relinquished his seat in the flight deck in order that the contract mechanic could attempt to perform the required mx action so that the flight may continue. It very soon became quite obvious to both the captain and myself that this contract mechanic had no knowledge whatsoever of the systems he was trying to test; nor any knowledge of how to access them. Nor was he able to follow the instructions that [company maintenance control had] emailed him in order to conduct the test. 3 specific incidents that stand out in my mind are the following:1. I had to verbally read the instructions to the contract mx and show him myself where the associated systems were displayed and how to read them. 2. We had to point out to the contract mx that the proper instructions to perform the follow up action were not in his possession and that he needed to contact [company maintenance control] for further guidance.3. I had to locate and point out to the contract mx myself where pertinent circuit breakers were in order to perform the follow up action because in each instance he had identified the wrong circuit breakers to perform the tests! Only after repeated attempts to communicate either with his superiors on the phone or with [company maintenance control] did another mechanic show up and together the 2 of them attempted to complete the follow up required mx action. And then; again; only with the help of the captain and myself did the test get completed accurately. We felt compelled to file this [report] because it occurred to us that the mx action would not have been conducted correctly had it not been for the input of the flight crew. And again; these are not overly complex operations being undertaken: reading printed instructions; following directions; identifying circuit breakers based on a letter and number printed on a breaker panel. None of that was being performed properly had the flight crew not intervened. In my humble opinion; this event could have been prevented had a capable and properly trained mx technician been at the aircraft to perform the required mx follow up action. These events took place over the course of approximately 45 minutes while we watched a grossly incompetent contract mx technician attempt to conduct a rather routine mx follow up. In contrast; the next tech in ZZZ1 conducted the follow up test in 5 minutes!!! I would suggest that [the company] more cautiously vet their contract mx staff and in the future instruct the flight crews to always be paying close attention what is being tested / deactivated / placarded in the cockpit as it pertains to contract mx in outstations.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An Airbus pilot described the frustration of the crew as they observed; and attempted to assist; an inexperienced contract maintenance technician perform a relatively simple system recheck required per an MEL.

Narrative: There was a listed MEL associated with the flight that required Maintenance (MX) action as well as a MX and Flight Crew 'Follow Up Required' before each leg of flight. The system that was deferred and required action was the 'Skin Air Outlet Valve (Extract Valve)'; listed on the MEL. The required MX procedures had been performed at a previous time and at a previous location for the initial deferral. The ZZZ Contract mechanic was summoned to the aircraft to perform the 'MX Follow Up Required' which consisted of a 'AEVC test' which was required to be performed before each flight. The Captain relinquished his seat in the flight deck in order that the Contract Mechanic could attempt to perform the required MX action so that the flight may continue. It very soon became quite obvious to both the Captain and myself that this Contract Mechanic had no knowledge whatsoever of the systems he was trying to test; nor any knowledge of how to access them. Nor was he able to follow the instructions that [company maintenance control had] emailed him in order to conduct the test. 3 specific incidents that stand out in my mind are the following:1. I had to verbally read the instructions to the Contract MX and show him myself where the associated systems were displayed and how to read them. 2. We had to point out to the Contract MX that the proper instructions to perform the follow up action were NOT in his possession and that he needed to contact [company maintenance control] for further guidance.3. I had to locate and point out to the Contract MX MYSELF where pertinent circuit breakers were in order to perform the follow up action because in each instance he had identified the WRONG CIRCUIT BREAKERS to perform the tests! Only after repeated attempts to communicate either with his superiors on the phone or with [company maintenance control] did another mechanic show up and together the 2 of them attempted to complete the follow up required MX action. And then; again; only with the help of the Captain and myself did the test get completed accurately. We felt compelled to file this [report] because it occurred to us that the MX action would not have been conducted correctly had it not been for the input of the flight crew. And again; these are NOT overly complex operations being undertaken: reading printed instructions; following directions; identifying circuit breakers based on a letter and number printed on a breaker panel. NONE of that was being performed properly had the flight crew not intervened. In my humble opinion; this event could have been prevented had a CAPABLE AND PROPERLY TRAINED MX TECHNICIAN been at the aircraft to perform the required MX follow up action. These events took place over the course of approximately 45 minutes while we watched a grossly incompetent Contract MX technician attempt to conduct a rather routine MX follow up. In contrast; the next tech in ZZZ1 conducted the follow up test in 5 MINUTES!!! I would suggest that [the company] more cautiously vet their contract MX staff and in the future instruct the flight crews to always be paying close attention what is being tested / deactivated / placarded in the cockpit as it pertains to Contract MX in outstations.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.