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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1296357 |
Time | |
Date | 201509 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | LSZH.Airport |
State Reference | FO |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Gulfstream Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | Taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | First Officer Pilot Not Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Flight Crew Multiengine |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75 Flight Crew Total 8100 Flight Crew Type 1525 |
Person 2 | |
Function | Pilot Flying Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Flight Crew Multiengine |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 55 Flight Crew Total 13260 Flight Crew Type 2200 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Deviation - Procedural FAR Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Ground Incursion Taxiway |
Narrative:
Taxiing to runway 32; our aircraft crossed taxiway red light bar on taxiway K located after crossing runway 28 en-route to runway 32 (for departure). Red light bar is utilized for sequencing aircraft order for departure (de-ice pads). We were taxiing from parking area 7; (and as per ground instructions following another aircraft). Through 3 previous ground frequency changes; we were instructed to continue to follow an aircraft ahead. At final ground frequency change (4th); I did not immediately tune to next frequency and 'possibly' missed instruction from ground controller to hold and the aircraft continued to taxi across the red bars. My mistake (pilot not flying); by not switching to ground immediately. (There were no other aircraft in the immediate area or any incident potential). At this time; I was heads down at that particular moment; as we had stopped the checklist prior to event (to cross active runway 28); and now continuing with the checklist; I had not noticed the red light bar. As I looked up the controller notified us that we were over the red light bar. Upon switching to the 4th ground control frequency; the controller advised we had crossed the red light bar and he would be required to file a report. The red light bar in this instance is utilized for sequencing purposes only (prior to the runway holding point) and the intent of the controllers was to put another aircraft (to our left down taxiway K) between us and the aircraft ahead (the controller informed us of that). The point where this occurred has 3 de-icing pads (to our left) which merge into one single lane to stage to the runway hold point for departure. The red light bar was on our taxiway (K); just clearing the runway (28). Never was 'safety' impacted as this red light bar is utilized for sequencing; as 4 entries merge into one (deicing area) into the runway hold point (staging area) and are utilized to stagger aircraft for departure. There was no incursion onto a runway or beyond any runway hold points. Lastly; I the pilot not flying; should have switched to ground control immediately after crossing the runway and not have been heads down at that point. I believe this would have prevented the crossing of the red bar by having two pilots' heads up and alert to these visual lighted markings.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: While taxiing for takeoff; Gulfstream crew had to switch to four different ground controllers. During the final frequency switch the crew crossed a hold line marked with a red light bar. New Controller notified of the error and redirected the crew.
Narrative: Taxiing to Runway 32; our aircraft crossed taxiway red light bar on taxiway K located after crossing Runway 28 en-route to Runway 32 (for departure). Red light bar is utilized for sequencing aircraft order for departure (de-ice pads). We were taxiing from parking area 7; (and as per ground instructions following another aircraft). Through 3 previous ground frequency changes; we were instructed to continue to follow an aircraft ahead. At final ground frequency change (4th); I did not immediately tune to next frequency and 'possibly' missed instruction from ground controller to hold and the aircraft continued to taxi across the red bars. My mistake (Pilot Not Flying); by not switching to ground immediately. (There were no other aircraft in the immediate area or any incident potential). At this time; I was heads down at that particular moment; as we had stopped the checklist prior to event (to cross active runway 28); and now continuing with the checklist; I had not noticed the red light bar. As I looked up the controller notified us that we were over the red light bar. Upon switching to the 4th ground control frequency; the controller advised we had crossed the red light bar and he would be required to file a report. The red light bar in this instance is utilized for sequencing purposes only (prior to the runway holding point) and the intent of the controllers was to put another aircraft (to our left down taxiway K) between us and the aircraft ahead (the controller informed us of that). The point where this occurred has 3 de-icing pads (to our left) which merge into one single lane to stage to the runway hold point for departure. The red light bar was on our taxiway (K); just clearing the runway (28). Never was 'safety' impacted as this red light bar is utilized for sequencing; as 4 entries merge into one (deicing area) into the runway hold point (staging area) and are utilized to stagger aircraft for departure. There was no incursion onto a runway or beyond any runway hold points. Lastly; I the Pilot Not Flying; should have switched to ground control immediately after crossing the runway and not have been heads down at that point. I believe this would have prevented the crossing of the red bar by having two pilots' heads up and alert to these visual lighted markings.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.