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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1300187 |
Time | |
Date | 201510 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700) |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Takeoff |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Checklists |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Not Flying First Officer |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
Upon starting takeoff roll; and thrust levers increased to takeoff power; we received an alert message for improper takeoff configuration. We aborted the takeoff roll at approximately 15-20 KTS and continued off the runway. We reset the trim and continued the flight with no further issues. The trim appeared to be just outside of the range for takeoff. I'm not sure if it was bumped after the trim was set during the appropriate checklist; or if it was something that was missed during the performance check.a few threats I can think of was both the captain and I had commented on how tired we were; we were delayed leaving the gate due to a maintenance swap; and we were trying to get back on schedule. As well; the way the new checklist procedures are written is; simply put; ridiculous. As far as I know; we are the only airline that has 'above the line/below the line.' the checklist is over complicated; and was designed to eliminate heads down activity. But what it has done is put the first officer; 'heads down' at a critical time; as we are taking the runway; making a radio call; and some of the time being transferred controls. There is simply no reason that I can come up with to need to be heads down as we take the runway. The only items that should wait; and can be completely eliminated from checklist; and be a procedure are runway heading verification; and lights. Everything else can be done holding short of the runway when you have time to verify that things are properly set. I also feel that the 'takeoff configuration okay' status message should be part of the 'before takeoff' checklist before the line if we feel it is so necessary to have an above/below the line checklist setup.the company should eliminate the above/below the line use in checklists. It is a set up for errors like this. I end up jump seating to and from work on a regular basis [with many other companies.] none of them have the above/below the line nonsense. When we take the runway for departure; all check lists should be completed; and we should be ready for flight. The way the training video is set up; if I remember correctly; specifically instructs the first officer to run the 'below the line' checklist as we line up. It's a set up for task saturation everywhere except the sim; where the checklist was designed.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A CRJ-700 Captain rejected that takeoff for the TAKEOFF CONFIG alert because of a miss set trim. The First Officer complained the new Takeoff Checklist forces heads down; task saturation operation before takeoff.
Narrative: Upon starting takeoff roll; and thrust levers increased to takeoff power; we received an alert message for improper takeoff configuration. We aborted the takeoff roll at approximately 15-20 KTS and continued off the runway. We reset the trim and continued the flight with no further issues. The trim appeared to be just outside of the range for takeoff. I'm not sure if it was bumped after the trim was set during the appropriate checklist; or if it was something that was missed during the performance check.A few threats I can think of was both the captain and I had commented on how tired we were; we were delayed leaving the gate due to a maintenance swap; and we were trying to get back on schedule. As well; the way the new checklist procedures are written is; simply put; ridiculous. As far as I know; we are the only airline that has 'above the line/below the line.' The checklist is over complicated; and was designed to eliminate heads down activity. But what it has done is put the FO; 'heads down' at a critical time; as we are taking the runway; making a radio call; and some of the time being transferred controls. There is simply no reason that I can come up with to need to be heads down as we take the runway. The only items that should wait; and can be completely eliminated from checklist; and be a procedure are runway heading verification; and lights. Everything else can be done holding short of the runway when you have time to verify that things are properly set. I also feel that the 'takeoff configuration okay' status message should be part of the 'before takeoff' checklist before the line if we feel it is so necessary to have an above/below the line checklist setup.The company should eliminate the above/below the line use in checklists. It is a set up for errors like this. I end up jump seating to and from work on a regular basis [with many other companies.] None of them have the above/below the line nonsense. When we take the runway for departure; all check lists should be completed; and we should be ready for flight. The way the training video is set up; if I remember correctly; specifically instructs the FO to run the 'below the line' checklist as we line up. It's a set up for task saturation everywhere except the sim; where the checklist was designed.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.