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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 130035 |
Time | |
Date | 198911 |
Day | Wed |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : nftf |
State Reference | FO |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Widebody, Low Wing, 3 Turbojet Eng |
Navigation In Use | Other |
Flight Phase | landing other |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time total : 15000 |
ASRS Report | 130035 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Events | |
Anomaly | incursion : runway |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : anomaly accepted |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
Aircraft type: widebody transport. Gross weight: approximately 358000 pounds. Aircraft plted by: first officer. Airport: fua'amotu, tonga; runway 11 used for landing. Runway 29/11 was lengthened toward the west. T-vasi shown on approach chart was in fact a horizontal bar type instead. WX was VFR and excellent. No runway markings were visible to indicate newly extended runway was not to be used. NOTAM indicated runway was to be opened 12/tue/89. Problem: aircraft flown by the first officer landed short of the threshold by approximately 300'. Captain's warning that the aircraft was going to T/D short was disagreed with by the first officer and the F/east, and was ignored. Captain felt that taking the aircraft away from the first officer at such a low altitude would have presented an even greater hazard. The captain knew that the runway, although not officially open, was safe (given the conditions) to land on. First officer had been to this airport recently and knew of the runway condition. First officer purposely ignored the captain's input in the short final phase. The first officer fully intended to land short, citing the shortness of the old runway. Contributing factors: new style of flying, called 'cockpit resource management,' seems to be misinterpreted by some flight crews to mean they can argue with the PIC. Insufficient system of briefing by dispatch office. NOTAM system should be improved. The captain, not having been to this airport as recently as the first officer (and given the fact that the F/east appeared to back what the first officer was saying), was hesitant in demanding that his instructions be followed.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ACR WDB LANDED ON A NEW RWY EXTENSION PRIOR TO OFFICIAL OPENING.
Narrative: ACFT TYPE: WDB. GROSS WT: APPROX 358000 LBS. ACFT PLTED BY: F/O. ARPT: FUA'AMOTU, TONGA; RWY 11 USED FOR LNDG. RWY 29/11 WAS LENGTHENED TOWARD THE W. T-VASI SHOWN ON APCH CHART WAS IN FACT A HORIZ BAR TYPE INSTEAD. WX WAS VFR AND EXCELLENT. NO RWY MARKINGS WERE VISIBLE TO INDICATE NEWLY EXTENDED RWY WAS NOT TO BE USED. NOTAM INDICATED RWY WAS TO BE OPENED 12/TUE/89. PROB: ACFT FLOWN BY THE F/O LANDED SHORT OF THE THRESHOLD BY APPROX 300'. CAPT'S WARNING THAT THE ACFT WAS GOING TO T/D SHORT WAS DISAGREED WITH BY THE F/O AND THE F/E, AND WAS IGNORED. CAPT FELT THAT TAKING THE ACFT AWAY FROM THE F/O AT SUCH A LOW ALT WOULD HAVE PRESENTED AN EVEN GREATER HAZARD. THE CAPT KNEW THAT THE RWY, ALTHOUGH NOT OFFICIALLY OPEN, WAS SAFE (GIVEN THE CONDITIONS) TO LAND ON. F/O HAD BEEN TO THIS ARPT RECENTLY AND KNEW OF THE RWY CONDITION. F/O PURPOSELY IGNORED THE CAPT'S INPUT IN THE SHORT FINAL PHASE. THE F/O FULLY INTENDED TO LAND SHORT, CITING THE SHORTNESS OF THE OLD RWY. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: NEW STYLE OF FLYING, CALLED 'COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT,' SEEMS TO BE MISINTERPRETED BY SOME FLT CREWS TO MEAN THEY CAN ARGUE WITH THE PIC. INSUFFICIENT SYS OF BRIEFING BY DISPATCH OFFICE. NOTAM SYS SHOULD BE IMPROVED. THE CAPT, NOT HAVING BEEN TO THIS ARPT AS RECENTLY AS THE F/O (AND GIVEN THE FACT THAT THE F/E APPEARED TO BACK WHAT THE F/O WAS SAYING), WAS HESITANT IN DEMANDING THAT HIS INSTRUCTIONS BE FOLLOWED.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.