Narrative:

I was conducting a training flight. The purpose of the flight was to practice a simulated single engine ILS approach and a simulated single engine go around. The student's flight instrument requested that I practice these procedures with his student. The student had 10 hours dual with his flight instrument in this aircraft. The student and I departed hwd VFR and proceeded to tracy intersection, an initial approach fix for livermore airport's ILS approach. En route to tracy intersection, I instructed the student to place on his head an IFR hood to simulate instrument flying conditions. Upon reaching tracy intersection, I contacted stockton approach to request a practice ILS instrument approach into livermore airport. Stockton approach acknowledged and issued an altitude restriction and radar vectors to the localizer final approach course. Nearing the final approach course, stockton approach issued a radar vector of 220 degrees and cleared us for the ILS approach. The student intercepted the localizer and proceeded inbound. Our position was approximately 10 NM from the airport. At this point, we performed and completed our prelndg checklist. Stockton approach advised us that radar services were terminated and to contact livermore tower. I acknowledged and contacted livermore tower, advising the controller we were inbound on the ILS approach and requested touch and go's upon completing the approach. As the student intercepted the G/south, I simulated engine failure on the left engine. The student promptly went through engine failure emergency procedures and correctly idented and verified the left engine as the 'failed' engine. I then set the left engine for '0 thrust' to simulate a feathered engine. At the OM, prelndg checklist procedures were repeated and I advised livermore tower of our position. The tower cleared us for a touch and go and instructed us to enter right traffic for runway 25R. Upon reaching the decision height, I instructed the student to initiate a simulated single engine go around. We were upwind when the tower informed us to squawk 1200 and to enter right traffic for touch and go on runway 25R. After turning downwind, we performed the prelndg checklist. The tower instructed us to make a short approach and instructed another aircraft on a long final for runway 25R to follow us. I acknowledged the tower and proceeded to make the short approach. At this point, the student started to have difficulty controling the airplane. I began to assist him and events began to happen quickly. The prelndg checklist was repeated on base and final. Everything to us appeared to be normal. It wasn't until we flared and began touching down that we realized the gear was not down and locked. I maintained control of the landing and performed emergency procedures to secure the airplane. The tower, realizing the situation as we touched down, instructed the other aircraft to go around. Once the situation was under control, events took place to remove the airplane from the runway. Tow truck operators and personnel used air bags to lift the airplane from the runway. The gear wheels were then extended and appeared to be locked in the down position. The airplane was then lowered to the runway. The airplane was then hand-towed to transient parking and tied down. The occurrence took place at xx:05 pm and took approximately 4 hours to remove the airplane from the runway and tie it down in the transient parking. The airport resumed normal operations. It is difficult for me to determine what exactly went wrong, since the events up till the T/D appeared to be normal. In talking with the other flight instrs at my FBO, I learned that the gear warning system (aural) was operating intermittently. I believe the system may have failed on the approach since it did not alert me. There was no indication from this system that there was a problem with the landing gear. As a multi-engine flight instrument, I teach my students to check for the visibility (3 green lights) and aural gear indicators on downwind, base and final. I believe if the system was operating properly, this occurrence would not have happened. Supplemental information from acn 130498: the tower cleared us to proceed right traffic 24R. When I was climbing I put the flaps up and landing gear, too. I remember where I was in downwind, when I said 'now I have to put landing gear down, and 10 degree of flaps.' I checked this with the instrument and I did it.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMA TWIN, TRAINING FOR MULTI-ENGINE INSTRUMENT RATING AND UNDER CONTROL OF TRAINEE, MAKES GEAR UP LNDG.

Narrative: I WAS CONDUCTING A TRNING FLT. THE PURPOSE OF THE FLT WAS TO PRACTICE A SIMULATED SINGLE ENG ILS APCH AND A SIMULATED SINGLE ENG GAR. THE STUDENT'S FLT INSTR REQUESTED THAT I PRACTICE THESE PROCS WITH HIS STUDENT. THE STUDENT HAD 10 HRS DUAL WITH HIS FLT INSTR IN THIS ACFT. THE STUDENT AND I DEPARTED HWD VFR AND PROCEEDED TO TRACY INTXN, AN INITIAL APCH FIX FOR LIVERMORE ARPT'S ILS APCH. ENRTE TO TRACY INTXN, I INSTRUCTED THE STUDENT TO PLACE ON HIS HEAD AN IFR HOOD TO SIMULATE INSTRUMENT FLYING CONDITIONS. UPON REACHING TRACY INTXN, I CONTACTED STOCKTON APCH TO REQUEST A PRACTICE ILS INSTRUMENT APCH INTO LIVERMORE ARPT. STOCKTON APCH ACKNOWLEDGED AND ISSUED AN ALT RESTRICTION AND RADAR VECTORS TO THE LOC FINAL APCH COURSE. NEARING THE FINAL APCH COURSE, STOCKTON APCH ISSUED A RADAR VECTOR OF 220 DEGS AND CLRED US FOR THE ILS APCH. THE STUDENT INTERCEPTED THE LOC AND PROCEEDED INBND. OUR POS WAS APPROX 10 NM FROM THE ARPT. AT THIS POINT, WE PERFORMED AND COMPLETED OUR PRELNDG CHKLIST. STOCKTON APCH ADVISED US THAT RADAR SVCS WERE TERMINATED AND TO CONTACT LIVERMORE TWR. I ACKNOWLEDGED AND CONTACTED LIVERMORE TWR, ADVISING THE CTLR WE WERE INBND ON THE ILS APCH AND REQUESTED TOUCH AND GO'S UPON COMPLETING THE APCH. AS THE STUDENT INTERCEPTED THE G/S, I SIMULATED ENG FAILURE ON THE LEFT ENG. THE STUDENT PROMPTLY WENT THROUGH ENG FAILURE EMER PROCS AND CORRECTLY IDENTED AND VERIFIED THE LEFT ENG AS THE 'FAILED' ENG. I THEN SET THE LEFT ENG FOR '0 THRUST' TO SIMULATE A FEATHERED ENG. AT THE OM, PRELNDG CHKLIST PROCS WERE REPEATED AND I ADVISED LIVERMORE TWR OF OUR POS. THE TWR CLRED US FOR A TOUCH AND GO AND INSTRUCTED US TO ENTER RIGHT TFC FOR RWY 25R. UPON REACHING THE DECISION HEIGHT, I INSTRUCTED THE STUDENT TO INITIATE A SIMULATED SINGLE ENG GAR. WE WERE UPWIND WHEN THE TWR INFORMED US TO SQUAWK 1200 AND TO ENTER RIGHT TFC FOR TOUCH AND GO ON RWY 25R. AFTER TURNING DOWNWIND, WE PERFORMED THE PRELNDG CHKLIST. THE TWR INSTRUCTED US TO MAKE A SHORT APCH AND INSTRUCTED ANOTHER ACFT ON A LONG FINAL FOR RWY 25R TO FOLLOW US. I ACKNOWLEDGED THE TWR AND PROCEEDED TO MAKE THE SHORT APCH. AT THIS POINT, THE STUDENT STARTED TO HAVE DIFFICULTY CTLING THE AIRPLANE. I BEGAN TO ASSIST HIM AND EVENTS BEGAN TO HAPPEN QUICKLY. THE PRELNDG CHKLIST WAS REPEATED ON BASE AND FINAL. EVERYTHING TO US APPEARED TO BE NORMAL. IT WASN'T UNTIL WE FLARED AND BEGAN TOUCHING DOWN THAT WE REALIZED THE GEAR WAS NOT DOWN AND LOCKED. I MAINTAINED CONTROL OF THE LNDG AND PERFORMED EMER PROCS TO SECURE THE AIRPLANE. THE TWR, REALIZING THE SITUATION AS WE TOUCHED DOWN, INSTRUCTED THE OTHER ACFT TO GO AROUND. ONCE THE SITUATION WAS UNDER CONTROL, EVENTS TOOK PLACE TO REMOVE THE AIRPLANE FROM THE RWY. TOW TRUCK OPERATORS AND PERSONNEL USED AIR BAGS TO LIFT THE AIRPLANE FROM THE RWY. THE GEAR WHEELS WERE THEN EXTENDED AND APPEARED TO BE LOCKED IN THE DOWN POS. THE AIRPLANE WAS THEN LOWERED TO THE RWY. THE AIRPLANE WAS THEN HAND-TOWED TO TRANSIENT PARKING AND TIED DOWN. THE OCCURRENCE TOOK PLACE AT XX:05 PM AND TOOK APPROX 4 HRS TO REMOVE THE AIRPLANE FROM THE RWY AND TIE IT DOWN IN THE TRANSIENT PARKING. THE ARPT RESUMED NORMAL OPS. IT IS DIFFICULT FOR ME TO DETERMINE WHAT EXACTLY WENT WRONG, SINCE THE EVENTS UP TILL THE T/D APPEARED TO BE NORMAL. IN TALKING WITH THE OTHER FLT INSTRS AT MY FBO, I LEARNED THAT THE GEAR WARNING SYS (AURAL) WAS OPERATING INTERMITTENTLY. I BELIEVE THE SYS MAY HAVE FAILED ON THE APCH SINCE IT DID NOT ALERT ME. THERE WAS NO INDICATION FROM THIS SYS THAT THERE WAS A PROB WITH THE LNDG GEAR. AS A MULTI-ENG FLT INSTR, I TEACH MY STUDENTS TO CHK FOR THE VIS (3 GREEN LIGHTS) AND AURAL GEAR INDICATORS ON DOWNWIND, BASE AND FINAL. I BELIEVE IF THE SYS WAS OPERATING PROPERLY, THIS OCCURRENCE WOULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 130498: THE TWR CLRED US TO PROCEED RIGHT TFC 24R. WHEN I WAS CLBING I PUT THE FLAPS UP AND LNDG GEAR, TOO. I REMEMBER WHERE I WAS IN DOWNWIND, WHEN I SAID 'NOW I HAVE TO PUT LNDG GEAR DOWN, AND 10 DEG OF FLAPS.' I CHKED THIS WITH THE INSTR AND I DID IT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.